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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I explore a two-
period economy with a three-tier hierarchy in which the principal without
full commitment decides how and when to motivate a productive intermedi-
ary (agent one) to privately sub-contract and collaborate with another agent
(agent two) on a project with uncertain quality. The dynamic moral hazard
problem arises due to the agents’ hidden e↵ort choice and the opportunity for
future work. Besides free riding, the agent one’s exclusion and over-investment
incentives need to be considered due to his private sub-contract option. Both
the dominant incentive constraint in the optimal short term contract and the
principal’s investment decision depend on the project’s value-cost ratio, the
level of synergy in the partnership and the amount of patience. In general,
the principal under-invests and stops earlier compared to the first-best out-
come. However, there exist scenarios in which agent one always over-invests
when the individual work is motivated, and the principal might compromise
to motivate a higher e↵ort level by over-investing relative to the static game,
especially if the synergy is positive but small and the project’s value-cost ratio
is medium. In a two-tier hierarchy, the principal can be weakly better o↵,
but the ine ciency caused by agent one’s private link to the other agent still
exists.
In the second chapter, I study how a principal motivates an uninformed
agent to learn about, and reveal, his quality through private experiments. The
principal commits to a reward scheme and she aims to assign the rewards to
correspond as closely as possible to the quality of the agent. To get a high
reward, the agent experiments privately and discloses the results selectively. I
show that the optimal reward scheme features an increasing step function: the
initial steps encourage a potential good type agent to continue experiments
vii
after early successes; the later steps are designed to deter a bad type agent
from over-experimentation after a failure, and the scheme becomes flat when
enough successes are reported. If the agent’s incentives to deviate from the
intended path of experimentation are weak, a one-step function is optimal: the
agent receives a bonus if he reports enough successes; otherwise, he only gets a
non-negative compensation. I characterise the conditions where the principal
achieves the same e ciency level relative to a public information environment.
The third chapter is an extension of the second chapter. I consider a
situation in which an uninformed agent persuades a principal for a high reward
through costly private experimentation. I show the existence of three types of
equilibria as well as their conditions: no-experiment equilibrium, separating
equilibria with learning and pooling equilibria with learning. The participation
threshold determines the upper bound of the entire set of equilibria, and the
over-experimentation determines the boundary between the separating and
pooling equilibria with learning. As the agent’s value-cost ratio or prior belief
increases, the set of separating equilibria with learning shrinks but the set of
pooling equilibria with learning expands. Moreover, when the agent can pre-
commit to report a specific number of successes to prove his quality, he tends
to commit to a number that is as small as possible.
viii
Chapter 1
Motivating Partnership in R&D
Projects
1.1 Introduction
Partnering and outsourcing are prevalent when firms and experts undertake
innovative projects. According to Hagedoorn (1996, 2002) and Narula and
Hagedoorn (1999), there is significant growth in inter-firm R&D partnering
since 1960: non-equity, contractual forms, such as joint R&D pacts and joint
development agreements, have become very important, and their share in the
total of partnerships has far exceeded that of joint ventures especially in high-
tech industry. The collaboration among researchers and experts is even more
common. Collaborators can use the synergy to boost the probability of a
project’s success, and improve profitability by sharing the risk and cost bur-
dens.
An investor is willing to encourage such collaboration if the benefit
from the synergistic e↵ect is high. However, the e↵ort level of the firm or
expert is normally private, as is his network, so the investor cannot directly
contract with all of his partners. Thus, the investor doesn’t know whether
the project is conducted by the individual work or via collaboration, in which
case she might over-pay for a low level of e↵ort. As a result, the following
questions arise: How does the investor motivate the private partnership via
the grand contract? when is motivating the partnership optimal? Does the
1
private partnership distort her investment decision and if so, how?
This chapter studies a simple three-tier hierarchy in a two-period econ-
omy, in which a principal without full commitment motivates agent one (inter-
mediary) to sub-contract with the other agent (agent two) and collaborate on
a risky project. The project’s quality is either good or bad which is initially
unknown, and only a good project can generate a single success with positive
probability after the agent(s) exert e↵ort. The agents make a binary e↵ort
decision, and, due to the synergy, the collaboration has a higher probability of
success relative to the individual attempt, given the project is good. There is
no direct link between the principal and the second agent, so she can only af-
fect agent one’s private decision about partnering through the grand contract
that she o↵ers.
The dynamic moral hazard problem arises due to the unobservable
choice of e↵ort and the lack of full commitment, in which the agents could po-
tentially manipulate the principal’s belief and distort e ciency through their
private learning. Given the presence of the future opportunity to work, pro-
crastination also increases the agency cost, in which the agent(s) hold an op-
timistic belief relative to the principal. Moreover, since agent one’s partnering
decision is also private, he has more channels and a higher incentive to deviate
from the principal’s goal. In the first place when the principal motivates the
partnership, agent one (intermediary) has a free-riding incentive and an exclu-
sion incentive. In the free-riding incentive, he can shirk and free-ride on agent
two’s e↵ort and save the cost, and agent two has the same incentive. Mean-
while, in the exclusion incentive, he can deviate to exclude the other agent
and work alone, and he can enjoy the large gain alone following success, such
that he can manipulate the principal’s and agent two’s beliefs at di↵erent level
even after a failure occurs. In the second case when the principal motivates the
individual work, agent one has an over-investment incentive besides shirking.
By doing so, he can boost the probability of success and his expected gain
in the current period. If a failure occurs, agent one might reject the second
opportunity due to pessimistic belief, even if the principal is still willing to
invest.
In this chapter, I characterise the principal’s optimal short term con-
tract in each period when motivating the partnership and the individual work
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respectively. The second period is equivalent to a static game as there is no
future opportunity to work, in which the level of synergy plays a crucial role
for determining the agent(s)’ dominant incentive. When the partnership is
motivated, agent one’s free-riding incentive dominates others for the positive
synergy case, and his exclusion incentive dominates for the small negative
synergy case1. In the first period, when the partnership is motivated, the con-
clusion is similar to the case above if the positive synergy is very large or the
synergy is negative. However, if the synergy is positive but small, in a high
enough quality project with a high value-cost ratio, the free-riding incentive
dominates only for a very impatient agent; for a su cient patient agent, the
exclusion incentive dominates. Moreover, there exist scenarios in which agent
one’s over-investment incentive is always violated when motivating the indi-
vidual work, and it would further distort the principal’s optimal investment
decision.
The principal’s optimal investment decision in the first period depends
on both amount of synergy and her patience level. The presence of the dynamic
moral hazard problem leads the optimal stopping threshold to be earlier and
the principal to under-invest relative to the first-best scenario. To reduce
to cost of deterring potential deviations, the principal would optimally under-
invest by motivating a weakly lower e↵ort level, or even shut down the window
of investing in the first period. When the synergy is positive and very large,
she would motivate the partnership if the quality of the project is very high
or very low. If the quality is medium, only an impatient principal would
motivate the partnership; otherwise, she will withhold the investment in the
first period. When the negative synergy is small, the principal would motivate
the partnership if the quality is very high or the quality is medium and she is
very impatient; otherwise, she would only motivate the individual work if she is
su ciently impatient, and not invest if she is very patient. When the synergy is
positive but small, a similar conclusion can be achieved in the most scenarios,
however, there also exist scenarios in which the principal compromises to a
higher e↵ort level relative to the decision in the static game. This happens
when agent one’s over-investment incentive is violated in a project with a
1In the small negative synergy case, the partnership can still achieve a higher probability
of success relative to individual work.
3
medium value-cost ratio. In this case, the principal compromises to motivate
partnership if she is impatient, thus she over-invests relative to the static game,
which is where the ine ciency arises.
In a two-tier hierarchy, the principal is better o↵, as she can directly
contract with both of the agents and the exclusion incentive can be discarded.
Due to the presence of agent one’s private option of partnering, the over-
investment relative to the static game still exists, as well as the ine ciency
when the positive synergy is small.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 1.2 summarises
related literature; section 1.3 shows the model’s setup and first-best results;
the main results are in section 1.4, and Section 1.5 concludes. All the proofs
are in Appendix A.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter is closely related to the literature on strategic experimentation
and financing innovation. Bergemann and Hege (2005) consider optimal invest-
ing and stopping when financing an innovation project with unknown quality,
when the bargaining power is in the hands of an agent (entrepreneur) with no
full commitment, and Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2013) then consider the optimal
sharing rule of profit when a principal obtains the bargaining power with lim-
ited liability, given binary (fixed) investment choice from principal and e↵ort
level from the agent in each short-term contract. Compared to their work,
my work also focuses on the principal’s short-term contract, but in a scenario
with multiple agents, in which the principal cannot directly contract with both
agents and one of the agents behave as an intermediary contractor. Bonatti
and Ho¨ner (2011) consider collaboration among multiple agents who receive
constant and equal payment after success, where the e↵ort level path across
time at equilibrium path in the presence of free-riding, the opportunity to work
tomorrow, and the assistance of a deadline are discussed. In the contrast, in
this chapter as one of the agent can privately sub-contract with the other,
the exclusion incentive and over-investment incentive srise. Halac, Kartik and
Liu (2016) consider the single agent’s dynamic moral hazard problem with a
long term contract. By contrast, I consider the similar dynamic moral hazard
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problem in multiple agents without full commitment. Buisseret (2015) points
out the existence of over-investment behaviour compared to the first-best re-
sult in a single agent setting with continuous e↵ort choice. Compared to his
model, my work shows that in the multiple agents setting, the agent’s private
sub-contract option could lead to a result in which the principal might moti-
vate a higher e↵ort level compared to the static game, but still under-invests
compared to the first-best.
Since agent one plays the role of intermediary, this work is related to the
literature discussing hierarchic and decentralised contracts, where e ciency is
mainly considered. Melumad, Mookherjee and Riechelstein (1995) confirm
the conditions for providing additional incentive in delegated contracts, Sev-
erinov (2008) compares centralized, decentralized and hierarchic structure of
contract when agents obtain private information, and concludes that the opti-
mal form depends on the degree of complementarity/substitutability between
two agentss input. Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2001) model the one pe-
riod optimal incentive scheme with an intermediary and an agent with private
information, where there is no direct communication between principal and
agent, but they only consider the agent working on the task alone. When a
supervisor is introduced to monitor the private information of the agent, Faure-
Grimaud, La↵ont and Martimort (2003) show that acentralized and delegated
contract achieves the same outcome. In the context where intermediary work
jointly with other agents, Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo (1998), Sanchez
and Hortala-Vallve (2005) compare the e ciency of the two-tier and three-tier
hierarchies in a moral hazard environment. These works mainly focus on static
settings, whereas my work focuses on the hidden action in dynamic settings
with belief manipulation, which is missing in their work.
There are still other relevant papers. Gomes (2005) considers a multi-
lateral contracting dynamic game with externalities where a randomly chosen
agent, at every period, o↵ers contracts to an endogenously selected group of
agents. Compared to his model, my work discusses the ratchet e↵ect due to
the short-term contract and the over-investment compared to a static setting
due to the private sub-contract option. Watson (2013) discusses the general
property of contracting institutions, but he only focuses on the static setting.
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1.3 Model
1.3.1 Setup
In a two-period economy with dates 0 and 1, there is a risky project, a risk
neutral principal and two risk neutral agents. The quality of the project is
initially unknown and is either good or bad, and the common prior belief of
being good is p0 2 (0, 1). If the project is bad, it can never be successful and
yields a return zero. In contrast, if the project is good, a single success with
positive return R > 0 can be achieved with a positive probability, and this
probability depends on two agents’ e↵ort. In each period t, if the project is
good, the probability of success is
Pr (Success|Good) =  (e1,t + e2,t + ✓e1,te2,t) (1.3.1)
Where ei,t 2 {0, 1},   2 (0, 1) and ✓ 2 ( 1, 1 2   ). ei,t is the agent i’s binary
e↵ort level in period t, where i = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1.   measures the individual
contribution to the probability of success, and ✓ is the multiplier of synergy in
the partnership. A positive synergy exists when ✓   0, and the teamwork can
generate a higher probability of success compared to the sum of two agents’
individual contribution2. On the other hand, the synergy is negative when
 1 < ✓ < 0, but the probability is still higher in that partnership compared
to the case when only one agent works.
There is no direct link between the principal and agent two, thus she
cannot o↵er a contract to agent two directly. But agent one is linked to agent
two in his network. I assume the principal has no full commitment. In period
t, the principal publicly proposes a share of the project’s return to agent one,
!1,t 2 [0, 1]. As a prime contractor, agent one decides whether to o↵er a share
of his gain to agent two, !2,t 2 [0, 1], and this partnership and sub-contract
are not observable by the principal. If agent two accepts it, the two agents
simultaneously choose private e↵ort level ei,t; otherwise, agent one works alone.
The cost of e↵ort is C(ei,t) = cei,t, and the common discount factor is  , where
c > 0 and   2 [0, 1]. The timeline in period t is shown in Figure 1.1.
2✓ < 1 2   guarantees Pr(Success|Good) < 1.
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t=0
Principal proposes
!1,t to agent one
Agent one proposes
!2,t to agent two
Agents choose
ei,t
payo↵s are
realised
t=1
Figure 1.1: Timing in period t
The history in the first period is the null history. In the second period,
t = 1, the public history is h1 = (O0,!1,0), and the agent i’s private history
is hi1 = (O0,!1,0,!2,0, ei,0), where O0 is the output of the project in t = 0
and O0 2 {Success,No Sucess}. The game ends if the success is achieved in
the first period, and the posterior belief about the project’s quality now is
Pr(Good|Success) = 1. On the contrary, when success is not achieved, the
principal is more pessimistic about the project’s quality, and her posterior
belief pP1 is updated according to Bayes’ rule:
pP1 =
8<:Pr(Good|Teamwork,No Success) =
p0[1  (2+✓)]
1 p0 (2+✓) = p1
Pr(Good|One Works,No Success) = p0(1  )1 p0  = pˆ1
(1.3.2)
I also denote agent i’s private posterior belief by pi1 and pˆ
i
1 respectively in the
scenarios when agent two accepts the sub-contract and when he does not. Due
to the linearity, this setting is equivalent to the one in which the principal and
agent one o↵er a wage in the contracts without loss of generality. Agent i’s
payo↵ uit(p
i
t) and the principal’s profit ⇡t(p
P
t ) in period t can be written as:
u1t (p
1
t ) = p
1
t (1  !2,t)!1,t(e1,t + e2,t + ✓e1,te2,t) R  ce1,t
u2t (p
2
t ) = p
2
t!2,t!1,t(e1,t + e2,t + ✓e1,te2,t) R  ce2,t
⇡t(p
P
t ) = p
P
t (1  !1,t)(e1,t + e2,t + ✓e1,te2,t) R
(1.3.3)
1.3.2 First-Best Policy
In the first-best case, all actions are observable and contractable. Thus neither
of the agents have a moral hazard problem, and the posteriors of the principal
and the agents are consistent, pPt = p
i
t. In period t, the agent i should accept
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the contract and work if his continuation value U i(pit) is non-negative:
IRi,t : U
i
t (p
i
t) = u
i
t(p
i
t) +  
⇥
1  pit (e1,t + e2,t + ✓e1,te2,t)
⇤
U it+1(p
i
t+1)   0
(1.3.4)
Similarly, the principal would propose the grand contract if her continuation
value Vt(pPt ) is non-negative:
Vt(p
P
t ) = ⇡t(p
P
t ) +  
⇥
1  pPt  (e1,t + e2,t + ✓e1,te2,t)
⇤
Vt+1(p
P
t+1)   0 (1.3.5)
Since the posterior belief pPt shrinks after the failure, the principal’s continua-
tion value shrinks as well. This implies that she would only invest in a period
when her static profit from operating the project via a “partnership” or agent
one’s “individual work” is positive:
pP1  (2 + ✓)R  2c   0 or pPt  R  c   0 (1.3.6)
The contacts depend on the project’s the value-cost ratio and the belief about
its quality, which implies that the principal would not motivate the agent(s)
to operate the project as long as she is su ciently pessimistic and the re-
lation in (1.3.6) breaks down. Thus the socially e cient time to stop oper-
ating the project is reached when the posterior belief makes (1.3.6) binding,
which is denoted by PE. The properties of the first-best’s optimal contracts 
!P1,t(p
P
t ),!
P
2,t(p
P
t )
 
are characterised in Lemma 1.3.1.
Lemma 1.3.1. In the first-best, pE = min
n
2c
(2+✓) R ,
c
 R
o
such that, for pPt  
pE,
1) when a partnership is motivated,
 
!P1,t(p
P
t ),!
P
2,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
2c
(2+✓) RpPt
, 12
⌘
; when
the individual work is motivated,
 
!P1,t(p
P
t ),!
P
2,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
c
 RpPt
, 0
⌘
.
2) in the static game at t, the partnership always dominates the individual
work when the synergy is positive; when the synergy is negative, the partner-
ship dominates the individual work if Rc   1(1+✓) RpPt , and the individual work
dominates the partnership if Rc 2
h
1
 pPt
, 1
(1+✓) RpPt
⌘
.
In a partnership, the probability of success is higher when two agents
work, and the principal gains the extra benefit by pPt  (1 + ✓)R. However,
the cost is also higher, and she needs to pay more to the agents with c. The
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principal would prefer the partnership only if the extra benefit can cover the
extra cost.
The static game can be considered as the period in which the principal is
not going to invest anymore if the project fails, or when the principals is myopic
with   = 0. In the static game at t, when the synergy is positive, ✓ 2 ⇥0, 1 2    ,
the principal always prefers to motivate the partnership in period t if she is not
su ciently pessimistic, pPt   pE. This also implies that the project’s value-
cost ratio is high enough, Rc   2(2+✓) pPt . Now the principal proposes a grand
contract such that the prime contractor’s participation constraint binds. The
prime contractor, agent one, o↵ers half of his own gain to agent two to form
the partnership, and both of them work. On the other hand, when the synergy
is negative, ✓ 2   1,min 0, 1 2     , the principal’s choice varies at di↵erent
beliefs. In a project with a high value-cost ratio, Rc   1(1+✓) pPt , for the principal,
the collaboration is still more profitable compared to agent one working alone;
and she prefers to have agent one working alone if the belief shrinks such that
R
c <
1
(1+✓) RpPt
. The principal then proposes a share of the project’s return such
that agent one is indi↵erent between working alone and rejection. The prime
contractor would not propose a positive share to agent two. In a project with a
medium level of the value-cost ratio with Rc 2
⇣
1
 pPt
, 1
(1+✓) pPt
i
, the partnership
is dominated by to agent one working alone, as the extra benefit from the
partnership is fairly low. Thus the principal would motivate agent one to
work alone if she is still optimistic with pPt   pE.
In the two-period economy, the principal’s optimal plan at t = 0 is af-
fected by her patience, and its properties in the first-best are characterised
in Lemma 1.3.2, in which agent i’s optimal e↵ort level at t = 0 in the
first-best scenario is denoted by ePi,0. Thus
 
eP1,0(p0), e
P
1,0(p0)
 
= (1, 1) and 
eP1,0(p0), e
P
1,0(p0)
 
= (1, 0) represents the partnership, and the individual work
is motivated at t = 0. In the first best scenario, since the principal would only
invest in the project if her prior belief is higher than the e cient stopping
threshold, this Lemma only focuses on the case when p0   pE. This Lemma
also implies that the principal never delays the investment by withholding the
o↵er and only having the project be conducted at t = 1.
Lemma 1.3.2. In the first-best, at t=0, for p0   pE,
1) when the synergy is postive,
 
eP1,0(p0), e
P
2,0(p0)
 
= (1, 1);
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2) when the synergy is negative,
 
eP1,0(p0), e
P
2,0(p0)
 
= (1, 1) if Rc   1 2p0 (1+✓)p0 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)] ; 
eP1,0(p0), e
P
2,0(p0)
 
= (1, 0) if Rc 2
h
1
 p0
, 1(1+✓) p0
⌘
; if Rc 2
h
1
(1+✓) p0
, 1 2p0 (1+✓)p0 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)]
⌘
,
9 E 2 (0, 1) such that
 
eP1,0(p0), e
P
2,0(p0)
 
=
8<:(1, 1)   2
⇥
0,  E
⇤
(1, 0)   2   E, 1⇤ (1.3.7)
3) in the first-best, three-tier and two-tier contracting structures achieve the
same e ciency level.
When the partnership is formed at t = 0, the probability of success
is much higher than for the individual work, and the expected gain from the
current period is boosted. At the same time, however, once no success occurs,
the principal becomes more pessimistic, which lowers the expected gain in the
second period. Alternatively, she can withhold or invest less at beginning. By
doing so, her current expected gain now is reduced as the probability of success
is lower. However, she would not be too pessimistic after the first failure, which
leads the expected gain in the second period to be higher. Thus, the principal
would optimally make the trade-o↵ at t = 0.
Lemma 1.3.2.1) characterises the scenarios in which the principal’s de-
cision consists with her optimal choice in a static game with the same belief.
When the synergy is positive, the principal would always prefer to motivate
the collaboration at t = 0. This implies that the gain from boosting a higher
probability of success is large enough to cover the loss in the future due to a
pessimistic belief.
Lemma 1.3.2.2) shows that, if the synergy is negative and the project’s
quality is very high with Rc   1 2p0 (1+✓)p0 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)] > 1(1+✓) p1 , the principal still
prefers to motivate the partnership at t = 0, which is consistent with her choice
in the static game. This is because the project’s return is very high and the
principal doesn’t want to delay or withhold the investment. When the syn-
ergy is negative and the project’s value-cost ratio is low, Rc 2
h
1
 p0
, 1(1+✓) p0
⌘
,
the principal would prefer to motivate the individual work at t = 0, in which
case the principal’s extra gain from the partnership is not large enough to
cover the cost of supporting a higher level of e↵ort. As a result, she com-
promises on the individual work. When the project is quality is medium,
10
R
c 2
h
1
(1+✓) p0
, 1 2p0 (1+✓)p0 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)]
⌘
, the principal would only motivate the part-
nership at t = 0 when she is su ciently patient. If the principal insists on her
best choice of a static game, the probability of success and her current static
expected profit would both be higher at t = 0. However, if a failure arrives,
her posterior belief also drops substantially, which reduces her expected profit
at t = 1. Alternatively, she can motivate the individual work at t = 0, and
would not be too pessimistic at t = 1 if a failure occurs. Her expected profit
at t = 1 now would be larger, even though she su↵ers a lower current expected
profit at t = 0. The result shows that, when the principal is patient enough,
the extra gain at t = 1 can cover her loss at t = 0 by choosing the individual
work at the beginning.
If the principal can directly propose contracts to both of the agents,
in the first-best case, two agents would accept the contract and work if their
participation constraints are satisfied. Since the moral hazard problem doesn’t
exist, the optimal shares that the principal proposes to the agents would also
be the same as those in Lemma 1.3.2, and the socially e cient stopping time
should be the same as well. As a result, the principal’s profit level would be
the same as that in the presence of a sub-contract.
1.4 Second-Best Analysis
Now I discuss the principal’s second-best policy, in which the sub-contracting
behaviour and the agents’ e↵ort level are neither observable nor contractable.
In this situation, the principal can only use the grand contract to motivate
agent one to form a partnership with agent two. In this section, I firstly
characterise the properties of the static game, which can be treated as period
t = 1, an then move to period t = 0.
1.4.1 Static Game
The static game can be considered as the last period of this two-period econ-
omy, or a scenario in which both the principal and agents are myopic and the
discount factor is 0. Since the beliefs must be correct on the equilibrium path,
each party now has the same posterior belief pPt . Given the grand contract
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!1,t and the subcontract !2,t, the agents’ payo↵s in the static game at t are
shown in the Table 1.1.
i=2
Work Shirk
i=1
Work (1 !2,t)!1,tpPt  (2+✓)R c, !2,t!1,tpPt  (2+✓)R c (1 !2,t)!1,tpPt  R c, !2,t!1,tpPt  R
Shirk (1 !2,t)!1,tpPt  R, !2,t!1,tpPt  R c 0, 0
Table 1.1: Agent i’s payo↵ in the static game at t
When the partnership is desired, the free-riding incentive now arises
due to private e↵ort. To form the partnership, agent one needs to propose
a share such that agent two’s additional gain from working is weakly greater
than that from shirking and free-riding. Given that agent two works, agent
one also has the incentive to free ride on agent two’s work, thus the share in
the sub-contract also needs to satisfy that agent one is weakly better o↵ by
working. These conditions can be simplified as follows:
agent two’s gain from workingz }| {
!2,t!1,tp
P
t  (1 + ✓)R  
gain from free-ridingz}|{
c
(1  !2,t)!1,tpPt  (1 + ✓)R| {z }
agent one’s gain from working
  c|{z}
gain from free-riding
(1.4.1)
Thus, to support the partnership, the principal can simply add up the two
constraints in (1.4.1):
!1,1p
P
t (1 + ✓) R   2c (1.4.2)
Since the principal cannot observe the sub-contract, agent one has extra
incentives and more options to deviate from the principal’s desire. Firstly,
agent one could simply propose zero share to exclude agent two and work
alone. In this exclusion incentive, agent one can pocket the entire gain from
the grand contract, even if the probability of success is lower. To mitigate this
issue, the principal needs to propose a grand contract such that the agent is
weakly better o↵ by sub-contracting to agent two rather than excluding him.
It implies the following constraint:
12
!1,tp
P
t (1 + ✓) R| {z }
agent one’s gain from the partnership
  2 + ✓
1 + ✓
c| {z }
gain from excluding agent two
(1.4.3)
Secondly, agent one has the incentive of complete outsourcing, in which
he can motivate agent two to work alone by o↵ering a share such that agent
two’s participation constraint of working alone is binding. By doing so, in
Table 1.1, it’s clear that agent one’s static payo↵ would be the same as that
when he works alone and excludes agent two. Thus agent one is indi↵erent
between these two incentives in the static game, due to the identical individ-
ual contribution   and operation cost c. In the following analysis, I assume
agent one would work alone if he were indi↵erent between working alone and
complete outsourcing.
On the other hand, when the principal motivates the individual work,
agent one may still have the incentive to subcontract to agent two. In a static
game, the principal can propose a share such that the expected gain from work-
ing alone can just cover the e↵ort cost c. Since the sub-contracting behaviour
is not observable, he can simply privately form a partnership with agent two
and work together, which potentially yields a higher surplus.To prevent such
deviation, the principal needs to make sure that the share guarantees that
(1.4.2) doesn’t hold and agent two rejects the o↵er, or (1.4.3) doesn’t hold.
Compared to the first-best, it’s now clear that the principal has to leave
a positive surplus for agent one to sustain the partnership between the two
agents, and her own surplus is reduced. Alternatively, the principal can just
propose a share such that agent one’s participation constraint from working
alone is satisfied. By doing so, the principal sustains a larger share of surplus
although the probability of success is lower. As the value-cost ratio remains
unchanged, the principal prefers the agents’ teamwork only if she is su ciently
optimistic. The lower bound of this belief is denoted by pT , in which the prin-
cipal is indi↵erent between the partnership and the individual work. Also, if
the cost of motivating operating the project is too high, the principal stops
proposing any grand contracts. This happens when the principal is so pes-
simistic that the share o↵ered to agent one needs to be larger than the entire
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potential profit from having the agent(s) working. This belief at the stopping
threshold is denoted by p⇤.
Lemma 1.4.1. In the second-best, p⇤ = min
n
2c
(1+✓) R ,
c
 R
o
  pE, and pT =
max
n
(3+✓)c
(1+✓)2 R ,
((3+2✓)c
(1+✓)3 R
o
such that, in the static game, for pPt   p⇤,
1) if ✓ 2 ⇥0, 1 2    , for Rc   maxn 2(1+✓) pPt , 3+✓(1+✓)2 pPt o,  eS1,t(pPt ), eS2,t(pPt )  =
(1, 1) and
 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
2,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
2c
(1+✓) RpPt
, 12
⌘
;
 
eS1,t(p
P
t ), e
S
2,t(p
P
t )
 
= (1, 0) and 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
2,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
c
 RpPt
, 0
⌘
for Rc 2
h
1
 pPt
, 3+✓
(1+✓)2 pPt
⌘
. Specially, p⇤   pT if
✓   1.
2) if ✓ 2   1,min 0, 1 2     , for Rc   3+2✓(1+✓)3 pPt ,  eS1,t(pPt ), eS2,t(pPt )  = (1, 1)
and
 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
2,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
(2+✓)c
(1+✓)2 RpPt
, 1+✓2+✓
⌘
;
 
eS1,t(p
P
t ), e
S
2,t(p
P
t )
 
= (1, 0) and 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
2,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
c
 RpPt
, 0
⌘
for Rc 2
h
1
 pPt
, 3+2✓
(1+✓)3 pPt
⌘
.
The optimal contracts in the static game at t,
 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
2,t(p
P
t )
 
, are
then summarised in Lemma 1.4.1, in which eSi,t(p
P
t ) is the agent i’s optimal
e↵ort level at t. It shows that the level of synergy plays a crucial role for both
free-riding and exclusion incentives. When the synergy is positive, the free-
riding incentive dominates, and the principal can simply have (1.4.2) binding.
The optimal grand contract is then o↵ered such that agent one is indi↵erent
between working and shirking in the partnership, and agent one would o↵er
half of his gain to agent two. Moreover, when the positive synergy is very
large, ✓ 2 ⇥1, 1 2    , the principal always prefers the partnership to agent
one working alone as long as operating the project is still profitable for her,
pPt 2
h
2c
(1+✓) R , 1
⌘
, which is equivalent to the case when the project has a
high value-cost ratio, Rc   2c(1+✓) RpPt . In this case, the principal only needs to
transfer a small share to agent one which is lower than the cost of individual
work, and then agent one would form the partnership with agent two and work
hard. If the principal motivates the individual work, agent one would find it’s
always profitable to deviate to collaboration as the synergy is very strong.
On the other hand, when the synergy is positive but small, ✓ 2 [0, 1),
the principal would prefer the partnership only if she is su ciently optimistic,
pPt 2
h
(3+✓)c
(1+✓)2 R , 1
⌘
, in which case the benefit from the partnership can still
cover the cost of dealing with the free-riding problem. This also implies the
value-cost ratio is su ciently high, Rc   3+✓(1+✓)2 RpPt . However, if the principal
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is pessimistic, pPt 2
h
c
 R ,
(3+✓)c
(1+✓)2 R
⌘
, she would only motivate agent one to work
alone as the cost of forming the partnership is too high. In this case, the
value-cost ratio stays at the medium level, Rc 2
h
c
 RpPt
, (3+✓)
(1+✓)2 RpPt
⌘
.
When the synergy is negative, the exclusion incentive dominates. Agent
one gains more in this deviation even if he still has the option of free-riding
on agent two’s hard work. Thus the principal needs to have (1.4.3) binding.
To form the partnership, the principal proposes a larger share in the grand
contract, and agent one would propose less than half portion in the optimal
sub-contract. This is beneficial for the principal only if she is su ciently opti-
mistic, pPt 2
h
(3+2✓)c
(1+✓)3 R , 1
⌘
. If the principal is pessimistic, pPt 2
h
c
 R ,
(3+2✓)c
(1+✓)3 R
⌘
,
it’s too costly to deal with the agent one’s exclusion incentive. Thus the prin-
cipal would only o↵er a smaller share to agent one to have him working alone.
The principal stops proposing grand contracts to support the project
when she is very pessimistic and her belief drops below the threshold p⇤. This
is because the cost of motivating the agent(s) to work is too high and the
principal cannot gain any positive profit. Compared to the socially e cient
stopping threshold pE in the first-best, the principal stops earlier in the second-
best as p⇤   pE. This is because the principal has to leave positive surplus
to agent one to mitigate potential incentives of deviation, and her own net
expected profit is smaller.
1.4.2 Belief Manipulation
Now move backward to the first period, t = 0. All parties now have the
same prior belief p0. In contrast with the static game, now a potential future
opportunity exists to conduct the project in period t = 1. In the environment
without full commitment, due to the unobservable sub-contracts and e↵ort
level, the agents could potentially misbehave at t = 0 to manipulate other
parties’ beliefs about the project’s quality, which a↵ects the optimal contracts
o↵ered at t = 1. Such deviation doesn’t exist once there is full commitment.
Consider agent two first. Given the principal’s belief pP1 and agent one’s
belief p11, the principal would o↵er optimally o↵er !
⇤
1,1(p
P
1 ) and agent one would
optimally o↵er !⇤1,1(p
1
1) at t = 1. Thus, given agent two’s private belief p
2
1, he
would optimally choose between rejection and acceptance at t = 1, and his
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optimal expected payo↵ would be:
uˆ21(p
2
1; p
P
1 , p
1
1) = Max
e2,12{0,1}
 
0, p21!
⇤
2,1(p
1
1)!
⇤
1,1(p
P
1 ) [1 + (1 + ✓)e1,1]  e2,1c
 
(1.4.4)
When agent one works alone at t = 0, there is no room for deviation by agent
two. When the partnership is motivated at t = 0, on the equilibrium path, a
common posterior belief is obtained by all parties, pi1 = p
P
1 = p1, and agent
two’s expected payo↵ at t = 1 is uˆ21(p1; p1, p1), which occurs with probability
1   p0 (2 + ✓). However, he may reap more benefit by shirking at k = 0.
Similarly to the static game, agent two can save the cost c and free-ride on
agent one’s hard work to achieve a positive gain at t = 0. Moreover, by doing
so, he also has a more optimistic belief compared to other parties at t = 1 as
pˆ1 > p1, and his optimal expected payo↵ would be uˆ21(pˆ1; p1, p1) with a higher
probability 1 p0 . This implies that the free-riding incentive can additionally
give agent two an additional gain at t = 1. As a result, the sub-contract should
satisfy the following incentive constraint to have agent two working at t = 0:
ICFR2,0 : !2,0!1,0p0 (1 + ✓)R
  c+    (1  p0 )uˆ21(pˆ; p1, p1)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)] uˆ21(p1; p1, p1) | {z }
agent two’s gain from belief manipulation by free-riding: B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)
(1.4.5)
Compared to agent two’s free-riding incentive in the static game, the extra
terms are present on the side of shirking. It’s clear that the gain from the
belief manipulation, B21 (pˆ1; p1, p1), is always positive
3, so agent one needs to
o↵ers a larger share in the sub-contract to mitigate this free-riding problem,
compared to the case in the static game.
Agent one has similar incentive of belief manipulation at t = 0, which
can be achieved through more channels, as long as the principal continues
investing at t = 1. Given the principal’s belief pP1 and the agent 2’s belief p
2
1,
the principal would o↵er optimally o↵er !⇤1,1(p
P
1 ) and agent two would only
accept the sub-contract if !2,1   !⇤2,1(p21) at t = 1. Thus, given agent one’s
3Since pˆ1 > p1, uˆ21(pˆ1; p1)   uˆ21(p1; p1).
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belief p11, his expected payo↵ at t = 1 can be represented as:
uˆ11(p
1
1; p
P
1 , p
2
1) =
Max
e1,12{0,1}
 
0, e1,1(p
1
1!
⇤
1,1(p
P
1 ) R  c), p11(1  !⇤2,1(pP1 ))!⇤2,1(p21)[1 + (1 + ✓)e1,1] R  ce1,1
 
(1.4.6)
It shows that agent one would optimally choose between rejection, individual
work and the partnership, given his private belief.
Suppose the principal motivates the partnership at t = 0. At t = 1,
given the equilibrium belief p1, the principal would o↵er !⇤1,1(p1) and agent
two would exert e↵ort if !2,1   !⇤2,1(p1) is o↵ered, and agent one obtains
uˆ11(p1; p1, p1) at t = 1, which occurs with probability 1 p0 (2+✓). Similarly to
the static game, agent one can free-ride on agent two’s hard work and save the
cost. Also, if a failure occurs, agent one is more optimistic than the principal
and agent two with pˆ1 > p1, and this information is private. From (1.4.6),
it’s easily to see that agent one can achieve a weakly higher expected payo↵
uˆ11(pˆ1; p1, p1), and it occurs with a even higher probability 1  p0 . Therefore,
even though agent two’s current expected payo↵ is lower, he can receive an
even higher payo↵ at t = 1 to compensate for the loss. To mitigate agent one’s
free-riding incentive at t = 0, the following incentive constraint needs to be
satisfied:
(1  !2,0)!1,0p0 (1 + ✓)R
  c+    (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ; p1, p1)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)] uˆ11(p1; p1, p1) | {z }
agent one’s gain from belief manipulation by free-riding: B11(pˆ1;p1,p1)
(1.4.7)
This is the same to agent two’s free-riding incentive constraint at t = 0 in
(1.4.5). the last two terms on the right hand side of the inequality (1.4.7)
represents the gain from belief manipulation by free-riding, B11(pˆ1; p1, p1). To-
gether with 1.4.5, the free-riding problem at t = 0 can be tackled when the
following constraint is satisfied:
ICFR1,0 : !1,0p0 (1 + ✓)R   2c+  
⇥
B21 (pˆ1; p1, p1) + B
1
1 (pˆ1; p1, p1)
⇤
(1.4.8)
To resolve the free-riding problem at t = 0, the principal needs to leave a
larger share to agent one, compared to that in the static game.
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Secondly, agent one can manipulate other parties’ beliefs by excluding
agent two at t = 0. After no success occurs at t = 0, the principal holds
a posterior belief pP1 = p1, and agent two believes that p
2
1 = pˆ1. Then the
principal would o↵er !⇤1,1(p1) and the agent 2 would accept the sub-contract
if !2,1   !⇤2,1(pˆ1) at t = 1. However, agent one’s private belief now is p11 =
{p0, pˆ1}, and he is still more optimistic than both of the other parties, where
his expected payo↵ at t = 1 would be uˆ11(p
1
1; p1, pˆ1) with probability 1 p0 e˜1,0,
where e˜1,0 is agent one’s potential e↵ort choice in deviation at t = 0, and e˜1,0 2
{0, 1}. To mitigate the agent 1’s exclusion incentive at t = 0, the principal
needs to o↵er a contract !1,0 such that the benefit from the partnership is
weakly higher than the benefit from working alone or not working at all at t =
0. This incentive concern is summarised in (1.4.9), in which I let B11(p
1
1; p
P
1 , pˆ1)
be the agent i’s gain from belief manipulation by exclusion incentive, where
B11(p
1
1; p
P
1 , pˆ1) = (1  p0 e˜1,0)uˆ11 (p11; p1, pˆ1)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)] uˆ11(p1; p1, p1):
ICE1,0 :
gain from the partnershipz }| {
!1,0p0 (2 + ✓   e˜1,0)R
  c(1  e˜1,0) + 2 + ✓
1 + ✓
 
c+  B21(pˆ1; p1, p1)
 
| {z }
gain from excluding agent two
+ B11(p
1
1; p1, pˆ1)
(1.4.9)
On the right hand side of agent one’s exclusion incentive constraint at t = 0,
the first term represents the saved own cost, and the second term represents
the saved cost which is paid for mitigating agent two’s free-riding and belief
manipulation incentive. Together with his own gain from belief manipulation
by exclusion incentive, B11(p
1
1; p
P
1 , pˆ1), these imply that the principal needs to
o↵er a larger share and leave more surplus to agent one, compared to the
exclusion incentive in the static game.
Thirdly, agent one also has the option of delegating the entire work to
agent two at t = 0. However, with Lemma 1.4.2, I show that this complete
outsourcing incentive is always weakly dominated by agent one’s exclusion
incentive.
Lemma 1.4.2. Exclusion incentive weakly dominates complete outsourcing.
If agent one motivates agent two to work alone at t = 1, agent two’s
participation constraint needs to be satisfied when he is paid to cover the entire
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cost. Due to the identical individual contribution and cost, agent one makes
the same gains as in the case when he works alone. If agent two is asked to
work alone at t = 0, due to future opportunity to conduct the project again, he
has the incentive to shirk and manipulate the agent 1’s belief to gain a higher
surplus at t = 0. This implies that agent one has to pay more than the e↵ort
cost c at t = 0 to have agent two working. In contrast, he can exclude agent
two and work alone, in which case he just pays the e↵ort cost c. Therefore,
the following analysis can just be focused on the free-riding incentive and the
exclusion incentive.
Now consider the incentives in the case where the principal motivates
the individual work at t = 0. On the equilibrium path, all parties hold a
common posterior belief pˆ1 after no success occurs at t = 0. Thus the princi-
pal would optimally o↵er !⇤1,1(pˆ1) and agent two would only accept the sub-
contract if !2,1   !⇤2,1(pˆ1) at t = 1. This gives agent one the optimal expected
payo↵ uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1) with probability 1   p0 . From the perspective of agent
one, he has the incentive to shirk at t = 0: by doing so, his belief remains the
same and he is more optimistic than the other two parties. Thus, his optimal
expected payo↵ at t = 1 would be uˆ11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) with probability 1. This sug-
gests that the principal needs to o↵er a share such that agent one is weakly
better o↵ by working alone compared to shirking at t = 0:
p0!1,0 R   c+  
B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)z }| {⇥
uˆ11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1)  (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1)
⇤| {z }
gain from belief manipulation by shirking
(1.4.10)
Similarly to the static game, due to the unobservable sub-contract be-
haviour, agent one can deviate to collaborate with agent two at t = 0 to
extract the future value. This is agent one’s over-investment incentive. On
the one hand, agent one has to leave a share of the return to agent two to form
the partnership; on the other hand, however, he can boost the probability of
success, which leads the current expected payo↵ to be higher. By doing so,
if no success occurs, the principal still has the posterior belief pˆ1 and o↵ers
!⇤1,1(pˆ1) at t = 1. However, agent two would have a pessimistic belief p1 if he
works at t = 0.
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Lemma 1.4.3. When the individual work is motivated at t = 0 but agent one
deviates to collaborate, he would either work alone or reject the o↵er at t = 1.
Lemma 1.4.3 suggests that agent two would not participate in the
project after such deviation at t = 0, even if the partnership is desired by
the principal. This is because both agents are more pessimistic than the prin-
cipal, and the share of the return o↵ered by the principal is not large enough
to support the cost of the partnership, and it’s possibly too small to support
an individual work. To mitigate agent one’s over-investment incentive, the
following constraint must be satisfied:
p0!1,0(1 + ✓) R < max {M1,M2}
M1 =2c+  
 
(1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, p1)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)] uˆ11(p1; pˆ1, p1)
 
M2 =
2 + ✓
1 + ✓
c+  
 
(1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)] uˆ11(p1; pˆ1, p1)
 
(1.4.11)
The first inequality, p0!1,0(1+ ✓) R < M1, suggests that the principal’s grand
contract cannot be too large such that agent two accepts the sub-contract
and works in deviation. As agent one still can free-ride in the collaboration by
deviation and holds the same belief as the principal, but is more optimistic than
agent two, he gains uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, p1) with probability 1 p0 . This is crucial when
the synergy is positive, in which case agent two would not work given agent
one shirks in the collaboration. The second inequality, p0!1,0(1 + ✓) R < M2,
shows that agent one cannot achieve a better outcome by deviating from his
equilibrium strategy, even if agent two accepts the sub-contract and works.
The optimal grand and sub-contracts
 
!⇤1,t(p
P
t ),!
⇤
2,t(p
P
t )
 
when motivat-
ing the partnership and the individual work respectively are summarised in
Proposition 1.4.1. It shows that the last period of the two-period economy is
equivalent to a static game. This is obvious since there is no future opportu-
nity to conduct the project, and all parties’ beliefs must be the same on the
equilibrium path. Also, there is no room for the agent(s) to manipulate the
belief. Therefore, they would behave in the same way as for the static game.
Proposition 1.4.1. In the second-best,
 
!⇤1,1(p
P
1 ),!
⇤
2,1(p
P
1 )
 
=
 
!S1,1(p
P
1 ),!
S
2,1(p
P
1 )
 
. 
!⇤1,0(p
P
0 ),!
⇤
2,0(p
P
0 )
 
=
 
!S1,0(p
P
0 ),!
S
2,0(p
P
0 )
 
for pˆ1 < p⇤. For pˆ1   p⇤, given
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the individual work is motivated at t = 0, (1.4.11) must be satisfied and 
!⇤1,0(p0),!
⇤
2,0(p0)
 
=
⇣
c+ B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)
 Rp0
, 0
⌘
; given the partnership is motivated at
t = 0, !⇤2,0(p0) =
c+ B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)
!⇤1,0(p0)(1+✓) Rp0
, and
1) if ✓ 2   1,min 0, 1 2     , !⇤1,0(p0) = (2+✓)c+ [(2+✓)B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+(1+✓)B11(pˆ1;p1,pˆ1)](1+✓)2 Rp0 ;
2) if ✓ 2 ⇥1, 1 2    , !⇤1,0(p0) = 2c+ (B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+B11(pˆ1;p1,p1))(1+✓) Rp0 ;
3) if ✓ 2 ⇥0,min 1, 1 2     , for pT > p1   p⇤ with pˆ1p1 2  1, 21+✓ , !⇤1,0(p0) =
2c+ (B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+B11(pˆ1;p1,p1))
(1+✓) Rp0
; for p1   pT , or pT > p1   p⇤ with pˆ1p1   21+✓ ,
9 ˜ 2 (0, 1), such that:
!⇤1,0(p0) =
8<:
2c+ (B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+B11(pˆ1;p1,p1))
(1+✓) Rp0
  2 [0,  ˜)
(2+✓)c+ [(2+✓)Bˆ21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+(1+✓)Bˆ11(pˆ1;p1,pˆ1)]
(1+✓)2 Rp0
  2 ( ˜, 1]
(1.4.12)
At t = 0, for pˆ1 < p⇤, the principal’s belief drops below the stopping
threshold after a low e↵ort level is motivated, thus she would not continue
investing at t = 1 anymore. As a result, there is also no room for the agent(s)
to manipulate the belief, and the concern of the incentives should be the same
as those in the static game. This leads that the optimal grand and sub-contract
should be the same as those in the static game.
For pˆ1   p⇤, the incentives for belief manipulation need to be taken into
account, due to the presence of the future opportunity. Proposition 1.4.1 sug-
gests that, when motivating agent one’s individual work, the principal needs
to o↵er a share such that agent one is indi↵erent between working alone and
shirking and belief manipulation, which makes (1.4.10) binding. Compared to
the static game, the extra part  B
1
1(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)
 Rp0
reflects the share which is trans-
ferred to prevent agent one from manipulating other parties’ beliefs. Then
agent one would not o↵er any sub-contracts to agent two on the equilibrium
path, !⇤2,0(p0) = 0. However, unlike the static game, the principal also needs
to prevent agent one from seeking a higher e↵ort level to boost the current
expected gain in this case, in which (1.4.11) needs to be satisfied. This implies
that there exist some scenarios in which the principal would fail to motivate
the individual work at t = 0, and the detail is discussed in Corollary 1.4.1.
It suggests that, if the individual work is desired by the principal, agent one
would always deviate to a higher e↵ort level by the partnership when the indi-
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vidual contribution is large, the multiplier of the synergy is su ciently large,
and when he is very optimistic and not patient. In such a scenario, agent one
is very impatient such that he prefers to explore the project as much as possi-
ble and achieve success as early as possible, even if the principal is willing to
wait. As a result, the principal has to compromise on a sub-optimal choice by
motivating a higher e↵ort level or withholding the investment in such cases.
For pˆ1   p⇤, given the partnership is motivated at t = 0, the optimal
sub-contract !⇤2,0(p0) must satisfy that agent two is indi↵erent between working
and shirking, in which (1.4.5) binds. Moreover, compared to the sub-contract
in the static game, the extra share  B
2
1(pˆ1;p1,p1)
!⇤1,0(p0)(1+✓) Rp0
represents the surplus that
agent one sacrifices to prevent agent two from belief manipulation. Similarly, in
the grand contract !⇤1,0(p0), the principal needs to take care of agent one’s free-
riding and exclusion incentives, in which (1.4.8) and (1.4.9) must be satisfied.
When the synergy is negative, it shows that agent one’s exclusion incentive
dominates, and he finds that the most profitable deviation is to exclude agent
two and work alone. Thus, the extra term
 [(2+✓)Bˆ21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+(1+✓)Bˆ11(pˆ1;p1,pˆ1)]
(1+✓)2 Rp0
represents the share necessary to prevent agent one from belief manipulation
by exclusion incentive. On the other hand, when the synergy is positive and
very large, ✓ 2 ⇥1, 1 2    , agent one’s free-riding incentive dominates, in which
he prefers to free ride on agent two’s hard work among di↵erent channels of
deviation. By doing so, the cost of the sub-contract would be less than the
cost of working alone. Therefore, (1.4.8) must bind in this case, and the extra
term
 (B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+B11(pˆ1;p1,p1))
(1+✓) Rp0
is paid to deter the belief manipulation.
The analysis is more complex when the synergy is positive but small,
in which case ✓ 2 ⇥0,min 1, 1 2     . For pT > p1   p⇤ with pˆ1p1 2  1, 21+✓ , the
incentive for free-riding at t = 0 dominates others. In this case, the principal
optimally motivates the individual work at t = 1 if no success occurs at t = 0,
and the di↵erence in the posteriors at di↵erent e↵ort levels doesn’t vary too
much. If agent one deviates, he would still stick to the individual work at
t = 1 after his deviation at t = 0. Also, in this case, there is no room for agent
two to manipulate the belief as he would not be hired at t = 1.
In all other cases at the small positive synergy, agent one still finds that
the incentive of excluding agent two and shirking is dominated, and he is made
better o↵ by ensuring that at least one unit of e↵ort is exerted. However, his
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patience level now plays a crucial role, and the share varies when deterring
agent one’s belief manipulation. When agent one is not patient, in which case
his discount factor is very small,   2 [0,  ˜), agent one’s free-riding incentive
dominates and (1.4.8) must bind. when agent one is very patient,   2 [ ˜, 1],
the exclusion incentive dominates, and the o↵er should be the same as that
in which the synergy is negative. These results also hold when the positive
synergy is very large. In this case, the loss from shirking after excluding agent
two is too large, and agent one doesn’t want to withhold e↵ort.
Corollary 1.4.1. In the second-best, at t = 0,
1) if ✓ 2 ⇥1, 1 2    , the individual work cannot be motivated;
2) if ✓ 2   1,min{1 2   , 1}  with pˆ1   pT and pˆ1p1   maxn 21+✓ , 2+✓(1+✓)2o, or
✓ 2 ⇥0,min{1 2   , 1}  with pT > pˆ1   p⇤, 9 v 2 (0, 1), ✓v 2   1,min 1, 1      
and pv 2 (0, 1) such that the individual work cannot be motivated when   2
[ v, 1), ✓ 2
⇥
✓v,min
 
1 2 
  , 1
  
, p0 2 (0, pv) and   2 [ v, 1], in which c +
 vB11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) = max {M1,M2}.
Given the structure of the optimal grand and sub-contracts have been
characterised, the focus shifts to the timing of motivating the partnership
and the individual work. At t = 0, the principal’s continuation value for the
partnership and individual work can be written as:
V CO0 (p0) = p0
 
1  !CO1,0 (p0)
 
 (2 + ✓)R +  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]⇡⇤1(p1)
V WA0 (p0) = p0
 
1  !WA1,0 (p0)
 
 R +  (1  p0 )⇡⇤1(pˆ1)
(1.4.13)
Where ⇡⇤1(
P
1 ) is her optimal profit at t = 1 given belief p
P
1 , and !
CO
1,0 (p0) and
!WA1,0 (p0) represents the optimal grand contract when motivating the partner-
ship and the individual work respectively, which are given in Proposition 1.4.1.
Besides, the principal has the option to delay the investment, in which case she
would only o↵er the grand contract at t = 1 and the associated continuation
value would be V D0 (p0) =  ⇡
⇤
1(p0). By doing so, the principal can completely
deter the possibility of belief manipulation, and o↵er a smaller share in the
grand contract with a optimistic belief p0. On the other hand, she still su↵ers
a loss from her impatience due to the presence of the discount factor   2 [0, 1],
and also wastes the chance of making a second attempt after the first failure.
The di↵erence between the principal’s continuation value for the partnership
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and the individual work at t = 0 can be represented as:
4V CW0 (p0) =
extra gainz }| {
p0 R(1 + ✓) 
extra cost for higher e↵ort levelz }| {
p0 R
⇥
(2 + ✓)!CO1,0   !WA1,0
⇤
    {(1  p0 )⇡⇤1(pˆ1)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]⇡⇤1(p1)}| {z }
loss from the future profit
(1.4.14)
Compared to the individual work, if the principal motivates the partnership at
t = 0, she can boost the probability of success and gain the extra p0 R(1+ ✓);
on the other hand, she has to pay the extra cost p0 R[(2 + ✓)!CO1,0   !WA1,0 ]
to compensate the higher e↵ort level. Also, she still su↵ers a loss in terms
of future profit. This is because she would be more pessimistic if no success
occurs after the first attempt, and has to o↵er a larger share to motivate the
agents to work at t = 1, together with a lower probability of success which
would lower the expected value. Similarly, compared to no investment at t = 0,
if the principal motivates the partnership, she can have a positive static profit
at t = 0; however, she also su↵ers a loss in the next period if the project fails,
in which she is more pessimistic and the expected profit would be even lower.
This is summarised in the expression of 4V CN0 (p0), where
4V CN0 (p0) = p0
 
1  !CO1,0 (p0)
 
 (2 + ✓)R| {z }
net profit from the partnership
    {⇡⇤1(p0)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]⇡⇤1(p1)}| {z }
loss in the future profit
(1.4.15)
When the individual work is compared to no investment at t = 0, the logic is
the same as that for the partnership, and the detail is shown in 4V WN0 (p0),
where
4V WN0 (p0) = p0
 
1  !WA1,0 (p0)
 
 R| {z }
net profit from the individual work
    {⇡⇤1(p0)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]⇡⇤1(p1)}| {z }
loss in the future profit
(1.4.16)
Therefore, the principal would motivate the partnership only if its continu-
ation value from doing so is larger than that from motivating a lower e↵ort
and by delaying the investment, in which 4V CW0 (p0) and 4V CN0 (p0) are both
positive. A similar argument would be applied if other options are optimal.
Then the principal’s optimal choice of the e↵ort level at t = 0 is demonstrated
24
in Proposition 1.4.2, in which e⇤i,t(p
P
t ) is agent i’s optimal e↵ort level at t and
would be motivated in the optimal grand and sub-contracts given the belief
pPt .
Proposition 1.4.2. In the second-best, at t = 0,
1) if ✓ 2 ⇥1, 1 2    , 9 ⇤ 2 (0, 1), such that,
1.a) for Rc 2
h
2
p0 (1+✓)
, 2pˆ1 (1+✓)
⌘Sh 2[1 p1 (1+✓)]
p1 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)] ,+1
⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
=
(1, 1);
1.b) for Rc 2
h
2
pˆ1 (1+✓)
, 2[1 p1 (1+✓)]p1 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)]
⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) when   2
[0,  ⇤], and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) when   2 ( ⇤, 1), in which V CO0 (p0)| ⇤ = V NO0 (p0)| ⇤.
2) if ✓ 2   1,min 0, 1 2     , 9Rc   3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3 and 0   ⇤c   ⇤w  1 such that
2.a) for Rc   Rc ,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1);
2.b) for Rc 2
h
3+2✓
p0 (1+✓)3
, Rc
⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) at   2 [0,  v],
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
=
(1, 0) at   2 ( c,  w], and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( w, 1]; specially, for
R
c 2
h
3+2✓
p0 (1+✓)3
, 1pˆ1 
⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) and  
⇤
c =  
⇤
w = 1;
2.c) for Rc 2
h
1
p0 
, 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3
⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  ⇤w], and 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( ⇤w, 1]; specially, for Rc 2
h
1
p0 
,min
n
1
pˆ1 
, 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3
o⌘
, 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) and  
⇤
w = 1.
3) if ✓ 2 ⇥0,min 1, 1 2     , 9 R˜c   3+✓(1+✓)2p1 , 0   ˜⇤c   ˜⇤w  1 such that
3.a) for Rc   R˜c ,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1);
3.b) for Rc 2
h
3+✓
p0 (1+✓)2
, R˜c
⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) at   2 (0,  ˜c],
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
=
(1, 0) at   2 ( ˜c,  ˜w], and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( ˜w, 1];
3.c) for Rc 2 S˜ =
h
max
n
2
p0 (1+✓)
, 1pˆ1 
o
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
⌘
with (1.4.11) being
violated,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  v),
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) at   2 [ v,  ˜⇤c ], 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( ˜⇤c , 1];
3.d) for Rc 2 S˜ with (1.4.11) being satisfied, or Rc 2
h
1
p0 
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
⌘
\ S˜, 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  ⇤w], and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 ( ˜⇤w, 1]; spe-
cially, for Rc 2
h
1
p1 
,min
n
1
pˆ1 
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
o⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) and  ˜⇤w = 1.
In general, Proposition 1.4.2 shows that the principal would optimally
reduce the investment level and motivate a lower e↵ort level at t = 0 due
to the high cost of deterring the dynamic moral hazard problem. It follows
that the optimal e↵ort level at t = 0 would be lower than that in the static
game. However, due to the presence of the private sub-contract, when the
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positive synergy is small and the principal fails to deter agent one’s over-
investment behaviour, she would also over-invest in these scenarios, in which
the optimal e↵ort level is higher than that in the static game but still weakly
lower than that in the first-best. Compared to the first-best, the principal’s
optimal choice at t is distorted and she weakly under-invests at all levels of
the value-cost ratio, leaving positive surplus to the agent(s) due to the hidden
e↵ort and private sub-contract.
When the project’s value-cost ratio is not high enough to support the
cost of a second trial after the first failure, Proposition 1.4.2 shows that the
principal’s optimal decision at t = 0 in this two-period economy is the same
as that in the static game. This is obvious and the principal never delays
the investment, and all parties behave as myopic players. However, when the
value-cost ratio is high enough to cover the cost of the second investment after
the failure, the principal’s decision is distorted due to impatience and the fear
of belief manipulation.
Proposition 1.4.2.1) shows that, if the synergy is very large, and the
project’s value-cost ratio is very high, the principal would optimally motivate
the high e↵ort level to boost the probability of success, and the benefit is
much higher than the cost of deterring the agents’ belief manipulation by all
di↵erent channels of deviation. On the other hand, when the value-cost ratio
is medium with Rc 2
h
2
(1+✓) p1
, 2[1 p1 (1+✓)]p1 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)]
⌘
, her patience plays a crucial
role. When she is very impatient, the cost of deterring the agents’ deviation
is not high from her point of view, so she would stick to motivating the high
e↵ort level through the partnership. However, when she is very patient, she
weights the future value a lot, in which case the cost of deterring the agents’
deviation is too high to be covered, and she would delay the investment at
t = 0, and only invest the partnership at t = 1. The option of the individual
work totally is excluded, in which agent one would always deviate to privately
collaborate with agent two and boost the current expected gain, even if the
principal is willing to sustain a lower e↵ort level.
Proposition 1.4.2.2) and 1.4.2.3) suggest that the principal behaves sim-
ilarly when the synergy is negative or positive but small. In both cases, when
the project’s quality is high, the principal still finds it beneficial to moti-
vate the higher e↵ort level since the cost of doing that is now comparatively
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low and could be covered by the extra gain. When the project’s quality is
medium and the synergy is positive but small, there exists a scenario where
the principal would over-invest at t = 0, specifically, pT > p0 > pˆ1   p⇤ and
p0 (2 + ✓)R   max
n
2
1+✓c,
2+✓
(1+✓)2
o
and (1.4.11) is violated. In this scenario,
the partnership is dominated by the individual work but is still better than no
investment in a static game. When the principal tries to motivate the individ-
ual work at t = 0, which is her best choice in a static game, agent one always
find that he’s better o↵ by deviating to collaborate with agent two. Thus, he
cannot be deterred from deviating to privately over-invest. As a result, the
principal has to compromise and distort to a higher e↵ort level to exhaust
the future possibility of investment and shut down the window of belief ma-
nipulation by the agent(s). This ine ciency arises due to the presence of the
private sub-contract, and one example of this scenario is shown below. The
observation ceases to exist when the synergy is negative for the same quality
of the project. In the rest of the scenarios, when the project’s quality is low
or medium with (1.4.11) being satisfied, such distortion doesn’t exist, and the
principal would stick to motivating the individual work at t = 0 if she is very
impatient, which is her optimal choice in the static game; if she is su ciently
patient, in which case she weights the cost of the deterring the dynamic moral
hazard problem very high, she would withhold the investment and only invest
at t = 1.
Example 1.4.1. Rc = 15.5, p0 = 0.3, ✓ = 0.6,   = 0.3,   = 0.9. Thus
pˆ1 = 0.2308, p1 = 0.0862, pT = 0.3024 and p⇤ = 0.2151. In the first-
best,
 
eP1,0, e
P
2,0
 
= (1, 1). In the static game,
 
eS1,0, e
S
2,0
 
= (1, 0). When the
partnership is motivated,
 
!CO1,0 ,!
CO
2,0
 
= (0.8961, 0.5) and V CO0 (p0) = 0.377;
when she choose not to invest at t = 0, V NO0 (p0) = 0.3555. Therefore, 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) =
 
eP1,0, e
P
2,0
     eS1,0, eS2,0 .
1.4.3 Comparisons to Two-Tier Hierarchy
Now I compare the three-tier hierarchic structure to the two-tier one, in which
the principal can directly contract with agent two. Both structures are shown
in Figure 1.2. The dynamic moral hazard problem can be partially mitigated
but still exists. For simplicity, it assumes that the principal would only hire
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agent one if she motivates the individual work4. Agent one can be considered
as the insider of a small network, and agent two is the outsider.
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Figure 1.2: Links among players
In this environment, agent one’s exclusion incentive can be dropped
when motivating the collaboration. Now !⇤1,t would be the total share o↵ered
to both of the agents. Since the two agents are identical, they would equally
share the gain in the contract. If the synergy is positive and very large this
change doesn’t play a role, since the exclusion incentive is dominated by the
free-riding incentive, which is the same as that in the three-tier structure.
On the other hand, if the synergy is positive but small or negative, taking
the exclusion incentive away can improve the principal’s profitability: the
exclusion-work incentive dominates and the associated constraint needs to be
binding in the three-tier structure environment. Now the principal can o↵er a
relatively smaller total share to the agents, and the stopping threshold would
be the same as that in the three-tier structure with positive synergy, as well
as the threshold in which the principal is indi↵erent between the collaboration
and the individual work.
When motivating the individual work, the private sub-contract still
matters. In the first place, if the link between two agents is dropped, the
4If this assumption is removed, the principal can randomly contract with one of the
agents when motivating the individual work. It can reduce the agent’s gain from the belief
manipulation further since he faces an uncertainty of being o↵ered a contract, which makes
the principal better o↵ compared to the situation with this assumption.
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principal is much better o↵ since she doesn’t need to worry about the agent’s
over-investment incentive and whether (1.4.11) is violated or not, so the prin-
cipal would not compromise to over-invest at t = 0. In the second place, if the
link still exists, the principal still faces exactly the same consideration as she
does in the three-tier structure with positive synergy. At t = 0, the analysis of
the principal’s optimal choice is the same as those in the three-tier structure
environment with positive synergy and the free-riding incentive dominating.
As a result, from the perspective of the principal, the two-tier structure
is weakly better than the three-tier one, and they can reach the same e ciency
level when the synergy is positive and free-riding incentive dominates. From
the perspective of the agents, they are weakly worse o↵ since they have less
options to deviate and the surplus they can keep is also less. The conclusion
is summarised in Proposition
Proposition 1.4.3. The principal is weakly better o↵ and the agents are
weakly worse o↵ in a two-tier structure compared to a three-tier one.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the principal’s optimal contract and timing of motivating
two agents collaborating on a risky project, in which she has no direct link
to one of the agents nor full commitment. In a two-period economy with the
presence of a dynamic moral hazard problem, the e↵ect of agent one’s private
sub-contract on the principal’s optimal decision is highlighted, as well as the
comparisons between the three-tier and two-tier structure.
The principal’s optimal contract for motivating the collaboration and
the individual work in each period are fully characterised. Due to the presence
of agent one’s private sub-contract and the principal’s inability to contract with
agent two, if the principal motivates the collaboration, agent one’s exclusion
incentive dominates when the synergy is negative, or when the positive synergy
is small and he is su ciently patient. It follows that the principal has to leave
more surplus to agent one to deter the deviation and belief manipulation.
When the positive synergy is very large, or when it’s small but agent one
is impatient, the free-riding incentive dominates and the o↵er should be the
same as that when the principal can contract directly with both agents. On
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the other hand, if motivating the individual work, besides the incentive of
shirking, the principal also needs to deter agent one from over-investing by
privately collaborating with agent two.
The principal’s choice of motivating the optimal e↵ort level in each
period is also fully characterised. Without the full commitment, to deter belief
manipulation by the agent(s), the principal tends to reduce the investment and
motivate a lower e↵ort level in this first period. Meanwhile, due to agent one’s
private sub-contract, there exist scenarios in which agent one’s over-investment
incentive cannot be deterred. It follows that the principal compromises to over-
invest by motivating an e↵ort level that exceeds her optimal choice in a static
game, and ine ciency arises. Moreover, this result suggests that the two-tier
structure is weakly better than the three-tier one.
Even though this paper only considers a two-period economy, the key
properties of many periods have been covered. In future work, it would be
interesting to explore the properties of a general network with more agents, in
which the discussion of e ciency would help to determine the optimal network
structure.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Contract to Reward
Private Experimentation
2.1 Introduction
Seeking and blundering are good, for it is only
by seeking and blundering we learn.
— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faustus
I study an environment in which a principal motivates an uninformed agent
to learn and reveal his quality through costly and private experiments. The
principal aims to assign the rewards to correspond as closely as possible to the
quality of the agent, and she commits to a reward scheme before evidence is
acquired. However, The agent, whose quality is initially unknown, only wants
to get a high reward, and he experiments privately and discloses the results
selectively. Thus the optimality of the principal’s commitment arises as a key
question.
For instance, consider a professor who wants to deliver a fair reference
letter for an undergraduate student. Knowing that the student can privately
take many exams and internships and selectively report the results, the pro-
fessor can commit to only write a good letter if the student reports enough
successes. Is this commitment optimal?
The reward scheme that is committed to by the principal is designed
to reflect the agent’s true quality, but it also a↵ects the agent’s incentives to
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acquire and reveal the evidence. A harsh standard in the commitment might
deter the acquisition of the evidence due to a high cost of experiments, but a
relaxed one may contaminate the informativeness of the evidence.
In designing the optimal reward scheme, the principal takes into account
two options that the agent has to deviate from the intended path of experimen-
tation: early-stop and over-experimentation. The early-stop incentive occurs
when the total experimental cost is larger than the benefit from continuing ex-
periments. In this case, a potential good type stops experimenting too early,
to save experimental cost, and he doesn’t learn enough and compromises on a
lower reward level. The over-experimentation incentive emerges when he fails
after he has acquired many successes. Now the agent has learned that he is
a bad type. However, since the principal doesn’t observe any experiments or
results, the bad type agent can still continue to acquire successes and pretend
to be a good type by hiding the unfavourable results in his later report. Thus,
the bad type can still achieve a high reward level. Both incentives would cause
a mismatch between types and rewards.
Building upon these two incentives, my first main result suggests that
the optimal reward scheme is an increasing step function. When the motivated
number of successes is small and the agent’s incentives to deviate from the
intended path of experimentation are weak, a one-step function is optimal:
the agent receives the conditional expected value as a bonus if he reports
enough successes; otherwise, he only gets a non-negative compensation. As this
number increases, in which case the conditional expected value becomes higher
than the expected cost of acquiring one more success by a bad type agent, extra
steps are added after many successes have been acquired, to deter the bad
type’s over-experimentation behaviour, who only needs a few more successes
to pretend to be a good type. These steps make a bad type agent indi↵erent
between over-experimenting and stopping immediately. Furthermore, if the
failures are not verifiable, and the agent’s prior expected value cannot cover
the expected total cost of the experiments, the early-stop incentive distorts the
reward scheme at early stage, since the agent cannot prove that an experiment
has been carried out and failed. Thus the additional steps are required to
encourage a potential good type to continue the remaining experiments, which
make a potential good type agent indi↵erent between aborting experiments
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and continuing. As a result, the distortion results in that a bad type agent
is always over-paid relative to his true value. I also show that it’s always
optimal to screen the bad type agent from the potential good agent when
motivating a strictly positive number of successes. Therefore, the number
of motivated successes is the same as the number of experiments which are
conducted without failures.
My second main result shows that the optimal motivated number of
successes reported by the potential good type agent is always weakly greater
than the largest number whose expected total cost can be covered by the
agent’s prior expected value. On the one hand, the more successes that a
potential good type agent discloses, the more accurate the principal’s reward
could be. This force leads to a higher motivated number of experiments. How-
ever, on the other hand, when the motivated number is too large such that the
conditional expected value is higher than the cost of over-experimentation, or
the agent’s prior expected value cannot cover the experiments’ expected total
cost, the principal has to sacrifice and pay more to a bad type to motivate
the agent to conduct so many experiments and deter the bad type agents from
over-experimenting and contaminating the informativeness of the reported suc-
cesses. This force discourages the principal from motivating a large number of
experiments, and the optimal number is determined by the trade-o↵ between
these two forces. Moreover, when the good type agent’s value is too low or the
cost of an experiment is too high, the principal would optimally motivate no
experiments and assign the ex ante expected value to the agent.
In a public information environment where the experiments and re-
sults are publicly observed, I show that the one step function is still optimal.
Moreover, when the failures are verifiable and the agent’s value-cost ratio is
low, the private experimentation achieves the same e ciency level as the pub-
lic environment. In this case, the agent is able to prove that he has indeed
conducted the experiment and failed, and the incentive for deviation from
over-experimenting is weak.
I explore two extensions of the model, which show the robustness of my
findings. Firstly, I introduce a small probability of bad luck in each experiment,
which is privately observed and causes a failure for both types. The results
suggest that this environment is equivalent to the scenario with unverifiable
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failures, since the failures caused by the bad luck provide no information about
the agent’s type but the incentive to stop at an earlier stage. Secondly, I
consider a scenario with finite opportunity for experimenting, and show that
the principal’s optimal reward scheme is consistent with that with infinite
opportunity.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 summarises
related literature. Section 2.3 shows the model’s setup as well as some pre-
liminary results and the benchmark. The main analysis of the private experi-
mentation is demonstrated in section 2.4. Extensions can be found in section
2.5. Section 2.6 finally concludes. All proofs not shown in the main text are
given in Appendix B.
2.2 Literature Review
This work relates to literature about private experimentation. Henry (2009)
considers a scenario where the number of experiments is pre-determined, and
the agent is not able to stop until all experiments are conducted regardless
of their results. My work di↵ers in allowing the agent to decide whether to
continue after each experiment. Ispano (2015) shows the conditions such that
the sender optimally reveals the unverifiable bad news. My work compares the
di↵erence when failures are verifiable and when they are not. Moreover, their
work doesn’t consider the receiver’s optimal commitment from the perspective
of mechanism design, which is the key result in my work.
The closest work is by Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014). They charac-
terise the parameter range in which the persuasion equilibria with cut-o↵ rule
exists in costly private experimentation with symmetric information structure.
In their work, the receiver makes a binary decision, and the sender applies a
sanitisation strategy in which all unfavourable results are concealed. In con-
trast, my model considers an asymmetric information environment, and the
principal o↵ers a reward scheme according to di↵erent reported results, rather
than a binary approval decision. My work follows the mechanism design ap-
proach and Delgenhauer and Schulte’s does not. The cut-o↵ function in my
model is similar to their cut-o↵ approval rule, but the interpretations are dif-
ferent. Also, the cut-o↵ function is not always optimal, and the alternative
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step function is introduced, which is absent in their work. Other di↵erences
are that I use, and I show that, the sanitisation strategy is not optimal for the
agent when failures are verifiable.
There is a large literature in strategic experimentation, such as Bergmann
and Hege (2005), Halac, Kartik and Liu (2016), and Henry and Ottaviani
(2014), etc. Bergman and Hege (2005) show the optimal way to finance an
innovative project without full commitment, and Halac, Kartik and Liu (2016)
focus on the scenario with full commitment. Henry and Ottaviani (2014) show
that the principal free rides on the agent’s experiments when results are public
information. In most cases where results are private information, the principal
or the receiver can use the timing of when they observe success to determine
monetary transfer: this is a key di↵erence from the current model, which does
not include such timing.
This work also relates to literature on information disclosure and per-
suasion. Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kolotilin (2015) focus on the sender’s
optimal mechanism; Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) find the optimal way for
the sender to design the structure of the experiment, and Bergemann, Bon-
atti and Smolin (2015) consider a monopolist who can design the experiment
and set the selling price. They all focus on public experimentation, where
experimental results can be publicly observed. In contrast, this work mainly
focuses on the private case, and compares the results to public case. Glazer
and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) and Hart, Kremer and Perry (2016) analyse how
commitment can help the principal to improve outcomes in evidence games
where the agent’s set of hard evidence is exogenously given and he cannot
generate any other evidence. By comparison, this work considers how the
optimal commitment changes if the agent can acquire hard evidence at a cost.
DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2017) also consider an uninformed
agent who chooses one test among many di↵erent tests and strategically re-
veals the result to the market. In their paper, the market is competitive, and
the agent has only one chance to take a test, in which the null result with
positive probability is introduced and is not verifiable. By contrast, my model
focuses on the softest test in which the good type always passes and the bad
type passes with some probability, and the agent has infinite opportunity for
experimenting. In my work, both the scenarios, when the failure is verifiable
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and not verifiable, are discussed. Also, my model focuses on the principal’s
optimal full commitment, which is absent in their paper.
This work can be compared to literature on signalling and screening, for
example Spence (1973), and Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976). In their models,
there is no learning process for the agent, and every type of agent can mimic
the behaviour of others for a price. Here, the agent would learn his own type
through experiments, and a potential good type cannot perfectly masquerade
as bad type. Additionally, in this work, the agent can only be more optimistic
that his type is good if no failure occurs, and full screening cannot be achieved.
Other literature that this work relates to includes Ho¨rner and Skrzy-
pacz (2014) and Celik (2015) who focus on gradually revealing information,
and Ho¨rner and Skrzypacz (2014) who show that sequential tests can help to
mitigate the hold-up problem. Kruse and Strack (2015) focuses on mechanism
design for an optimal stopping time, and a cut-o↵ rule is proposed as optimal.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Setup
An agent (he) wants to get reward (or evaluation) from a principal (she).
Initially the agent’s type1 (value), Mi 2 {M, 0}, is unknown, but a common
prior is shared: type is good (G) with probability p0, and its value isMG = M ,
where p0 2 (0, 1) and M 2 R+ ; it’s bad (B) with probability 1 p0, and value
is MB = 0.
The agent can learn his own type through the private experiments2.
The constant cost of each experiment is c, where c 2 R+. In each experiment,
a good type agent can always succeed. However, a bad type can only succeed
with probability 1  ✓, where ✓ 2 (0, 1). ✓ can be considered as the threshold
to pass a test. The experiment has the property of the softest test, where a
good type always passes the test and a bad type fails it with some positive
probability. Since experiments are privately observed, the agent can selectively
report a subset of acquired results. Give he conducts n experiments, denote
1This setting is equivalent to that in which the agent sells a project with unkown quality.
2It can also be interpreted that there are many di↵erent tests with the same level of cost
and threshold for passing.
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the reported number of successes and failures by kg and kb respectively, where
n, kg, kb 2 N.
Before experimentation, the principal can o↵er a reward scheme a(·) to
the agent which specifies the di↵erent reward levels corresponding to di↵erent
combinations of reported results by the agent, where a : N⇥N! R+. Specif-
ically, a(·) = a(kg, kb). The principal cares about the precision and fairness of
the reward, and her payo↵ function is:  (a(kg, kb) Mi)2.
The risk neutral agent only cares about the reward level, and his payo↵
function is a(kg, kb)  nc, given he has conducted n experiments and reported
kg successes and kb failures. All parameters and payo↵ functions are common
knowledge, and the timeline is shown below:
1. Principal o↵ers the reward scheme, and agent chooses whether accept or
not.
2. Agent begins to run experiments after acceptance.
3. Agent stops experiments and selectively reports to principal.
4. Payo↵s are realised.
Principal o↵ers
the reward scheme
Agent runs
experiments
Agent reports
results
Payo↵s are realised
Figure 2.1: Timeline
2.3.2 Preliminaries
This section shows some preliminary results, which can help to simplify the
future analysis. Now consider how the posterior belief is updated when dif-
ferent results are acquired. If the agent has acquired k 2 N successes without
failures, he becomes more optimistic on that his type is good, and the posterior
belief denoted by pk is updated according to Bayes’ rule:
Pr(Good|k, 0) = p0
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k = pk (2.3.1)
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In this case, the agent has no reason to hide the successes. This is because, on
the equilibrium path, the more successes are reported the higher the posterior
belief the principal has, which leads a higher expected value. Instead, if the
agent has acquired at least one failure, he learns that he is a bad type since
only the bad type can fail with positive probability in an experiment. Thus,
no matter how many successes he has achieved before, his posterior belief now
is Pr(G|kb   1) = 0.
Since one failure is enough for the principal to learn the agent is bad
with value MB = 0, the principal needs not to provide any incentives for the
bad type agent to reveal more than one failures. On the one hand, more
failures don’t a↵ect the belief if the principal has observed one failure, and
the precision of the reward is not a↵ected. On the other hand, If the agent
continues to experiment after the first failure, he either gets more failures or
more successes. Thus he can hide failures and report more successes to achieve
a higher reward level. Since the success is verifiable, the only way for a bad
type to pretend to be good is to over-experiment—continuing experiments to
acquire successes by luck after his first failure arrives. On expectation, a bad
type agent can achieve one more success with cost c1 ✓ . To mimic the good
type’s behaviour, the bad type agent’s selective report satisfies: kg + kb  k.
This is the agent’s over-experimentation incentive, which would be discussed
later in details, as well as the verifiability of failures.
Notice that the principal’s commitment always motivates the potential
good type agent, who hasn’t failed yet, to reveal a certain number of successes,
therefore, to determine the optimal commitment, the question can be decom-
posed into the following two parts: firstly, given the principal motivates the
potential good agent to reveal a arbitrary k successes, the properties of the
associated reward scheme, ak(kg, kb), needs to be characterised; secondly, the
optimal number k⇤ then can be found, which maximised the principal’s ex ante
expected payo↵. Thus, the optimal commitment is the optimal reward scheme
ak
⇤
(kg, kb), and k⇤ successes are motivated to be reported by the potential
good agent.
Claim 2.3.1. a0(·) = p0M .
When k = 0, no successes are motivated to be reported, and claim 2.3.1
suggests that the principal would optimally assign a single reward level to the
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agent regardless of the agent’s report, which equals the agent’s prior expected
value. The agent would not conduct any experiments on the equilibrium path,
and no further information about the agent’s quality is provided.
When k 2 N+, a single reward level cannot be optimal, otherwise the
agent can easily deviate to conduct no experiments and gain the same reward
as those who report some successes. Some features associated with the optimal
reward scheme can be summarised in Lemma 2.3.1.
Lemma 2.3.1. Given the commitment motivates the potential good agent to
report k 2 N+ successes, the optimal associated reward scheme is equivalent to
the reward scheme with: for 8kg, kb 2 N,
1) ak(kg, 1)   ak(kg, kb > 1);
2) ak(kg   k, kb   1) = 0;
3) ak(kg   k, 0) = ak(k, 0).
Lemma 2.3.1.1) states that it is optimal to assign at most the same level
of reward to those reporting more failures, since one failure is enough for the
principal to learn that the agent is a bad type and more failures don’t a↵ect the
principal’s posterior belief on the agent’s type. Given the reported number of
successes, the principal punishes the bad type agent who has more failures by
assigning a lower reward level. Lemma 2.3.1.2) pushes the punishment to the
maximum when an agent reports more than enough successes together with
some failure(s). The principal learns the agent is bad when observing failures,
and she also learns that the bad type has over-experimented to acquire so
many successes after his first failure. This punishment is just the bad type’s
true value, which prevents such behaviour from occurring when a contract is
accepted. Thus, the bad type agent would conceal failures when pretending
to be a potential good one.
Lemma 2.3.1.3) shows that, to guarantee that an agent’s ex ante optimal
plan is to reveal enough successes k given the reward scheme from principal, the
marginal benefit from running one more trial is strictly less than the marginal
cost after continuously obtaining k successes, and it must also be true for all
numbers greater than k. If not, the agent would continue experimenting as
long as no failure occurs. For any other reward scheme satisfying such criteria,
it would lead to the same end as the one with assigning the same level of reward
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to those reporting more than enough successes without failure. Therefore, the
remaining analysis can focus on ak(k, 0), ak(kg < k, 0) and ak(kg < k, 1) only.
2.3.3 Benchmark: Public Experimentation
Before solving the main model, I discuss a benchmark to provide useful back-
ground and intuition, in which the experiments are conducted publicly and
the results are observable by both parties. If a failure occurs, the principal
learns immediately that the agent is a bad type, and any further experiments
don’t a↵ect the principal’s belief or improve the precision of the reward. The
agent cannot hide any failures, or over-experiment to pretend that failure never
occurs.
When the principal’s commitment motivates the potential good agent
to acquire k successes, the agent’s expected payo↵ is:
UAP (k, p0) =  c+[p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)]UAP (k 1, p1)+(1 p0)✓ak(0, 1) (2.3.2)
Denote by UAP (k   j, pj) the agent’s continuation value of acquiring the re-
maining k   j successes with current belief pj, where j  k. After paying
the cost c in the first experiment, with probability p0 + (1   p0)(1   ✓), the
agent succeeds and becomes more optimistic with a posterior belief p1, and his
continuation value of acquiring the remaining k  1 successes is UAP (k  1, p1);
with probability (1  p0)✓, the agent fails, and then he learns that his type is
bad, and receives a reward level ak(0, 1). The agent’s ex ante expected payo↵
can also be simplified as:
U(k, p0) = E
 
ak(kg, kb)
  k, p0   k˜c, where k˜ = kX
i=1
p0
pi 1
(2.3.3)
where k˜ is the expected number of experiments that the agent would run
after accepting the contract, and it equals to the summation of the likelihood
ratio of prior to posterior beliefs. Thus k˜c is the ex ante expected total cost3.
3In this plan, the agent only needs to continue experimenting when no failure occurs,
thus it’s easily to see the probability that no failure occurs in k experiment is p0+(1 p0)(1 
✓)k, and the probability that first failure occurs in jth experiments is (1   p0)(1   ✓)j 1✓.
Therefore, the expected total cost is:
⇥
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k
⇤
kc+
Pk
i=1(1 p0)(1 ✓)i 1✓(i 
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Following this plan, the agent’s ex ante expected gain4 is E
 
ak(kg, kb)
  k, p0 .
The agent would accept the contract and run experiments as long as Individual
Rationality (IR) is satisfied, and his ex-ante expected payo↵ is non-negative.
Thus the principal maximises her expected payo↵ conditional on the prior
belief and the number of experiments provided incentives to run:
Max
a(·)2R+
V (k, p0) = E
⇣
   ak(·) Mi 2   k, p0⌘
s.t : IR : UAP (k, p0)   0
(2.3.4)
Proposition 2.3.1. In public experimentation:
1) Given the commitment motivates the potential good agent to report k 2 N+
successes, the optimal associated reward scheme is a one-step function at k
(OF), specifically:
OF =
8<:a
k(j < k, 1) = max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
ak(k, 0) = pkM +max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o (2.3.5)
2) The optimal number kP satisfies k  kP <1, where
k =
8<:max{k 2 N : p0M   k˜c} p0M   c0 p0M < c
Given the principal motivates the potential good agent to report k 2 N+
successes, the optimal reward scheme is a one-step function (OF), and it can
be interpreted as follows: the principal commits that the agent gets a high
reward level if reporting weakly more than k successes without failures, and
he is treated as a bad type if reporting strictly less successes with one failure.
The agent then runs experiments after accepting the contract, and reports all
results he acquires. Thus when any less than k successes are reported, there
is a failure associated.
The participation threshold k is now introduced, which is the largest
number of experiments whose expected total cost can be covered by the agent’s
1)c =
Pk
i=1
⇥
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)i 1
⇤
c =
Pk
i=1
p0
pi 1 c.
4E
 
ak(kg, kb)
  k, p0  = [p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k]ak(k, 0) +Pk 1i=0 (1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓ak(i, 1).
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kg
ak(·)
0 k
ak(k, 0)
ak(j < k, 1)
M
pkM
max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
Figure 2.2: OF in public experimentation
prior expected value. When the prior expected value is very low, p0M < c,
it can cover the cost for at least one experiment, in which case k = 0. When
the prior expected value is high, p0M   c, the threshold equals to the round
down of the number of experiments such that the prior expectation equals to
the expected total cost5, p0M = k˜c. When the incentivised number in the
contract is smaller than this threshold, k < k, the agent is willing to carry
out the principal’s desired plan since the prior expectation of agent’s value is
higher than the ex ante expected total cost, p0M   k˜c. Then the principal can
simply assign the bad type’s true value to those facing early failures, and the
posterior expectation, pkM , to those who have achieved the desired number
of successes without failure. These reward levels are the same as the agent’s
self evaluation after learning through experiments.
If the principal incentivises more than the participation threshold, k >
k, she needs to take care of the agent’s individual rationality, IR, to guarantee
the agent’s acceptance of her contract in the first place. Ex ante, it’s too costly
to achieve the desired number of successes without failures, k˜c > p0M . Thus
it becomes optimal to assign a positive reward level to a bad type reporting
one failure, which is just equal to the excess cost—the di↵erence between the
expected total cost and the prior expectation. This can be treated as a reward
5If k is continuous, the threshold number would be the one such that the prior expectation
just equals to the total expected cost. Due to the discreteness of experiment, the threshold
needs to be rounded down.
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for audacity, or compensation for fear of failure, even if the agent’s type turns
out to be bad. If the exact k successes are acquired without failure, the agent
gains a bonus which is equal to the posterior expectation, pkM . It captures the
feature that the principal is risk averse, and she optimally reduces the risk of
making a mistake—assigning weakly a higher level of reward to every ex post
scenario. This is equivalent to the principal paying the excess cost up front
when agent accepts the contract, and incentivise him to collect the bonus if
the desired number of successes are obtained without failure.
In the public experimentation, the principal optimally motivates the
potential good agent to report kP successes, which is always weakly greater
than the first threshold k. On the one hand, a higher reward is closer to the
true valuation of good type, which is the gain in the ex post scenario where
the agent’s type is good; on the other hand, the loss also increases in ex post
scenarios where the agent’s type is bad. Therefore, the principal is only willing
to push kP as large as possible if the gain can cover the loss. This kP must
be finite, since the good type’s value is finite and increasing required successes
without failure would raise losses in every ex post scenario beyond the number
whose associated reward is closest to the good type’s value. A numeric example
is shown below.
Furthermore, Proposition 2.3.1.2) also implicitly shows that it could be
optimal for the principal to motivate no experiments and only assign the single
reward to the agent. It happens when the good agent’s value-cost ratio Mc is
too low, in which case it’s too costly to motivate the any positive amount of
experiments: the gain from a more accurate reward for the good agent cannot
cover the loss from over-paying the bad type agent.
Example 2.3.1. When ✓ = 0.6, p = 0.4,M = 3 and c = 1, then the participa-
tion threshold number is k = 1. In public experimentation, the optimal num-
ber is kP = 2 and its associated reward scheme is CF =
8<:a2(2, 0) = 2.86a2(j < 2, 1) = 0.44
and the principal’s expected payo↵ is V P (2, p0) =  0.89.
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2.4 Analysis in Private Experimentation
In private experimentation, experiments and results are privately observed by
the agent, thus extra incentives must be provided in the principal’s commit-
ment.
Given j < k successes are acquired without failures in the first j exper-
iments, the agent now is more optimistic that his type is good with posterior
pj, and his continuation payo↵ of continuing experiments would be:
U(k   j, pj) =  c+ p0
pj
U(k   j   1, pj+1) + (1  pj)✓max
 
ak(j, 0), ak(j, 1)
 
(2.4.1)
If continuing one experiment, by paying the cost c, he gets one more success
with probability p0pj and his continuation payo↵ would be U(k   j   1, pj+1);
with probability (1  pj)✓, he fails and his posterior belief of being good type
drops to 0. In this case, the bad type agent gets U (k   j, 0), where
U (k   j, 0) = max
n2N+, jnk
max
 
ak(n, 0), ak(n, 1)
   (n  j) c
1  ✓ (2.4.2)
Now the bad type agent privately learns his type is bad, which the principal
doesn’t observe. He only cares about whether the future experiments can
generate a net benefit since the cost of previous experiments is sunk. On
expectation, when paying the cost c1 ✓ , he can still acquire one more success.
Thus he can over-experiment to get more successes or even continue doing so
until k successes are acquired. Depending on the reward scheme, he decides to
reveal or not reveal the failures. This is called over-experimentation incentive.
If the bad type is doing so, the report is less informative.
After j successes without failures, if the potential good type decides
to stop, he would reveal all the successes and get ak(j, 0) when the failure
is verifiable, or make a fake failure and get max
 
ak(j, 0), ak(j, 1)
 
when the
failure is not verifiable. In this deviation, even though the reward is lower,
the potential good agent can save the cost of experiments. Thus the agent’s
incentive of early-stop rises. To motivate the potential good type agent to
continue and fulfil the initial plan, the reward scheme must guarantee that
the continuation payo↵ U(k   j, pj) is higher than that of early-stop, which
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demonstrates the agent’s first type of incentives constraints ICSj :
ICSj : U(k   j, pj)  
8<:ak(k, 0) verifiable failuremax ak(j, 0), ak(j, 1) unverifiable failure
(2.4.3)
Lemma 2.4.1. When motivating the potential good agent to report k 2 N+
successes, the optimal associated reward scheme satisfies: for 0  j < k,
max
 
ak(j + 1, 1), ak(j + 1, 0)
  max ak(j, 1), ak(j, 0)  c
1  ✓ (2.4.4)
When a bad type agent’s over-experimentation incentive is taken into
account, Lemma 2.4.1 suggests that, when motivating a positive number of
successes to be reported, the associated optimal scheme always separates the
bad type agent from the potential good type one. The principal prefers to
deliver the bad type agent a reward that is as low as possible, but it also
creates a high incentive of over-experimenting for those who just need a few
successes to pretend to be the potential good ones. Compared to a reward
scheme which makes bad type agents who fail late pooling with the potential
good type ones, the principal can always construct a profitable deviation, in
which the potential good agent receives the same as before but the bad type
agents are now at most indi↵erent between over-experimenting and not. As a
result, the principal makes strictly less loss in this deviation. The constraints in
Lemma 2.4.1 are now the second type of incentive constraints that are designed
to deter the bad type agent’s over-experimentation incentive, ICFj , in which
the extra gain from over-experimentation is less than the extra expected cost
of doing so. As a result, the number of motivated successes, which are reported
by the potential good agent, equals to the number of motivated experiments
that the agent needs to conduct without failures.
Given k successes are motivated to be reported by the potential good
agent, there are k   1 early-stop incentives constraints ICS, and k   1 over-
experimentation incentive constraints ICF . Together with IR, the principal
faces 2k   1 constraints.
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2.4.1 Verifiable failures
The verifiability of failures plays a crucial role in determining the optimal
contract o↵ered by the principal. When it’s verifiable, it’s the hard evidence
to prove that the agent indeed has paid the cost, conducted the experiment
and failed. When it’s not verifiable, the such conducted experiment cannot be
proved, and the principal cannot distinguish the agent who fails from those
haven’t undertaken it. This section focuses on the scenario in which failures are
verifiable. The scenario with unverifiable failures is discussed later in Section
2.4.2.
Lemma 2.4.2. In private experimentation with verifiable failures, for kg < k,
ak(kg, 1)   ak(kg, 0) = 0 (2.4.5)
When the failures are verifiable, the agent’s must be a bad type if less
than the required number of successes are reported without failures since the
principal provides enough incentives to the potential good type to continue
experimenting after early success. A reward for honesty can be created by
assigning a weakly higher reward level to those who report a failure. As the
largest punishment to those who pretend to face a failure, the principal then
can simply assign the bad type’s true value, ak(j < k, 0) = 0, if “no failure
presented” when fewer successes are reported. Thus ICS and ICF can be
simplified as:
ICS,V0jk 1 : U(k   j, pj)   0
ICF,V0j<k 1 : a
k(j + 1, 1)  ak(j, 1)  c
1  ✓
ICF,Vk 1 : a
k(k, 0)  ak(k   1, 1)  c
1  ✓
(2.4.6)
Thus, this simplification shows that IR is the same as ICS,V0 . After the success
in the first trial, the agent is more optimistic, and he is willing to carry out
the remaining experiments. Thus, as long as IR is satisfied, ICS,V1jk 1 must
be slack, in which the early-stop incentive can be discarded.
These constraints demonstrate that the associated optimal reward scheme
must share the property of screening: a bad type would not blend into a po-
46
tential good type, and the potential good type would not pretend to be bad.
However, full screening cannot be achieved here. This is because the agent
can only be more optimistic after more successes are achieved without failure
and treat himself as a potential good type, but he cannot be sure whether he
is a good type or a lucky enough bad type who hasn’t failed yet.
Proposition 2.4.1. In private experimentation with verifiable failures,
1) Given the commitment motivates the potential good type agent to report
k 2 N successes, the associated optimal reward scheme ak(·) is:
a) CF when k  kˆ, where kˆ =
8<:max{k 2 N : pkM  c1 ✓} p1M  c1 ✓0 p1M > c1 ✓ ;
b) Type I multi-step function (MF-I) when k > kˆ;
2) The optimal number k⇤V satisfies k  k⇤V < 1. Especially, k⇤V = kP if
kˆ   kP .
Here the over-experimentation threshold kˆ is introduced, which mea-
sures the largest number of reported successes where the agent’s conditional
expected value is weakly smaller than the expected cost of a bad type achiev-
ing a success. Proposition 2.4.1.1.a) shows CF, the optimal cut-o↵ reward
scheme in public experimentation, is still optimal when the motivated number
of experiments is low, and the over-experimentation threshold kˆ determines
the scope of CF in private experimentation with verifiable failures.
The demonstration of the optimal reward scheme at di↵erent value-cost
ratio can be summarised in Figure 2.4. When the agent’s value-cost ratio is
low, Mc 2
⇥
0, 11 ✓
⇤
, kˆ !1, the over-experimentation threshold kˆ doesn’t a↵ect
the optimality of CF. Now optimal commitment is exactly the same as that
in public experimentation. Intuitively, this happens when the good type is
not superior enough or the experimental cost is relatively high. Also, since
the failures are verifiable, once the commitment is made and experiments are
carried out, all reports which have less than the required level of successes
must contain a failure, and the agent would disclose all of the information he
acquires.
When the agent’s value-cost ratio is medium, Mc 2
⇣
1
1 ✓ ,
1
(1 ✓)p1
i
, 0 <
kˆ <1, in which case the di↵erence between the good and bad type’s values are
not too large, or the cost of a single experiment is relatively low. Now the over-
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experimentation threshold equals to the rounded down number of reported
successes where the agent’s conditional expected value equals to the expected
cost of a bad type achieving a success, pkM =
c
1 ✓ . When the motivated num-
ber of experiments is lower than the over-experimentation threshold, k  kˆ,
and the optimal commitment in public experimentation could still be optimal
in private with verifiable failures, when the over-experimentation threshold is
su ciently high, kˆ   kP . However, if the motivated number of experiments
is too large, k > kˆ, CF cannot be applied. Consider the following situation
when the first failure occurs at the kth experiment. If the principal still sticks
to CF, the agent would definitely over-experiment since such behaviour would
lead to an extra gain pkM which can cover the expected cost of acquiring one
more success for the bad type. As a result, the incentive constraint ICF,Vk 1 is
violated and report becomes less informative. Therefore, alternative reward
schemes need to be considered, and the optimal one among them is a type-I
multi-step function (MF-I), which is proposed in Proposition 2.4.1.1.b).
Definition 1. Type I multi-step function (MF-I) is a reward scheme such that
ICF,Vljk 1 are all binding, where l = max{l 2 N : p0M  
Pk
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1 ✓ & 0 
l  k   1}:
MF-I =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
ak(j < l, 1) = max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
ak(l, 1) = plM  
kX
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1  ✓ +max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
ak(l < j < k, 1) = (j   l) c1 ✓ + ak(l, 1)
ak(k, 0) = (k   l) c1 ✓ + ak(l, 1)
(2.4.7)
The structure of MF-I demonstrates the feature of “setting blocks at the
end”: the di↵erence of rewards between rewards among a neighboured number
of reported successes cannot exceed c1 ✓ , which is the cost level of acquiring
a success for a bad type. For those failures which occurs early enough, that
is before lth experiments, it’s still too costly to over-experiment: the agent is
then happy to stop and report what he acquires, and the reward level could
be same as those in CF at the same level since failures are verifiable. Notice
that, the later the first failure occurs, the stronger the incentive for the agent
to over-experiment. Thus it’s optimal to have ICF,Vljk 1 be all binding. As a
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result, not only are bad types overpaid, but also they are treated di↵erently
when the first failure occurs in di↵erent experiments: the later the failure, the
higher is the reward associated. Meanwhile, it’s easy to see that when the
required number of successes k are reported, the associated reward level for a
potential good type in MF-I is strictly lower than that in CF6. One example
of MF-I’s structure can be found in Figure 2.3.
kg
ak(·)
0 l k
ak(k, 0)
ak(k   1, 1)
ak(l, 1)
ak(j < l, 1)
M
c
1 ✓
c
1 ✓
max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
plM  
Pk
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1 ✓
Figure 2.3: MF-I in private experimentation (Example: k > 2 and l = k   2)
If the agent’s value-cost ratio is su ciently high, Mc 2
⇣
1
(1 ✓)p1 ,1
⌘
, in
which case the good type is much better than the bad type or the cost of a
single experiment is too low, the agent would over-experiment at any positive
number of reported successes, where kˆ = 0. This leads to all ICF,V are binding.
As a result, the potential good type is still underpaid relative to the agent’s
self-evaluation, but the bad type is overpaid.
Under the optimal reward scheme, the principal still optimally motivate
the potential good type agent to report a number of successes that is higher
than the participation threshold k, even if it exceeds the over-experimentation
threshold kˆ. This is because the benefit of making the reward level for a
potential good type closer to the good type’s true valuation M is su ciently
large to cover the expected increased loss of overpayment in other ex post
scenarios where the type is bad. The lower bound of optimal amount k⇤V is
the same as that in public experimentation, and the exact number depends
6When comparing the reward level to those reporting required k successes without failure
in CF and MF-I, it has pkM   (k   l) c1 ✓  
⇣
plM  
Pk
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1 ✓
⌘
> 0.
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M
c
0
CF
CF at k  kˆ
MF-I at k > kˆ MF-I
1
1 ✓
1
p1(1 ✓)
Figure 2.4: Optimal reward scheme with verifiable failures at di↵erent value-
cost ratio
on the parameter range, and CF and MF-I are the only possible candidates of
reward scheme. A numeric example is shown below.
Example 2.4.1. When ✓ = 0.6, p = 0.4, M = 3 and c = 1, then the partic-
ipation threshold is k = 1, and the over-experimentation threshold is kˆ = 2.
In private experimentation with verifiable failures, at k = 2, the associated
optimal reward scheme is CF =
8<:a2(2, 0) = 2.86a2(j < 2, 1) = 0.44 , and the principal’s
expected payo↵ is VV (2, p0) =  0.89; at k = 3, the associated optimal reward
scheme is MF-I =
8>>><>>>:
a3(3, 0) = 3.65
a3(2, 1) = 1.15
a3(j < 2, 0) = 0.94
, and the principal’s expected pay-
o↵ is VV (3, p0) =  1.19. In the optimal contract, k⇤V = 2 and its associated
reward scheme is CF.
2.4.2 Unverifiable failures
The situation becomes more complicated when failures are not verifiable. This
implies that the agent can easily or cheaply lie when reporting failures, which
occurs when the hard evidence of failure is hard to find or stored or cost of
fake evidence is cheap. Thus the principal cannot tell whether the experiment
associated with the failure has been indeed carried out. If it is easy for the
agent to conceal a failure, the idea of “rewarding honesty” in public and private
experimentation with verifiable failures cannot be applied, and Lemma 2.4.2
doesn’t hold. If the principal assigns a strictly higher reward to those reporting
50
failures, the potential good type agent would pretend to be a bad type if it’s
beneficial to do so. On the one hand, when pretending to be those who face an
early failure, the gain is smaller than continuing to undertake the remaining
experiments; but, on the other hand, the agent can save experimental costs.
Therefore, the best that the principal can do is to assign the same level to those
reporting less than required number of successes with and without failures, and
ICF,NV and ICS,NV can now be written as:
ICS,NV0jk 1 : U(k   j, pj)   ak(j, 0) = ak(j, 1)
ICF,NV0j<k 1 : a
k(j + 1, 1)  ak(j, 1)  c
1  ✓
ICF,NVk 1 : a
k(k, 0)  ak(k   1, 1)  c
1  ✓
(2.4.8)
With the help of incentive constraints above, the agent would disclose all of the
information acquired on the equilibrium path, and “masquerading” behaviour
is deterred: ICF,NV prevent from “pretending to be good” and ICS,NV deter
“pretending to be bad”. Together with IR, there are still 2k   1 constraints,
whose number is the same as under private experimentation with verifiable
failures, but they are more strict. Thus it’s natural to check whether CF and
MF-I proposed before are feasible, and whether they would still be optimal
if all constraints were satisfied; otherwise, other reward schemes need to be
considered.
Proposition 2.4.2. In private experimentation with unverifiable failures,
1) Given the commitment motivates the potential good type agent to report
kN+ successes, the associated optimal reward scheme is:
a) CF when k  min
n
kˆ, k
o
;
b) MF-I when kˆ < k  k;
c) Type II multi-step function (MF-II) when k < k  kˆ;
d) Type III multi-step function (MF-III) when k > max
n
kˆ, k
o
.
2) The optimal number k⇤NV satisfies k  k⇤NV <1.
Proposition 2.4.2.1) shows that the structure of the optimal reward
scheme is determined mutually by the participation and over-experimentation
threshold. When the motivated number of experiments is smaller than both,
k < min
n
kˆ, k
o
, the agent finds that, in CF, the benefit from early-stop is
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too small, and the cost of over-experimentation after failure is too high. This
happens when the value-cost ratio stays at a medium level, Mc 2
h
1
p0
, 1(1 ✓)p1
i
,
where 0 < k <1 and kˆ > 0. Instead, when the ratio is su ciently high or too
low, Mc 2
h
0, 1p0
⌘
[
⇣
1
(1 ✓)p1 ,1
⌘
where now kˆ = 0 or k = 0, if the principal still
sticks to a CF scheme, at least one incentive constraint is violated, and the
agent then would either stop earlier without failure or over-experiment after
early failure. As a result, CF is no longer optimal in this case. The discussion
of the optimal reward scheme at di↵erent value-cost ratio when failures are
not verifiable is summarised in Figure 2.6.
Since there is no straightforward way of knowing which threshold num-
ber is larger, di↵erent scenarios need to be discussed. If the participation
threshold is relatively larger, kˆ < k, MF-I is optimal when the number of de-
sired experiments is between the two threshold numbers, kˆ < k  k. Since the
desired number of experiments is still smaller than the participation threshold,
the agent doesn’t gain from pretending to be bad by stopping early without
failure. On the other hand, however, now k > kˆ is large enough to generate a
gain from over-experimentation, specially if a failure occurs when the required
number of successes is almost achieved. Then only ICF,NV need to be attended
to, and MF-I scheme is optimal.
If the over-experimentation threshold is relatively larger, k < kˆ, when
the incentivised number k is between two thresholds, the conclusions are dif-
ferent. When k < kˆ, the agent is not willing to pretend to be a good type by
over-experimentation since the benefit from such behaviour cannot cover the
cost. However, when k > k, in which the prior expectation cannot cover the
ex-ante expected total cost, the agent find that it’s better to pretend to be a
bad type and receive a relatively smaller reward after accepting the principal’s
contract, among which the worst case is that the agent reports failure imme-
diately without any experiments. To deal with this, the type II step function
(MF-II) is introduced.
Definition 2. The type II multi-step function (MF-II) is a reward scheme such
that ICS,NV0jm are all binding, wherem = max{m 2 N : p0M 
Pk
i=m+1
p0
pi 1 c& 0 
m  k   1}:
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1) When 0  m < k   1,
MF-II =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
ak(0, 0) = 0
ak(0 < j  m, 1) =Pji=1 pipi 1 c
ak(m < j < k, 1) =
kX
i=m+1
pm+1
pi 1
c  pm+1M + ak(m, 1)
ak(k, 0) = pkM + ak(m+ 1, 1)
(2.4.9)
2) When m = k   1,
MF-II =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
ak(0, 0) = 0
ak(0 < j < k, 1) =
jX
i=1
pi
pi 1
c
ak(k, 0) =
kX
i=1
pi
pi 1
c
(2.4.10)
Definition 3. The type III multi-step function (MF-III) is a reward scheme
such that ICS,NV0jm and IC
F,NV
ljk 1 are all binding, 0  m < l  k   1:
MF-III =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
ak(0, 1) = 0
ak(0 < j  m, 1) =Pji=1 pipi 1 c
ak(m < j < l, 1) =
kX
i=m+1
pm+1
pi 1
c  pm+1M + ak(m, 1)
ak(l, 1) = plM  
kX
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1  ✓ +
kX
i=m+1
pm+1
pi 1
c  pm+1M + ak(m, 1)
ak(l < j < k, 1) = (j   l) c1 ✓ + ak(l, 1)
ak(k, 0) = (k   l) c1 ✓ + ak(l, 1)
(2.4.11)
MF-II captures the feature of “building stairs at beginning”: the prin-
cipal raises the reward level for those whose first failure occurs at some early
stage to compensate for the high expected total cost, until the agent is op-
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timistic enough to carry out the remaining experiments if no failure occurs.
This implies that this reward scheme makes only the first ICS,NV0jm constraints
binding. Then the remaining reward levels in MF-II share the same feature as
those in CF: if the motivated number of successes k is reported, the agent can
claim a bonus pkM . If the value-cost ratio is too small, all IC
S,NV are binding,
and steps are built until the very end. These stairs in MF-II have a di↵erent
e↵ect on an agent’s behaviour compared to those blocks at the end of MF-I
where the bad type is deterred from over-experimentation.
If the motivated number k is larger than both of the thresholds, k >
max
n
kˆ, k
o
, the agent has an incentive to stop earlier without failures at be-
ginning and to over-experiment at the end. On the one hand, due to k > k,
the agent finds that the ex ante expected total cost is too high to follow the
planned commitment, and he would be better o↵ by stopping earlier without
failure. On the other hand, since k > kˆ, even if previous incentives are solved,
the agent would over-experiment since pretending to be good type is more at-
tractive than ceasing to experiment. Therefore, both types of incentives need
to be addressed, and the type III step function (MF-III) is optimal among all
feasible alternatives.
MF-III then is the mixture of MF-I and MF-II: stairs at beginning
and blocks at the end. In this reward scheme, the first ICS,NV0jm and the
last ICF,NVljk 1 are binding. At the beginning, the principal raises the re-
ward level for those facing early failure to guarantee experiments are con-
ducted; when enough experiments have been carried out, she sets blocks by
fixing the neighboured number of reported good successes at c1 ✓ to deter over-
experimentation. Examples of MF-II’s and MF-III’s structure are shown in
Figure 2.5.
Proposition 2.4.2.2) shows that the lowest possible optimal number of
experiments motivated by the principal equals to the participation threshold,
k⇤NV   k, which is consistent with public and private experimentation with
verifiable failures. One numeric example is shown below.
Example 2.4.2. When ✓ = 0.6, p = 0.4, M = 3 and c = 1, then the partic-
ipation threshold is k = 1, and the over-experimentation threshold is kˆ = 2.
In private experimentation with unverifiable failures, at k = 1, the associ-
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Figure 2.5: MF-II and MF-III in private experimentation (Example: m = 2,
l = k   2)
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Figure 2.6: Optimal reward scheme with unverifiable failures at di↵erent value-
cost ratio
ated optimal reward scheme is , CF =
8<:a1(1, 0) = 1.88a2(0, 1) = 0 , and the principal’s
expected payo↵ is VNV (1, p0) =  1.35; at k = 2, the associated optimal re-
ward scheme is MF-II =
8>>><>>>:
a2(2, 0) = 3.11
a2(1, 1) = 0.69
a2(0, 1) = 0
, and the principal’s expected
payo↵ is VNV (2, p0) =  0.9993; at k = 3, the associated optimal reward
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scheme is MF-III =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
a3(3, 0) = 4.17
a3(2, 1) = 1.67
a3(1, 1) = 1.46
a3(0, 1) = 0
, and the principal’s expected payo↵
is UPNV (3, p0) =  1.68. In the ptimal contract, k⇤NV = 2 and its associated
reward scheme is MF-II.
2.4.3 Comparisons between Public and Private Exper-
imentation
Previous results have characterised the properties of the optimal reward scheme
given di↵erent motivated numbers of experiments, and showed that the opti-
mal number must be weakly larger than the participation threshold k, which
is the largest number of experiments whose expected total cost can be covered
by the agent’s prior expected value. However, these results don’t suggest that
it’s always optimal to motivate a positive number of experiments.
Corollary 2.4.1. There exist parameter ranges such that the principal is better
o↵ conducting no experiments and assigning a single reward level p0M to both
types.
Imagine the case when the cost of an experiment is very high, which
implies the excess cost is also prohibitively high. Thus, the principal finds it’s
too costly to incentivise a single experiment, even if a success can help improve
posterior beliefs. Following similar reasoning, when the value-cost ratio, Mc , is
too low, the principal would not motivate the agent to run any experiments,
since the benefit from improving the precision of reward is not enough to cover
the cost of doing so.
Corollary 2.4.2. When Mc  11 ✓ , private experimentation with verifiable
failures is equivalent to public experimentation.
Corollary 2.4.2 suggests that, when the value-cost level is low, the prin-
cipal’s optimal contract and the e ciency level in private experimentation with
verifiable failures are the same as the public one. When Mc <
1
1 ✓ , kˆ ! 1,
and the over-experimentation threshold doesn’t play a role since the extra gain
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from over-experimentation is too low. As a result, in private experimentation
with verifiable failures, the principal can optimal motivate the same number
of experiments by CF as that in public information environment.
When the value-cost ratio is increasing, it shows that a good type
agent becomes relatively more valuable, or the experimental cost is relatively
cheaper. Thus the prior expectation now can cover larger numbers of exper-
iments, meaning the participation threshold k becomes larger. In the public
case, the excess cost is also getting smaller, implying the reward levels for both
types become more precise and closer to the posterior beliefs. As a result, the
principal is willing to weakly increase the optimal number of experiments,
which is the positive e↵ect.
Proposition 2.4.3. 1) as Mc increases, k and k
P are increasing and kˆ is
decreasing;
2) k⇤V and k
⇤
NV are increasing as M increases.
When the value-cost ratio is getting larger, the over-experimentation
threshold kˆ becomes smaller, which leads that it becomes more attractive to
deviate for a bad type who fails when only one more success is needed to
prove he is a potential good type. Thus the bad type in such situation has the
strongest incentive to over-experiment and it’s easier to violate the original
incentive constraint. As a result, the principal needs to distort the reward
scheme at an earlier point of failure to prevent such behaviour, so that the
imprecision occurs at an earlier stage and the principal is willing to reduce the
number of experiments. This is the negative e↵ect, but it is not the only e↵ect.
Since the participation threshold also increases in the private case, it’s not
clear which e↵ect dominates. If the increasing of the value-cost is solely from
the increasing of the good type’s value M , then the positive e↵ect dominates,
and the principal is willing to raise the optimal number of experiments; if the
value-cost ratio increases only due to increase in the cost of experiments, the
result is ambiguous.
Now consider the reward levels that di↵erent types received under the
optimal reward scheme. For a bad type whose value is zero, he can achieve
a (weakly) positive reward level as long as he accepts the contract o↵ered
by the principal. In the public case, the principal pays the excess cost to
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ensure that the agent does not deviate from conducting experiments. In the
private case, bad types who fail early would receive di↵erent reward levels,
which are increasing as the early failure occurs later. As a result, even if the
agent learns his type is bad after observing an early failure, he can still receive
something from the principal, which is weakly higher than his true value.
Now both the principal and the agent have the posterior belief pk, and the
agent’s a posterior expectation is pkM . The agent can now receive the highest
reward level in the associated optimal reward scheme. In the public case, the
potential good type can receive the amount of the posterior expectation as
a bonus, on top of the excess cost. The reward level is now higher than the
posterior expectation. However, in the private case, due to the distortion from
the over-experimentation threshold, the highest reward level should cooperate
with other reward levels for the bad type to guarantee the informativeness of
reported successes, and result is ambiguous when comparing to the posterior
expectation level.
Proposition 2.4.4. 1) A bad type is always overpaid in both the public and
private cases;
2) A potential good type is overpaid in the public case, but this doesn’t always
hold in the private case.
2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 Bad Luck
Now a small probability of bad luck is introduced. In each experiment, the
bad luck occurs with a small but strictly positive probability   2 (0, 1), in
which both types fail. It’s privately observed by the agent when bad luck
occurs. This can be considered as an exogenous negative shock which causes
the failure of both types, for instance, a bad health condition causes a capable
candidate to fail a CFA test.
When the bad luck occurs in an experiment, a failure occurs. This
negative shock provides no information about the agent’s quality, and the
principal may still want the agent to continue if not enough successes are
acquired. Thus, the principal can tolerate more failures which are caused only
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by bad luck. Also, since the bad luck may happen in every experiment, the
number of failures are uncertain before experiments are carried out. Thus the
principal optimally assigns them the same reward level,
akB(k
g, kb > 1) = akB(k
g, 1) and akB(k, 0) = a
k
B(k
g, 1) (2.5.1)
Now the term “k experiments incentivised to run” in akB(k
g, kb) means k exper-
iments which are not a↵ected by bad luck. Due to the presence of the failure
caused by the bad luck, a potential good type now can easily masquerade as a
bad type to save future cost. Thus, when bad luck arrives, the principal still
needs the agent’s expected benefit from continuing initial plan to be higher
than stopping immediately and reporting results,
ICS,B0jk 1 : UB(k   j, pj)   akB(j, 1)   akB(j, 0) (2.5.2)
If failures are verifiable, Lemma 2.4.2 holds then akB(j < k, 0) = 0; if they are
not, then akB(j, 1) = a
k
B(j, 0). Meanwhile, those who have already learned that
they are a bad type should be deterred from further experimentation, and the
incentives are given such that the benefit from over-experimentation to acquire
one more success is lower than its cost, where
ICF,B0j<k 1 : a
k
B(j + 1, 1)  akB(j, 1) 
c
(1  ✓)(1   )
ICF,Bk 1 : a
k
B(k, 0)  akB(k   1, 1) 
c
(1  ✓)(1   )
(2.5.3)
Then it’s easily seen that the incentives provided are the same as conditions
(2.4.8) in private experimentation with unverifiable failures and no bad luck,
in which the cost level is c1   . Therefore, the associated reward scheme would
be the same as that in proposition 2.4.2 at a di↵erent cost level. Also, since the
cost is higher, the ex ante expected total cost is higher, leading the threshold
number k, the number for which the prior expectation can cover the ex ante
expected total cost, to be lower. Under the optimal commitment, the agent
continues to experiment until either the first failure, which is not caused by bad
luck, occurs, or the required number of successes are achieved. Also, the agent
is indi↵erent between reporting one failure and not. Results are summarised
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in the following proposition, where all types may obtain more than one failure.
Proposition 2.5.1. When a bad luck exists with probability   2 (0, 1) in
each experiment and is privately observed by the agent, the associated optimal
reward scheme is the same as that in private experimentation with unverifiable
failures and no bad luck at cost level c1   .
2.5.2 Finite Opportunities for Experimentation
Up to this point, it has been assumed that the agent can conduct an infinite
number of experiments. Imagine now a scenario where opportunity T is finite,
T < 1. Firstly, consider the situation in which the number of experiments
provided incentives to run is k < T . The participation incentive constraints
should be the same as ICS shown previously, since these motivate the agent
to run a su ciently number of experiments. Suppose the agent fails at the
kth experiment. To prevent the agent from pretending to be a potential good
types by over-experimentation, the following condition must be satisfied:
(1  ✓T k)
1  ✓
  c+ (1  ✓)akF (k, 0) + ✓T kakF (k   1, 1)  akF (k   1, 1)
=)   c
1  ✓ + a
k
F (k, 0)  akF (k   1, 1)
(2.5.4)
Similar constraints can be obtained for j < k 1. Notice that these are exactly
the same as ICF shown previously, so the optimal reward scheme should be
the same as before.
If the incentive is to run T experiments, the constraints are slightly
di↵erent. Imagine that the agent fails for the first time in Tth experiments.
Now he has no further opportunity to continue experimenting, and the only
remaining option is to disclose results selectively. Thus the principal only
needs to motivate the agent to disclose information as her desire. For an early
first failure in jth experiments where j < T , the agent may still continue ex-
perimenting to get a higher reward level, thus ICF0j<T 1 must be satisfied.
On the side of ICS constraints, stopping early without failure can be inter-
preted as revealing that the agent is bad type when failures are verifiable, and
akF (k
g < k, 0) = 0 would be optimal and CF scheme is optimal; when failures
are not verifiable, the principal still needs to provide incentives to prevent the
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agent from pretending to be a bad type, which would be the same as ICS,NV0jT 1
in (2.4.8).
Proposition 2.5.2. When the number of private experiments T is finite, given
the commitment motivates the potential good agent to report 0 < k  T exper-
iments,
1) If k < T , the associated optimal reward scheme is the same as that proposed
in T !1;
2) If k = T , the associated optimal reward scheme is CF when failures are
verifiable; when failures are not verifiable, CF is optimal if T  k, and MF-II
is optimal otherwise;
3) The optimal number is the same as that in the public case with T ! 1
when T is su ciently large.
Proposition 2.5.2 shows that the reward schemes proposed in section
2.4 are still optimal at every positive number of experiments, even if the agent
cannot conduct experiments infinitely. Pushing motivated number of experi-
ments to the boundary T can mitigate incentives for misbehaving, especially
when failures are verifiable the same reward scheme in public experimenta-
tion, CF, can be applied. However, the proposition above also shows it is not
always optimal to do so. When the boundary is su ciently loosen, in which
case T is su ciently large, it doesn’t help to improve the principal’s benefit,
and the optimal amount stays the same as that in the scenario with infinite
opportunities, T !1.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter characterises the properties of the principal’s optimal commit-
ment when the agent can privately run costly experiments and selectively
report favourable results.
The single cut-o↵ function, or one-step function, is the optimal reward
scheme in public experimentation, and it is still optimal in the private sce-
nario if the motivated number of successes reported by the potential good
agent is small and the agent’s incentives to deviate from the intended path of
experimentation are weak. When this number rises, a multi-step function is
61
introduced, where a bad type agent receives a di↵erent level of rewards when
reporting di↵erent numbers of successes. These di↵erent levels feature two po-
tential types of agent’s incentives of deviation in a private environment, which
encourage a potential good type agent to continue experimenting after early
successes of block a bad type agent from over-experimentation after an early
failure. Moreover, the principal faces a trade-o↵ when determining the optimal
motivated number of successes, which is at least the largest number whose ex-
pected total cost can just be covered by the prior expectation of the good type
agent’s value. These results are robust when introducing finite opportunities
for experiments or privately observed bad luck.
There is still room to improve upon the current work, which only consid-
ers the scenario of learning from bad news. In future research, a more general
setting on information structure could be considered, and it would also be
interesting to introduce the strategic third party that designs experiments.
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Chapter 3
Private Experimentation and
Persuasion
3.1 Introduction
A candidate on the job market needs to show su cient quality in his CV to
persuade an employer to employ him and to negotiate a good salary. The
candidate undertakes various activities to signal skills and learning. For in-
stance, he studies hard to achieve a high GPA, undertakes an internship, or
sits professional certification exams such as the CFA. The employer is usually
skeptical about the candidate’s own reporting since most of these activities
are private. The agent will disclose success to send a positive signal to the
employer but when a failure occurs, the candidate may conceal the outcome,
or the participation in the activity, or the number of attempts at the activity.
These considerations potentially undermine the informativeness of the candi-
date’s CV. The question then arises: how many achievements are su cient for
the candidate? How does the employer interpret the candidate’s CV? when
making a salary o↵er?
When selling a new software, a technology firm needs to show that the
product has been thoroughly tested. The client doesn’t usually observe which
tests are undertaken before the firm disclose them and he is skeptical about the
results, since the firm can disclose fewer results or even retake the same tests
multiple times until the product passes. Therefore, how many test attempts
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and how many good results does the firm need to show?
This chapter considers a situation in which an uninformed agent per-
suades a principal for a high reward (evaluation) through private experimen-
tation. The agent’s type is initially unknown, and is either good or bad. The
type can be learned through experiments. The information structure of an
experiment is asymmetric: a good type agent always succeeds and a bad type
agent can fail with positive probability. The result generated in an experi-
ment is hard evidence, which can be forged. Since the experiments and results
are privately observed, the agent has infinite opportunity for experimenting
and he can selectively report the favourable results. The principal without full
commitment delivers a reward to the agent based on the disclosed results, who
cares about the precision of the evaluation.
I characterise three possible types of equilibria given the restriction on
the principal’s o↵-equilibrium path belief: no-experiment equilibrium, sepa-
rating equilibria with learning and pooling equilibria with learning. In the
first type, the agent doesn’t conduct any experiments and receives his prior
expected value as the reward. This equilibrium always exists as long as the
principal’s o↵-equilibrium path belief makes the agent worse o↵ by conducting
any positive amount of experiments. In a separating equilibrium with learn-
ing, the agent would stop experimenting either when he has acquired enough
successes without failures or when he fails before that. In this case, the bad
type agent will over-experiment since the extra benefit is less than his ex-
pected cost of doing so. Thus the disclosed successes are informative, where
the bad type agent has been separated from the potential good ones. This
type of equilibrium exists when the agent’s value-cost ratio is medium and the
number of successes reported by the potential good type is small. In a pooling
equilibrium with learning, some bad type agents would over-experiment and
report the same number of successes as the potential good ones’ when their
first failures arrive late enough. The agent’s report becomes less informative,
and the reward for the potential good type agent falls. This type of equilib-
rium exists when the agent’s value-cost ratio is not too low and the number
of successes reported by the potential good type is su ciently high.
Moreover, I show that both the participation threshold and the over-
experimentation threshold a↵ect the set of equilibria. The participation thresh-
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old is the largest number of experiments whose expected total cost can be
covered by the agent’s prior expected value. It determines the upper bound of
the entire set of equilibria, which is the largest possible number of successes
reported by the agent on the equilibrium path. For any number of experi-
ments over this, the agent be better o↵ by deviating and not conducting any
experiments. The over-experimentation threshold measures the largest num-
ber of successes where the agent’s conditional expected value is smaller than
the expected total of acquiring one more success by a bad type agent. It is
also the boundary between the separating and pooling equilibria with learn-
ing. When the number of successes reported by the potential good type is less
than the over-experimentation threshold, a bad type agent will not continue
experimenting after a failure.
When the agent’s value-cost ratio or the prior belief increases, the agent
is willing to conduct more experiments. On the one hand, it leads the partic-
ipation threshold rises and the set of equilibria expands as well.On the other
hand, a bad type agent has stronger incentive to over-experiment after he has
failed since the extra benefit also rises. Thus the over-experimentation thresh-
old falls, which also causes that the set of separating equilibria with learning
shrinks. As a result, the principal believes that it’s easier for a bad type agent
to over-experiment, and the set of pooling equilibria with learning expands.
When the probability of succeeding for a bad type agent increases, a positive
compound e↵ect on the participation threshold also suggests that the set of
equilibria expands. However, its e↵ect on the over-experimentation threshold
is ambiguous.
When the agent can pre-commit to the number of successes he plans to
acquire to prove that he is a potential good type, I show that the agent tends
to commit to the number that is as small as possible. This is because the
fear of failure deters his willingness to experiment, and his optimal decision
would as close as possible to that in the public experimentation scenario. His
optimal commitment is also constrained by the restriction on the principal’s
o↵ equilibria path belief.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 summarises
the related literature. The setup of the model and the benchmark are demon-
strated in section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the analysis of the equilibria,
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and section 3.5 considers the agent’s commitment. Section 3.6 concludes. All
proofs not shown in the main text are given in Appendix C.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to the literature about private experimentation. The clos-
est work are by Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) and Fu (2017). Felgenhauer
and Schulte (2014) characterise the parameter range in which the persuasion
equilibria with cut-o↵ rule exist in costly private experimentation with sym-
metric information structure. In their work, the receiver makes a binary deci-
sion, and the sender applies a sanitisation strategy in which all unfavourable
results are concealed. In contrast, my model considers an asymmetric infor-
mation environment, and the principal assigns the reward level according to
the disclosed information rather than a binary approval decision. The princi-
pal’s strategy on the equilibrium path shares the property of the cut-o↵ rule,
but the discussion of her o↵-equilibrium path belief is absent in their work.
Fu (2017) discusses the principal’s optimal contract for evaluating the agent
based on the reported experimental results, in which the principal can o↵er a
reward scheme before experiments are conducted. In contrast, the principal
doesn’t have full commitment in the current work, and she can only assign a
reward based on her posterior belief. Also, this work also discusses the agent’s
commitment, which is absent in the other papers.
Henry (2009) also considers a scenario in which the agent can pre-
commit to the number of experiments, and he cannot stop until all experiments
have been conducted regardless of their results. My work di↵ers in allowing
the agent to decide whether to continue after each experiment. Felgenhauer
and Loerke (2013) compares public experimentation and private experimen-
tation with symmetric information structure. Both works conclude that the
agent tends to the public experimentation as less experiments are conducted,
and Felgenhauer and Loerke (2013) also show that there is a deterrence e↵ect
which makes the principal and the agent better o↵ in private experimentation.
My work, by comparison, shows that the agent is weakly better o↵ in public
experimentation, but the deterrence e↵ect doesn’t exist due to the presence of
asymmetric information structure.
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This work relates to literature in strategic experimentation. Bergmann
and Hege (2005) shows the optimal way to finance an innovative project with-
out full commitment, Henry and Ottaviani (2014) show that the principal free
rides on the agent’s experiments when results are public information, and Ha-
lac and Kremer (2017) show that ine ciency is increased due to the agent’s
career concern in a bad news setting. In most cases where results are private
information, the principal or the receiver can use the timing of when they ob-
serve success to determine the monetary transfer: this is a key di↵erence from
the current model, which does not include such timing.
This work also relates to literature on information disclosure and per-
suasion. Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kolotilin (2015) focus on the sender’s
optimal mechanism; Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) finds the optimal way
for the sender to design the structure of the experiment, and Bergemann,
Bonatti and Smolin (2015) consider a monopolist who can design the exper-
iment and set the selling price. They all focus on public experimentation,
where results can be publicly observed. In contrast, My work mainly focuses
on the private case, and also compared the di↵erence between public and pri-
vate case. Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) and Hart, Kremer and Perry
(2017) analyse the commitment in evidence games where the agent’s set of
hard evidence is exogenously given. Compared to them, the agent can pri-
vately generate hard evidence given his type in my work. DeMarzo, Kremer
and Skrzypacz (2017) also consider an uninformed agent who chooses one test
among many di↵erent tests and strategically reveals the result to the market.
In their paper the market is competitive, and the agent has only one chance
to take a test, in which the null result with positive probability is introduced
and is not verifiable. The decision of the principal in my work shares the same
property as that of the competitive market. Compared to DeMarzo, Kremer
and Skrzypacz (2017), the information structure of the experiment is exoge-
nously given in my work, and it has the property of the softest test in which
the good type always succeeds but the bad type fails with positive probability.
Also, in my work, the agent has infinite opportunity for experimenting even
though the information structure of the test is fixed. My work also discusses
the agent’s optimal commitment, which is absent in theirs.
This work can be compared to literature on signalling, for example
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Spence (1973). In their models, there is no learning process for the agent, and
every type of agent can costly mimic the behaviour of others for a price. In
contrary, in my work, the agent has to learn his type first through the ex-
periments. Also, when the reported number of successes increases, it’s harder
for a potential good type agent to separate himself from the bad types as the
incentive for pooling is also increasing, and this is di↵erent from that in the
literature.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Description of the model
A risk-neutral agent (he) wants to get a reward (or evaluation) from a principal
(she) who has no full commitment. The agent is either good (G) or bad (B),
whose type Mi is initially unknown, where Mi 2 {M, 0} and i 2 {G,B}. A
common prior is shared. With probability p0, his type is good and the value
is MG = M ; with probability 1  p0, his type is bad and the value is MB = 0.
p0 2 (0, 1) and M 2 R+.
The agent can learn and prove his type through the private experiments.
The cost of each experiment is constant c, where c 2 R+, and the number of
opportunities is infinite. In each experiment, a good type agent can always
succeed; however, a bad type can only succeed with probability 1 ✓, where ✓ 2
(0, 1). The result in an experiment is hard evidence, which cannot be forged.
After the kth experiment in which the agent has acquired ng successes and nb
failures, he decides whether to continue experimenting, S
 
ng, nb
 
= 0, or to
stop and disclose the experimental results, S
 
ng, nb
 
= 1, where k, ng, nb 2 N,
k = ng + nb and S : N ⇥ N ! {0, 1}. Once the agent reveals the results,
he cannot run any further experiments. Moreover, since the experiments and
results are privately observed by the agent, he can selectively report a subset
of the acquired results which consists of kg successes and kb failures, where
kg, kb 2 N, kg  ng and kb  nb.
Based on the agent’s report, the principal assigns a reward to the agent,
and the reward level is a : N⇥N! R+. The principal has no full commitment,
and only cares about the precision of the reward. Specifically, given the reward
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a and the agent’s type Mi, her payo↵ function is: v(a,Mi) =  (a   Mi)2.
Meanwhile, the agent only cares about the reward level, and his payo↵ function
is: u(k, kg, kb) = a  kc. The timing of the game is shown as follows:
1. The agent runs experiments.
2. The agents selectively report the experimental results.
3. The principal gives the reward to the agent according to the report.
4. Payo↵s are realised.
Histories and Equilibrium. After the kth experiment, the agent’s private
history consists of the number of experiments he has run and the number
of successes and failures which he has acquired, hAk =
 
k, ng, nb
 
, and his
posterior belief is pA
(ng ,nb)
= Pr(Mi = M |ng, nb). If he stops and reports
kg success and kb successes, his expect payo↵ is E
⇥
u(k, kg, kb)|nb, ng, kg, kb⇤;
instead, if he continues experimenting, he pays the experimental cost c, and
gains U
✓
pA
(ng+1,nb)
◆
when he succeeds with probability pA
(ng ,nb)
; however, if he
fails with probability 1  pA
(ng+1,nb)
, he can only receive U
✓
pA
(ng ,nb+1)
◆
. Thus
his expected payo↵ U(pA
(ng ,nb)
) after the kth experiment would be:
U
⇣
pA(ng ,nb)
⌘
=
⇣
1  S(ng ,nb)
⌘ h
 c+ pA(ng ,nb)U
⇣
pA(ng+1,nb)
⌘
+ (1  pA(ng ,nb))U
⇣
pA(ng ,nb+1)
⌘i
+ S(ng ,nb)E
⇥
u(k, kg, kb)|nb, ng, kg, kb⇤
(3.3.1)
After experimental results are disclosed, the public history consists of
the number of successes and failures which the agent reports, hP =
 
kg, kb
 
.
The principal’s posterior belief now is pP
(kg ,kb)
= Pr(Mi = M |kg, kb), and her
expected payo↵ is E
⇥
v(a,Mi)|kg, kb
⇤
.
I restrict attention to the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in
the pure strategy, and a candidate equilibrium can be described as a collection⇢n
SEng ,nb
o
ng 0,nb 0
, (kgE, k
b
E), a
E, pE
 
, which satisfies the following conditions:
• Sequential Rationality : the agent’s strategy
✓n
SEng ,nb
o
ng 0,nb 0
, (kgE, k
b
E)
◆
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maximises U
✓
pA
(ng ,nb)
◆
; given the agent’s report, the principal’s strategy
aE maximises E
⇥
v(a,Mi)|kg, kb
⇤
;
• Belief Consistency : when  k, (kg, kb)  =  kE, (kgE, kbE) ,  k, (kg, kb)  is
“on the equilibrium” and pE
(kgE ,kbE)
= pP
(kgE ,kbE)
, which is determined by
Bayes’ rule; otherwise, (k, (kg, kb) is “o↵ the equilibrium”, and it requires
pP
(kg ,kb)
2 [0, 1].
In this paper, the o↵-equilibrium path belief is refined by the belief monotonic-
ity : given the equilibrium level of the reported failure(s) kbE, the principal’s
belief weakly increases if more successes are reported with zero probability;
given the equilibrium level of the reported success(es) kgE, the principal’s be-
lief weakly decreases if more failures are reported with zero probability. This
refinement can simplify the conditions for the existence of equilibria, and the
conclusion would still be robust without it.
3.3.2 Benchmark: public experimentation
Consider public experimentation as a benchmark for studying the model. The
experiments and results are publicly observable in this situation, and the agent
cannot hide any unfavourable results, nor claim that he hasn’t conducted any
experiments. Thus the principal’s belief coincides with the agent’s, pP
(kg ,kb)
=
pA
(ng ,nb)
. Claim 3.3.1 suggests that the principal optimally has the reward level
a⇤(pP ) equal to the agent’s conditional expected value given her belief pP . This
is a standard result in the evidence game by Hart, Kremer and Perry (2017),
due to the single peakedness of the principal’s payo↵ function.
Claim 3.3.1. Given the principal’s belief pP
(kg ,kb)
,
a⇤
 
kg, kb
 
= E
⇥
v(a,Mi)|kg, kb
⇤
= pP(kg ,kb)M
Proof. Given the principal’s belief pP , she solves the following maximisation
problem:
max
a2R+
E
⇥  (a Mi)2 |kg, kb⇤ =) max
a2R+
  pP (a M)2   (1  pP )a2
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Thus the optimal solution is a⇤
 
kg, kb
 
= a⇤(pP
(kg ,kb)
) = pP
(kg ,kb)
M .
Given the agent has run k experiments and no failure occurs, both
parties are more optimistic on that the agent is a good type, and the posterior
belief is updated according to Bayes’ rule:
Pr(Mi = M |k, 0) = p0
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k = pk (3.3.2)
In this case, the agent receives pkM as reward, and the total cost is kc. How-
ever, if the first failure occurs in j + 1th experiment, where j 2 N and j  k,
both parties learn that the agent’s type is bad as only a bad type fails in an
experiment. The agent receives zero even if he has j successes and has paid
cost jc, and he has no incentive to conduct any further experiments since the
principal has observed the failure. This implies that, if the agent plans to stop
experimenting after acquiring k successes, he would stop experimenting when
either k successes have been achieved without failure, or when a failure occurs
before that. Thus, the agent’s continuation payo↵ at beginning CUP (p0) can
be simplified as:
CUP (p0) = S(0,0)p0M+
 
1  S(0,0)
  ⇣
p0M   k˜c
⌘
, where k˜ =
kX
i=1
p0
pi 1
(3.3.3)
k˜ can be interpreted as the expected number of experiments that the agent
runs, which is simply equal to the sum of the ratio of the prior and posterior
beliefs.
Lemma 3.3.1. In public experimentation, the agent doesn’t run any experi-
ments and aP (p0) = p0M .
Proof. Notice that p0M > p0M   k˜c for 8k   1 since c > 0, thus SP(0,0) = 1
and aP (p0) = p0M .
Lemma 3.3.1 shows that the public results of the experiments deter the
learning process: the agent would never run experiments in public as long
as the cost of the experiment is positive, regardless of the prior belief. The
principal has no full commitment, thus she cannot commit to only assign a
positive reward level to those who achieves a certain amount of successes. For
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the agent, the fear of failure stops him at the outset, and he doesn’t learn
anything in this case.
3.4 Equilibrium analysis
Now consider the case where experiments and results are private. Since the
success is positive evidence of a potential good type, the agent would disclose
all of his successes, where kg = ng. Recall that only a bad type fails in an
experiment, thus the agent is not willing to reveal failure(s) if any. If he
does reveal the failure, the principal immediately learns that the agent is a
bad type, and would give him zero. He also cannot forge a success since it’s
hard evidence. Alternatively, the agent can claim that he hasn’t run many
experiments and achieves only successes. By doing so, he receives the at least
the same as that when disclosing the failure(s). At the stage of disclosing
evidence, these are the standard results in information disclosure literature.
Moreover, since the experiments and results are private information
before disclosure, a bad type agent can still continue conducting experiments
and collecting more successes with positive probability as many times as he
wants. This is called over-experimentation behaviour.
Lemma 3.4.1. In any equilibrium, a potential good type agent conducts weakly
more experiments than a bad type does.
Lemma 3.4.1 suggests that a potential good type always has weakly
more successes relative to a bad type agent. This is because a bad type agent
has a higher expected cost of acquiring one more success, and it’s easy for a
potential good type to separate himself from the bad type by conducting more
experiments with less cost. As a result, in general, only three possible scenarios
regarding the behaviour “on the equilibrium path” need to be considered:
• No experiment equilibrium: the agent doesn’t run any experiments.
• No over-experimentation scenario (separating equilibrium with learning):
the agent plans to run k > 0 experiments at the beginning, and stops and
discloses all the successes when he acquires k successes without failure(s)
or when he fails before that.
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• Over-experimentation scenario (pooling equilibrium with learning) : when
the first failure occurs after some early successes, he continues to exper-
iment until k successes are acquired; otherwise, he stops immediately.
In the scenarios without over-experimentation behaviour, the agent
would stop experimenting once he has learned that his type is bad on the
equilibrium path. Thus the potential good type is separated, and the bad
type would receive zero even if he might still have some successes. The exper-
imental results are informative, where pP(k,0) = p
A
(k,0) = pk. This is similar to
the separating equilibrium in a signalling game, but it’s not the same as the
agent needs to learn his type through the costly experiments.
In the scenario with over-experimentation behaviour, the experimental
results become less informative. Suppose again the first failure occurs in j+1th
experiments when the agent plans to acquire k successes at the very beginning,
where 0  j < k. If he stops and discloses the j successes that he has achieved,
the principal’s posterior belief is pP(j,0) and the reward level would be p
P
(j,0)M .
Instead, if the agent continues experimenting, the expected experimental cost
to guarantee another k j successes would be k j1 ✓c, and he can receive pP(k,0)M .
Therefore, the agent is always willing to do so if the extra benefit is larger than
the expected cost, in which case the following condition is satisfied:
 
pP(k,0)   pP(j,0)
 
M >
k   j
1  ✓ c (3.4.1)
Assume now condition (3.4.1) is violated at j   1. Since pP(j,0) is weakly in-
creasing and the right hand of condition (3.4.1) is decreasing as j increases,
the bad type agent who fails after j + 1th experiment would also have the over-
experimentation incentive as condition (3.4.1) is also satisfied for him. With a
similar argument, the bad type agent who fails before the j + 1th experiment
would stop immediately as the expected net benefit from over-experimenting
is negative. As a result, the principal’s belief on the equilibrium path, pP,O(k,0),
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is updated according to the Bayes’ rule:
pP,O(k,0) =
p0
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k| {z }
agent hasn’t failed
+
k 1X
i=j
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓| {z }
agent fails after j + 1th experiment
=
p0
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)j = pj < pk
(3.4.2)
This result implies that the principal now has a lower posterior belief on that
the agent is good when k successes are reported. Also, the informativeness
of the reported successes is less relative to the separating equilibrium with
learning. As a result, the potential good type is also worse o↵.
Lemma 3.4.2. In any equilibrium where the potential good type agent reports
k > 0 successes, aE (kg < k, 0) = 0.
Proof. In both of the scenarios above, only the bad type agent reports less
successes on the equilibrium path, thus pP(kg<k,0) = 0 and a
E (kg < k, 0) =
pP(kg<k,0)M = 0.
Lemma 3.4.2 suggests that the number of successes reported by the po-
tential good type agent on the equilibrium path plays a role in the acceptance
threshold, in which the principal only recognises the agent as a bad type when
fewer successes are reported. Therefore, in condition (3.4.1), pP(j,0) = 0 on the
equilibrium path. It’s easily to see that a bad agent whose first failure occurs
in the kth experiment has the strongest incentive to over-experiment, because
he is so close to showing that his type is good, and he will do so if the ex-
tra benefit pP(k,0)M is large enough to cover the cost
c
1 ✓ . Thus, the agent’s
expected payo↵ by stopping experiments and disclosing successes after k > 0
successes are acquired, Uk(p0), can be simplified as:
Uk(p0) =
pP(k,0)
pk
p0M   k˜c+
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓max
⇢
0, pPk,0M  
(k   i)c
1  ✓
 
| {z }
over-experimentation incentives
(3.4.3)
Compared to the choice of no-experiment, the agent would report k successes
if his expected payo↵ from doing so is non-negative, Uk(p0)   0.
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Lemma 3.4.2 also concludes that experimenting forever cannot be an
equilibrium. Suppose it is. Then the principal would consider the agent as
a bad type on the equilibrium path if the agent reports any finite number
of successes. As the costly experiments and results are private information
which needs to be disclosed after the agent stops experimenting, the agent
would deviate not to run any experiments, which is a contradiction.
Before the characterisation of the equilibria, it is worth discussing the
o↵-equilibrium path belief, in which the agent reports more successes relative
to the amount on the equilibrium path. Suppose that the agent has already
acquired k   0 successes. If he sticks to the strategy on the equilibrium path,
the reward level would be pP(k,0)M . Now consider the deviations. If more suc-
cesses are reported together with some failures, as a reasonable o↵-equilibrium
belief, the principal would learn this agent is a bad type, pP
(kg>k,kb>0)
= 0, since
only a bad type agent can failure in an experiment. Alternatively, when more
successes are reported without failures, the belief monotonicity suggests that
the principal would have a weakly higher posterior belief. If so, the potential
good type agent may have the incentive to continue experimenting to acquire
more successes as his posterior belief is higher and the expected cost to guar-
antee a successes is lower. The bad type agent may also have the incentive
to deviate to continue experimenting due to the weakly higher reward o↵ the
equilibrium path.
Lemma 3.4.3. In any equilibrium where the potential good type agent reports
k   0 successes, pP(kg>k,0) satisfies that, for 8n 2 N+,
n 1X
j=0
(1  pP(k,0))(1  ✓)j✓

max
i2{0,...,n j}
pP(k+i,0)M  
ic
1  ✓
 

pk
⇣
pk+n   pP(k+n,0)
⌘
pk+n
M +
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c
(3.4.4)
Lemma 3.4.3 demonstrates the further restriction on the o↵-equilibrium
path belief, which guarantees that neither the bad nor the potential good type
would deviate to continue experimenting after the equilibrium number of suc-
cesses has been achieved. The left hand side in (3.4.4) is the simplified expres-
sion due to the belief monotonicity refinement, and the complete expression is
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shown in the proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.4.1. In private experimentation, when (3.4.4) is satisfied,
1) no-experiment equilibrium exists in which the agent doesn’t conduct any
experiments and aE(p0) = p0M ;
2) a participation threshold k =
8<:max
n
k 2 N : p0M   k˜c
o
p0M   c
0 p0M < c
and an
over-experimentation threshold kˆ =
8<:max
 
k 2 N : pkM  c1 ✓
 
p1M  c1 ✓
0 p1M >
c
1 ✓
exist, such that:
2.a) when Mc 2
h
0, 1p0
⌘
, no-experiment equilibrium is unique;
2.b) when Mc 2
h
1
p0
, 1p1(1 ✓)
i
, separating equilibria with learning exist at
0 < k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
, in which aE(k, 0) = pkM , aE (kg < k, 0) = 0, and the
agent would stop and disclose all the successes when k successes are achieved
without failures or when he fails before that;
2.c) when Mc 2
⇣
max
n
1
p0
, 11 ✓
o
,+1
⌘
, pooling equilibria with learning
exist at kˆ+1 < k  k, in which aE(k, 0) = pkˆ+lM , aE (kg < k, 0) = 0, and the
potential good type agent and the bad type agent whose first failure occurs after
kˆ + l + 1th experiment would report k successes, where 0 < l  k  kˆ such that
M
c 2
⇣
max
n
k kˆ l
pk+l(1 ✓) ,
k kˆ l
pkˆ+l 1
+
Pkˆ+l
i=1
1
pi 1
o
, k kˆ l+1pk+l(1 ✓)
i
6= ?.
The existence for each type of equilibrium and it’s conditions can be
characterised, which are listed in Proposition 3.4.1. It shows that, given con-
dition (3.4.4) is satisfied, the existence of di↵erent types of equilibria is deter-
mined by the value-cost ratio Mc and two thresholds: the participation thresh-
old k and the over-experimentation threshold kˆ. In general, the results suggest
that the no-experiment equilibrium is unique when the value-cost ratio is too
low, and only pooling equilibria with learning survive when the value-cost ra-
tio is too high. The separating equilibria with learning only possibly exist
at the medium level of the value-cost ratio. These are discussed in detail in
the following paragraphs. Also, the existence of equilibria in di↵erent ranges
of the value-cost ratio is listed in Figure 3.1, in which yellow, cyan and grey
represents the region of existence of no-experiment equilibrium, separating
equilibria with learning and pooling equilibria with learning respectively.
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Proposition 3.4.1.1) shows the existence of the no-experiment equilib-
rium, in which neither the agent nor the principal learns. This is obvious
when value-cost ratio is too low, Mc <
1
p0
, in which it’s too costly for the agent
to run one experiment relative to the gain, and the principal doesn’t have
full commitment to cover the excess. Thus it’s unique in this case. The no-
experiment equilibrium also exists when the value-cost ratio is high, Mc   1p0 ,
but it requires a restriction on the o↵-equilibrium path belief, which are given
in (3.4.4). This restriction prevents the agent from deviating to conduct more
experiments, in which the expected extra gain is smaller than the expected
cost. It could still hold even if the principal holds “the more the better” belief
under some parameter range.
Proposition 3.4.1.2) demonstrates the conditions for the existence of
separating and pooling equilibria with learning, as well as their properties.
The results suggest that the separating or pooling equilibria with learning exist
when the reported number of successes by the potential good type is smaller
than the participation threshold k. The participation threshold is the largest
number of experiments whose expected total cost k˜c can be covered by the
agent’s prior expected value p0M . When k > k, the agent would never conduct
any positive number of experiments since the expected cost is too large and the
principal cannot commit to compensating for the excess. Thus, the agent is
better o↵ by deviating to no-experiment choice. When p0M < c, this threshold
is zero, thus the agent would not run any experiments on the equilibrium
path, so that only the no-experiment equilibrium survives. This is shown in
Proposition 3.4.1.2.a). On the other hand, when p0M   c, the participation
threshold is the rounded down number which makes Uk(p0) = 0, since the
expected payo↵ is weakly decreasing as the number of reported successes is
increasing.
In Proposition 3.4.1.2.b), to support a separating equilibrium with learn-
ing, the bad type agent must not have an incentive to over-experiment. There-
fore, the over-experimentation threshold kˆ is introduced, which is the largest
number of reported successes where conditional expected value pkM is smaller
than the bad type agent’s expected cost of acquiring one more success c1 ✓ .
When p1M >
c
1 ✓ , there always exists at least one bad type agent who would
over-experiment since the extra benefit is always higher than the cost. The
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separating equilibria with learning collapse in this case as k = 0. When
p1M  c1 ✓ , the extra benefit then can be smaller than the cost of over-
experimentation if the reported number of successes is low, k  kˆ. Therefore,
the possible separating equilibria with learning only exist when the number
of successes reported by the potential good type is constrained by both of
the thresholds, 0 < k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
. In this case, the reported successes are
informative: only the potential good type would report enough successes, and
the principal learns that the agent must be a bad type when observing fewer
successes are reported. Also, (3.4.4) needs to be satisfied, otherwise the po-
tential good type agent would always deviate to continue experimenting after
k successes are achieved. When the value-cost ratio is at the medium level
where 1p0  Mc  11 ✓ , the concern about the over-experimentation vanishes
as kˆ ! 1, in which case the bad type agent would never over-experiment as
the extra benefit is so small. This also implies that a pooling equilibrium with
learning would not exist in this case.
Proposition 3.4.1.2.c) suggests that the pooling equilibria with learning
would only survive when the value-cost ratio is high enough, Mc > max
n
1
1 ✓ ,
1
p0
o
.
Among these equilibria, the lowest possible number of successes reported by
the potential good type agent is kˆ + 2. Intuitively, on the one hand, the
lowest number must be higher than the participation threshold, otherwise
the extra benefit is not enough to support a bad type to over-experiment
on the equilibrium path; on the other hand, the reported successes now are
less informative since the principal knows at least one bad type agent over-
experiments on the equilibrium path— the one who has the strongest incen-
tive to do so as he only need one more successes to pretend to be a good
type. The less informative evidence would make the principal assign a lower
reward level to the agent, which mitigates the bad type’s over-experimentation
incentive. Specifically, suppose the equilibrium exists at k = kˆ + 1, the prin-
cipal believes that pP
(kˆ+1,0)
= pkˆ on the equilibrium path, and would assign
a
⇣
kˆ + 1, 0
⌘
= pkˆM . But the conditional expected value now is lower than
the cost of over-experimenting and acquiring one more success, in which case
no bad type agents want to over-experiment. Therefore, the pooling equilibria
can be found at kˆ+1 < k  kˆ. In such an equilibrium, all the bad type agents
whose first failures occur after the kˆ + l + 1th experiment would continue ex-
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perimenting until k successes are acquired. This is because the extra benefit
pkˆ+lM can maximumly cover the total expected cost of acquiring k   kˆ   l
more successes for the bad type agent, k kˆ l+11 ✓ c < pkˆ+lM  k kˆ l1 ✓ c. Mean-
while, it also requires that the agent’s expected payo↵ in his initial plan is
positive, UkO(p0) = p0M  
Pkˆ+l
i=1
p0
pi 1 c 
p0(k kˆ l)
pkˆ+l 1
c.
M
c
0
No-experiment
Separating at
0<kmin{k,kˆ}
Pooling at kˆ+1<kk
1
p0
1
1 ✓
1
p1(1 ✓)
scenario I: p01 ✓
M
c
0
No-experiment
Separating at
0<kmin{k,kˆ}
Pooling at kˆ+1<kk
1
1 ✓
1
p0
1
p1(1 ✓)
scenario II: p0>1 ✓
Figure 3.1: Existence of three types of equilibria in di↵erent value-cost ratios
Proposition 3.4.2. The agent is weakly better o↵ with public experimentation,
but the principal is weakly better o↵ with private experimentation.
Compared to public experimentation, Proposition 3.4.2 suggests that
private experimentation makes the agent weakly worse o↵ but the principal
weakly better o↵. This is mainly driven by the principal’s skeptical think-
ing. When the experiments and results are public, the principal doesn’t need
to worry about the possibility of over-experimentation, as the beliefs of the
principal and the agent are aligned. However, in private experimentation, the
principal has di↵erent concerns when a certain number of successes reported.
On the one hand, the principal knows that the agent has the opportunity for
additional experiments if the cost is not too large, so she is skeptical about the
agent’s type when the number of reported successes is very small as she might
think that the agent has failed; on the other hand, when a large number of
successes is reported, she might also think that a bad type may have achieve
it by over-experimentation. This result is similar to that in Henry (2009) and
Felgenhauer and Loerke (2013). Henry (2009) discusses the scenario in which
the agent pre-commits to a number of experiments and he cannot stop until
all of the experiments have been conducted. He argued that the agent runs
strictly less experiments in the public case. In contrast, my work analyses the
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scenario where the agent chooses whether to continue or stop experimenting
after each result is realised, and the agent’s commitment would be discussed
in the next section. Felgenhauer and Loerke (2013) find that there exists a
deterrence e↵ect which causes both the principal and the agent to be better
o↵ in private experimentation with exogenous precision of the experiment, but
this result doesn’t hold in my work. An example is also given below.
Example 3.4.1. Suppose p = ✓ = 0.7, M = 3.5 and c = 1. Thus k = 2 and
kˆ = 1. In public experimentation, the agent doesn’t run experiments, thus
UP (p0) = aP (0, 0) = p0M = 2.45, VP (p0) =  p0(1   p0)M2 =  2.5725. In
private experimentation, in the no-experiment equilibrium given restrictions
on the principal’s o↵-equilibrium path belief (3.4.4) is satisfied, UN(p0) =
UP (p0) = p0M = 2.45 and VN(p0) = VP (p0) =  2.5725. In the separating
equilibrium with learning, pP(1,0) = p1 ⇡ 0.886076, aE(1, 0) = p1M ⇡ 3.10127,
aE(0, 0) = 0, U1S(p0) = p0M   c = 1.45 and V 1S (p0) =  p0(1   p1)M2 ⇡
0.976899. The pooling equilibrium with learning doesn’t exist since kˆ+1 = k.
Proposition 3.4.3 demonstrates how the participation threshold k and
over-experimentation threshold kˆ vary when the value-cost ratio Mc , prior belief
p0 and the experiment’s “pass threshold” ✓ for the bad type agent.
Proposition 3.4.3. k is weakly increasing in Mc , p0 and ✓, and kˆ is weakly
decreasing in Mc and p0.
When the value-cost ratio increases, on the one hand, the agent becomes
relatively more valuable, and his prior expected value can cover more exper-
iments’ total expected cost. Thus, he is able to conduct more experiments
in his initial plan at the beginning, which leads the participation threshold
k to increase. On the other hand, the larger value-cost ratio also gives the
bad type agent stronger incentive to over-experiment, since the extra benefit
is larger than before. With the presence of skeptical thinking, the principal
believes that more bad type agents would now over-experiment. Thus the
informativeness of the reported successes is lower, which follows that the over-
experimentation threshold kˆ decreases.
When the agent’s prior belief increases, the agent’s prior expected value
is higher, which tends to raise the participation threshold. However, a higher
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prior belief also means that the expected total cost forthe same amount of
experiments is also higher, and this negative e↵ect tends to reduce the partici-
pation threshold. As a compounded e↵ect, the analysis shows that the positive
e↵ect dominates, which leads the participation threshold k to be increasing.
Meanwhile, when the agent is very optimistic on that he is a good type, he
has a stronger incentive to over-experiment after he fails. This is because his
loss from the failure is larger than that when he is pessimistic with a lower
prior belief.
When ✓ increases, it implies that it’s harder for a bad type agent to
achieve a success in an experiment. In the initial plan, the agent remains
uninformed. A higher ✓ implies that the failure arrives faster if the agent
is a bad type. Thus, if he plans to stop once a failure occurs, the expected
total cost of the given number of experiments falls. As a result, he can plan
to more experiments, which leads a higher participation threshold. However,
the compounded e↵ect of the “pass threshold” ✓ on the over-experimentation
threshold is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher ✓ implies that the agent
learns faster when a success arrives when he hasn’t failed yet, in which the
posterior value is higher after reporting the successes. Therefore the extra
benefit of over-experimenting is larger for a bad type. On the other hand, the
agent’s expected cost of acquiring one more success, c1 ✓ , is also higher, which
mitigates the agent’s incentive to over-experiment. As a result, the two forces
acting opposite directions mean that the compounded e↵ect is ambiguous.
Notice that the upper bound of the set of equilibria is determined by
the participation threshold, thus an increasing in k also implies that the entire
set is expanding, given that the restrictions on the o↵-equilibrium path belief
are still satisfied. This result is achieved when the value-cost ratio or the
prior belief increases. However, at the same time, the over-experimentation
threshold is decreasing as it’s harder to mitigate the agent’s incentive for over-
experimenting. Thus, given that the same amount of successes are reported,
the principal tends to discount their informativeness due to skeptical thinking.
Therefore, the set of separating equilibria with learning shrinks, which exists
when the reported number of successes are less than both the participation
and over-experimentation thresholds. With the increasing k, the set of pooling
equilibria with learning expands. These results are summarised in Corollary
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3.4.1.
Corollary 3.4.1. As Mc or p0 increases, the set of separating equilibria with
learning shrinks but the set of pooling equilibria with learning tends to expand.
Proof. Given (3.4.4) holds, the set of separating equilibria with learning exist
at 0 < k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
, and the set of pooling equilibria with learning exist
at kˆ + 1 < k  k. From Proposition 3.4.3, k increases and kˆ decreases
as Mc or p0 increases. Thus, min
n
k, kˆ
o
is decreasing as well as kˆ + 1. As
a result,
n
k 2 N : 0 < k  min
n
k, kˆ
oo
shrinks, but
n
k 2 N : kˆ + 1 < k  k
o
gets larger.
3.5 The agent’s commitment
In this section, the agent now can commit to report a certain number of
successes to prove that he is a potential good type before he conducts experi-
ment(s). The timing of the game is changed as follows:
1. The agent commits to report k   0 successes;
2. The agent runs experiments;
3. The agent selectively reports the experimental results;
4. The principal gives the reward to the agent according to the report;
5. Payo↵s are realised.
With the help of the commitment, the agent can pick a preferred equi-
librium that maximises his own expected payo↵, but the credibility of the
commitment needs to be considered. The agent can possibly commit not to
run any experiments or report any successes. In this case, the agent refuses
to learn through experiments, and he receives his prior expected value p0M
as a reward if it’s credible. However, the principal worries that the agent
might deviate and continue experimenting, in which case the commitment is
not credible. Such deviation occurs when the restriction on the o↵-equilibrium
path belief (3.4.4) is violated at k = 0. If so, the agent compromises to commit
to report a strictly positive number of successes. When committing to report
k > 0 successes, the agent also implicitly proves that he must be a bad type
when less than k successes are reported. Thus the principal’s posterior belief
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pP(k,0) is updated in the same way as that in the scenario where the agent cannot
commit. In the first place, the agent would only commit to report a number
of successes which is smaller than the participation threshold k  k, otherwise
he would achieve negative expected payo↵. In the second place, the agent’s
over-experimentation incentive still a↵ects the informativeness of the evidence.
The arguments are summarised in Proposition 3.5.1, which characterises the
agent’s optimal commitment and the existence condition.
Proposition 3.5.1. In private experiment, the agent optimally commits to
report k⇤ successes to prove that he is a potential good type, where
1) k⇤ = min
n
k 2 N : 0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
oo
if 9k such that (3.4.4) is satisfied
at 0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
;
2) k⇤ = kp 2 argmax
k2N, kˆ+1<kk
UkO (p0) if (3.4.4) is only satisfied at kˆ + 1 < k  k;
3) otherwise, k⇤ doesn’t exist.
Proposition 3.5.1.1) suggests that the agent tends to commit to report
the smallest number of successes which satisfy the restrictions on the princi-
pal’s o↵-equilibrium path belief (3.4.4) in the region where both the participa-
tion and over-experimentation incentives are satisfied, 0 < k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
. In
this case, the bad type agent doesn’t over-experiment, and the reported suc-
cesses are very informative. Therefore, his expected payo↵ would be the same
as that when the agent cannot commit, UkS(p0) = p0M  
Pk
i=1
p0
pi 1 c. Since
the agent’s expected payo↵ is weakly decreasing as k increases in this case, to
maximise his own expected payo↵, the agent would optimally choose the lowest
number of successes in which (3.4.4) is still satisfied. Ideally, the agent would
only commit to report one success. However, if (3.4.4) at k = 1 is violated, the
agent would always deviate to report more, in which case such a commitment
is not credible. Therefore, the agent compromises to commit to report two
successes. Similar argument can continue until the agent find the lowest num-
ber of successes in this region which satisfied the restriction (3.4.4). In this
region, the agent’s interest contrasts with the principal’s since the principal is
strictly better o↵ when the reported number of successes increases.
If (3.4.4) fails in the previous region, the agent seeks to commit to
report kˆ + 1 < k  k successes. Proposition 3.5.1.2) shows that the agent
would commit to report the number of successes which maximise his expected
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payo↵ in this region, UkO(p0). The principal learns that some bad type agents
have an incentive to over-experiment, which is the same as in the scenario when
the agent cannot commit, and the agent’s expected payo↵ would be UkO(p0) =
p0M  
Pkˆ+l
i=1
p0
pi 1 c  
p0(k kˆ l)
pkˆ+l 1
c. Notice that, in this case, the expected total
cost is higher than that when the agent commits to report 0 < k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
successes, so this region is strictly dominated, and the agent would only commit
to report a number of successes in this region when the restriction on the o↵-
equilibrium path belief (3.4.4) is violated in other regions.
Meanwhile, the expected total cost is not monotonic with respect to the
number of successes committed to report, so the agent might not always prefer
to commit to report a lower number in this region. This is because, on the
one hand, reporting a larger number of successes implies that the agent needs
to run more experiments, and the total expected cost tends to increase; on
the other hand, such a larger number also brings a weakly higher reward, and
the agent’s incentive of over-experimenting is much stronger, where more cost
from over-experimentation can be covered and the total expected cost tends
to decrease. Moreover, if the restriction (3.4.4) is not satisfied at this optimal
choice, the agent compromises to another sub-optimal choice in this region,
which maximise his expected payo↵ except the first choice. This argument
would stop until (3.4.4) is satisfied. As a result, it also implies that the agent
might commit to report the highest number k, which is most preferred by the
principal among all equilibria.
If (3.4.4) fails in the region 0  k  k, Proposition 3.5.1.3) suggests
that the agent cannot make a credible commitment. Also, there doesn’t exist
any equilibrium in private experimentation when the agent cannot commit,
which has been discussed in previous section.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter characterises the properties of three di↵erent types of equilibria in
private experimentation as well as the conditions for their existence, in which
the experiment has an asymmetric information structure. When the restric-
tion on the principal’s o↵-equilibrium path belief is satisfied, a no-experiment
equilibrium can possibly exist regardless of the agent’s value-cost ratio, the
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separating equilibria with learning only exist at the medium level of value-cost
ratio, and pooling equilibria with learning exist when the value-cost ratio is
not too low. The participation threshold determines the upper bound of the
equilibria, and the existence of an over-experimentation threshold determines
the boundary between separating and pooling equilibria with learning. Also,
the results suggest that the agent is worse o↵ but the principal is better o↵
relative to public experimentation. When the agent can commit before exper-
imenting, he tends to optimally commit to report a small number of successes
to prove that he is a potential good type. But, constrained by the principal’s
o↵-equilibrium path belief, the agent might commit to report a lager number.
Since this project is still work in progress, there is room to improve it.
In future study, it would be interesting to extend this model to a finite multiple
stage game, in which the agent can still experiment and disclose results after
his first report.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1
The e cient stopping threshold pE just makes (1.3.6) binding. This
implies that: when the synergy is positive, pE = 2c(2+✓) R  c R ; when the
synergy is negative, pE = c R <
2c
(2+✓) R .
In the first-best, agent(s) would accept the contract as long as the par-
ticipation constraint(s) bind(s). Thus, it can be only focused on uit(p
P
t ). When
the partnership is motivated, agent two’s participation constraint must bind
in the first-best. From (1.3.4), the optimal sub-contract satisfies: !P2,t(p
P
t ) =
c
!P21,t(p
P
t )(2+✓) Rp
P
t
. Thus, agent one’s participation constraint can be simplified
as:
pPt !
P
1,t(p
P
t )(2 + ✓) R  2c   0 (A.0.1)
Having (A.0.1) binding, the optimal grand contract in the first-best would be
!P1,t(p
P
t ) =
2c
(2+✓) RpPt
. Substituting it back to (A.0.1), the optimal sub-contract
in the first-best would be !P2,t(p
P
t ) =
1
2 . In this case, the principal’s profit at t
would be: ⇡t(pPt ,!
P
i,t) = p
P
t (2 + ✓) R  2c.
When the individual work is motivated, agent one’s participation con-
straint of working alone needs to be binding, thus !P1,t(P
P
t ) =
c
 RpPt
. Since agent
one now works alone, he o↵ers nothing to agent two, !P2,t(p
P
t ) = 0. Therefore,
the principal’s profit at t in this case would be: ⇡t(pPt ,!
P
i,t) = p
P
t  R  c.
In the static game at t, the principal prefers the partnership to the
individual work if the di↵erence between the principal’s profit at t from the
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partnership and the individual work is positive:
4⇡Ft (pPt ,!Pi,t) = pPt (1+✓) R c   0 ,
R
c
1
(1 + ✓) pPt
, pPt  
c
(1 + ✓) R
(A.0.2)
When the synergy is positive, 4⇡Pt (pFt ,!Pi,t)   0 since pPt   pE   c(1+✓) R ,
which implies that the partnership is always preferred in this case. On the
other hand, when the synergy is negative, c(1+✓) R >
c
 R = p
E. Thus, the
partnership still dominates the individual work if Rc   1(1+✓) pPt as (A.0.2) is
still satisfied; if Rc 2
h
1
 pPt
, 1
(1+✓) pPt
⌘
, (A.0.2) doesn’t hold and the individual
work dominates in this case.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.2
Firstly, I prove that the principal always prefers to invest in the project
at t = 0 as long as p0   pE. Consider when the principal sticks to the
choice in the static game at t = 0. Depending on the individual work and
the partnership is optimally motivated at t = 0 respectively, the di↵erence
between the principal’s continuation value from investing and not investing
would be:
4V It (p0) =⇡0(pP0 ,!Pi,0)   ⇡0(pP0 ,!Pi,0)
+  
 
[1  p0 ]⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1), [1  p0(2 + ✓) ]⇡1(p1,!Pi,1)
 (A.0.3)
When the principal doesn’t invest at t = 0, the posterior belief equals to the
prior belief, thus her gain at t = 1 would be the same as that in the static
game, and it’s discounted due to the presence of a discount factor. This is
represented in the second term in (A.0.3). Since ⇡t(pPt ,!
P
i,t)   0 and   2 (0, 1),
4V It (p0) is always positive. As a result, no-investment at t = 0 is dominated
for p0   pE.
Now the focus shifts to the choice between the partnership and the
individual work. At t = 0, in the first best, the principal would motivate the
partnership if the di↵erence between the principal’s continuation value from
the partnership and the individual work is positive:
4V Ft (p0) = 4⇡F0 (pP0 ,!Pi,0)+ [1 p0(2+✓) ]⇡1(p1,!Pi,1)  (1 p0 )⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1)   0
(A.0.4)
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=) 4⇡F0 (pP0 ,!Pi,0)    (1  p0 )⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1)   [1  p0(2 + ✓) ]⇡1(p1,!Pi,1)
(A.0.5)
Since pˆ1 > p1, ⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1)   ⇡1(p1,!Pi,1). Together with ✓ >  1, the right
hand side of (A.0.5) is always positive,  (1   p0 )⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1)    [1   p0(2 +
✓) ]⇡1(p1,!Pi,1)   0. Thus the right hand side reaches the maximum when
  = 1.
Consider the situation where the synergy is positive. When Rc   2(2+✓) p1 ,
from Lemma 1.3.1.2), the principal would motivate the partnership at t = 1 no
matter whether the partnership or the individual work is motivated at t = 0,
and
4V Ft (p0)   4⇡F0 (pP0 ,!Pi,0)  (1  p0 )⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1) + [1  p0(2 + ✓) ]⇡1(p1,!Pi,1)
= [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]

p1 (1 + ✓)R  1  2p0 (1 + ✓)
1  p0 (2 + ✓) c
 
/ p1 (1 + ✓)R  1  2p0 (1 + ✓)
1  p0 (2 + ✓) c  
2 + 2✓
2 + ✓
c  1  2p0 (1 + ✓)
1  p0 (2 + ✓) c
/ (2 + 2✓) [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]  (2 + ✓) [1  2p0 (1 + ✓)] = ✓   0
(A.0.6)
This implies that (A.0.4) holds for 8  2 [0, 1], thus partnership is preferred
at t = 0. When Rc 2
h
2
(2+✓) pˆ1
, 2(2+✓) p1
⌘
, according to Lemma 1.3.1.2), the
principal would not invest at t = 1 if the partnership is motivated at t = 0,
and
4V Ft (p0)   4⇡F0 (pP0 ,!Pi,0)  (1  p0 )⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1) + [1  p0(2 + ✓) ]⇡1(p1,!Pi,1)
= [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]

1  2p0 
1  p0 (2 + ✓)c  p1 R
 
/ 1  2p0 
1  p0 (2 + ✓)c  p1 R  
1  2p0 
1  p0 (2 + ✓)c 
2
2 + ✓
c
/ (2 + ✓) (1  2p0 )  2 [1  p0 (2 + ✓)] = ✓   0
(A.0.7)
This implies that (A.0.4) holds for 8  2 [0, 1], and then the partnership is
preferred at t = 0. When Rc 2
h
2
(2+✓) p0
, 2(2+✓) pˆ1
⌘
, the principal never invests
at t = 1 since the posterior belief falls below the e cient stopping threshold,
p1 < pˆ1 < pE. Thus at t = 0, the principal’s choice is the same as that in the
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static game. Since ✓   0, the partnership is preferred.
Consider the situation in which the synergy is negative. With Lemma
1.3.1.2), when Rc   1 2p0 (1+✓)p0 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)] > 1(1+✓) p1 , the principal would motivate
the partnership at t = 1 no matter whether the partnership or the individual
work is motivated at t = 0, then
4V Ft (p0)   ⇡F0 (pP0 ,!Pi,0)  (1  p0 )⇡1(pˆ1,!Pi,1) + [1  p0(2 + ✓) ]⇡1(p1,!Pi,1)
= p0 (1 + ✓)[1   (2 + ✓)]R  [1  2p0 (1 + ✓)] c
  [1  2p0 (1 + ✓)] c  [1  2p0 (1 + ✓)] c = 0
(A.0.8)
This implies that (A.0.8) holds for 8 [0, 1], and then the partnership is pre-
ferred at t = 0. When Rc 2
h
1
 p0
, 1(1+✓) p0
⌘
, 4⇡F0 (pP0 ,!Pi,0) < 0 then (A.0.5)
doesn’t hold as its right hand side is positive. Thus the principal would mo-
tivate the individual work at t = 0. When Rc 2
h
1
(1+✓) p1
, 1 2p0 (1+✓)p0 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)]
⌘
,
the principal would still motivate the partnership at t = 1. Thus (A.0.4) and
(A.0.5) imply that
   p0 (1 + ✓)R  c
p0 2(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)R  2p0 (1 + ✓)c
= 1 +
p0 (1 + ✓)[1   (2 + ✓)]R  [1  2p0 (1 + ✓)]c
p0 2(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)R  2p0 (1 + ✓)c
 1 + [1  2p0 (1 + ✓)]c  [1  2p0 (1 + ✓)]c
p0 2(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)R  2p0 (1 + ✓)c = 1
(A.0.9)
Therefore, (A.0.4) holds if   2 [0,  E), where  E = p0 (1+✓)R cp0 2(1+✓)(2+✓)R 2p0 (1+✓)c .
When Rc 2
h
1
(1+✓) pˆ1
, 1(1+✓) p1
⌘
, according to Lemma 1.3.1.2), the principal
would motivate the partnership only if the individual work is motivated at
t = 0, thus (A.0.4) and (A.0.5) imply that
   4⇡
F
0 (p
P
0 ,!
P
i,0)
(1  p0 )
h
ˆp1 (2 + ✓)R  2c
i
  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]max {p1 R  c, 0}
 p0 (1 + ✓)R  c
p0 (1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c = 1 
[1  p0 (1 + ✓)] c
p0 (1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c < 1
(A.0.10)
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As a result, (A.0.4) holds if   2 [0,  E), where  E = p0 (1+✓)R cp0 (1+✓)( R c) in this case.
When Rc 2
h
1
(1+✓) p0
, 1(1+✓) pˆ1
⌘
, according to Lemma 1.3.1.2), the principal
would not motivate the partnership at t = 0, then (A.0.4) and (A.0.5) imply
that
   4⇡
F
0 (p
P
0 ,!
P
i,0)
(1  p0 )( ˆp1 R  c)  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]max {p1 R  c, 0}
 p0 (1 + ✓)R  c
p0 (1 + ✓)( R  c) = 1 +
p0 (1   )(1 + ✓)R  [1  p0 (1 + ✓)]c
p0 (1 + ✓)( R  c)
= 1 +
(1  p0 )c  [1  p0 (1 + ✓)]c
p0 (1 + ✓)( R  c) = 1 +
p0 ✓c
p0 (1 + ✓)( R  c) < 1
(A.0.11)
As a result, (A.0.4) holds if   2 [0,  E), where  E = p0 (1+✓)R cp0 (1+✓)( R c) in this case.
Now check the e ciency level between the two-tier and three-tier struc-
ture in the first-best. In the two-tier structure, in which the principal can
directly o↵er contracts to both of the agents, Denote the contract o↵ered to
the agent i at t by si,t, where si,t 2 [0, 1], i = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1. Thus,
!1,t = s1,t + s2,t and !1,t!2,t = s2,t. In the first best, to motivate the agent(s)
to work, the participation constraint(s) need(s) to be binding:
U it (p
i
t) = p
i
tsi,t (2 + ✓)R  c+  [1  pit (2 + ✓)]U it+1(pit+1)   0
or U it (p
i
t) = p
i
tsi,t R  c+  (1  pit )U it+1(pit+1)   0
(A.0.12)
This is the same as that in (1.3.6). Therefore, the analysis and the conclusion
should be the same as that in the three-tier structure.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.1
When the synergy is positive, to motivate the partnership, (1.4.1),
(1.4.2) and (1.4.3) and imply that
pPt !
S
1,t(p
P
t )(1+✓) R = max
⇢
2c,
2 + ✓
1 + ✓
c
 
and !2,t(p
P
t ) =
c
!1,t(pPt ) (1 + ✓)Rp
P
t
(A.0.13)
Notice that 2   2+✓1+✓ in this case, so
 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
1,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
2c
(1+✓) RpPt
, 12
⌘
, and
the principal’s profit at t now is ⇡(pPt ,!
S
1,t(p
⇤)) = pPt  (2 + ✓)R   2(2+✓)1+✓ c. On
the other hand, to motivate the individual work, agent one’s participation con-
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straint of working alone needs to be binding as no return would be generated
if he shirks. This implies that
 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
1,t(p
P
t )
 
= (c, 0) and the principal’s
profit now is ⇡(pPt ,!
S
1,t(p
⇤)) = pPt  R   c. If agent one deviates to collaborate
with agent two, from Table 1.1, it shows that agent two would accept the o↵er
if ✓   1. If so, the principal would always motivate the partnership as long
as the profit is positive. As as result, the optimal stopping threshold in this
case would be p⇤ = 2c(1+✓) R . If 0  ✓ < 1, the individual work can still be
motivated as agent two would reject if agent one deviates to collaborate. In
this case, the principal would only motivate the partnership if the di↵erence
between the principal’s profit from the collaboration and the individual work
is positive:
4⇡(pPt ,!S1,t(p⇤)) = pPt  (1 + ✓)R 
3 + ✓
1 + ✓
c   0 =) R
c
  3 + ✓
(1 + ✓)2 pPt
(A.0.14)
Then the principal is indi↵erent when pPt = p
T = (3+✓)c(1+✓)2 R . Therefore, in this
case, the principal would motivate the partnership if Rc   3+✓(1+✓)2 pPt >
2
(1+✓) pPt
;
and she would motivate the individual work if 1
 pPt
 Rc < 3+✓(1+✓)2 pPt . As a
result, the stopping threshold is p⇤ = c R .
When the synergy is negative, 2+✓1+✓ > 2 in (A.0.13). To motivate the
partnership,
 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
1,t(p
P
t )
 
=
⇣
(2+✓)c
(1+✓)2 RpPt
, 1+✓2+✓
⌘
, and the principal’s profit
is ⇡(pPt ,!
S
1,t(p
⇤)) = pPt  (2+✓)R 
 
2+✓
1+✓
 2
c. On the other hand, to motivate the
individual work, the optimal contracts should be the same as those in which
the synergy is positive. This is because the participation constraint is the
same. It implies that
 
!S1,t(p
P
t ),!
S
1,t(p
P
t )
 
= (c, 0), and the principal’s profit in
this case is ⇡(pPt ,!
S
1,t(p
⇤)) = pPt  R   c. Therefore, the principal would only
motivate the partnership if the di↵erence between the principal’s profit from
the collaboration and the individual work is positive:
4⇡(pPt ,!S1,t(p⇤)) = pPt  (1 + ✓)R 
3 + 2✓
(1 + ✓)2
c   0 =) R
c
  3 + 2✓
(1 + ✓)3 pPt
(A.0.15)
Then the principal is indi↵erent when pPt = p
T = (3+2✓)c(1+✓)3 R . Notice that
(3+2✓)c
(1+✓)3 R >
2c
(1+✓) R , then the principal would motivate the partnership if
R
c  
3+2✓
(1+✓)3 pPt
. Moreover, since (3+2✓)c(1+✓)3 R >
c
 R , the principal would motivate the
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individual work if Rc 2
h
1
 pPt
, 3+2✓
(1+✓)3 pPt
⌘
. At last, she stops investing when
pPt  R  c < 0. As a result, p⇤ = c R .
Proof of Lemma 1.4.2
Consider the situation in which the individual work is motivated at
t = 0. If agent one sticks to the equilibrium strategy, his continuation value
would be:
U1,WA0 (p0) = p0!1,0 R  c+  (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1) (A.0.16)
Alternatively, if agent one deviates to delegate the entire work to agent two,
he must ensure that agent two is weakly better o↵ by working:
p0!2,0!1,1 R| {z }
gain from working
  c|{z}
gain from shirking
+ 
⇥
uˆ21(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1)  (1  p0 )uˆ21(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1)
⇤| {z }
gain from belief manipulation: B21(p0;pˆ1;pˆ1)
(A.0.17)
Thus agent one o↵ers a sub-contract such that (A.0.17) binds, and his contin-
uation value would be:
U1,CR0 (p0) = p0!1,0 R  c  B21(p0; pˆ1; pˆ1) +  (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1)
 p0!1,0 R  c+  (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1) = U1,WA0 (p0)
(A.0.18)
This implies that agent one is weakly better o↵ by working alone rather than
complete resourcing. Now consider the other situation in which the partnership
is motivated at t = 0. If agent one deviates to work alone, his continuation
value would be:
U1,E0 (p0) = p0!1,0 R  c+  (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) (A.0.19)
Alternatively, if agent one deviates to complete resourcing and delegate the
entire work to agent two, he must ensure that agent two is weakly better o↵
by working rather than shirking:
p0!2,0!1,1 R| {z }
gain from working
  c|{z}
gain from shirking
+ 
⇥
uˆ21(p0; p1, pˆ1)  (1  p0 )uˆ21(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)
⇤| {z }
gain from belief manipulation: B21(p0;p1;pˆ1)
(A.0.20)
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Thus agent one o↵ers a sub-contract such that (A.0.20) binds, and his contin-
uation value would be:
U1,EC0 (p0) = p0!1,0 R  c  B21(p0; p1; pˆ1) +  (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)
 p0!1,0 R  c+  (1  p0 )uˆ11(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) = U1,E0 (p0)
(A.0.21)
This implies that agent one is weakly better o↵ by excluding agent two relative
to complete resourcing. To sum up, the exclusion incentive dominates complete
resourcing incentive.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.3
When the individual work is motivated at t = 0 but agent one deviates
to form the partnership, after no success occurs, the principal’s posterior belief
is pˆ1 and the agents have the belief p1. At t = 1, the principal o↵ers !⇤1,1(p
P
1 ),
and agent two would accept the sub-contract if !2,1   !⇤2,1(p1). Since period
t = 1 is the last period in this economy, it’s analysis should be the same as
that in the static game. Thus, !⇤1,1(pˆ1) = !
S
1,1(p1) and !
⇤
2,1(p1) = !
S
2,1(p1).
To mitigate agent two’s free-riding problem, agent two’s free-riding incentive
constraint binds, !⇤2,1(p1) =
c
p1!⇤1,1(pˆ1)(1+✓) R
. The following discussion checks if
agent one’s free-riding incentive constraint (A.0.22) is satisfied:
p1!
⇤
1,1(pˆ1)(1 + ✓) R   2c (A.0.22)
If it’s satisfied, it needs to be proven that agent one’s payo↵ would be higher
by working alone or rejecting the grand contract at t = 1; If the free-riding
incentive is violated, it needs to be shown that either agent two would reject
the sub-contract or agent one’s expected payo↵ is lower by free-riding.
If pˆ1 < p⇤, the principal would not invest at t = 1, and agent one would
not accept a zero paid contract. Thus it can be focused on the case where
pˆ1   p⇤. If pˆ1   max{p⇤, pT}, the principal would motivate the partnership at
t = 1, and o↵ers !⇤1,1(pˆ1) = max
n
2c
(1+✓) Rpˆ1
, (2+✓)c(1+✓)2 Rpˆ1
o
. In the scenario with
positive synergy, (A.0.22) is not satisfied. Given agent one shirks, agent two’s
gain would be negative: 11+✓c   c  0. Thus agent two would reject the sub-
contract, leaving agent one working alone. Agent one would then reject the
grand contract since his expected payo↵ from the individual work is negative,
93
p1
pˆ1
c c < 0. On the other hand, in the scenario with negative synergy, it shows
that agent one’s payo↵ from the individual work is higher than that from the
collaboration and the free-riding. As a result, agent one’s optimal payo↵ at
t = 1 would be uˆ11(p1; pˆ1, p1) = max
n
p1
pˆ1
1
1+✓c  c, p1pˆ1 2+✓(1+✓)2 c  c, 0
o
If pˆ1 2
⇥
p⇤, pT
⇤
, the principal would motivate the individual work at
t = 1, and o↵ers !⇤1,1(pˆ1) =
c
 Rpˆ1
. Then the (A.0.22) is not satisfied. When the
synergy is positive, agent two would reject the sub-contract. Agent one would
also reject the grand contract since his expected payo↵ from the individual
work is negative. When the synergy is negative, agent one still gets negative
payo↵ from free-riding, and he would still reject the grand contract.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.1
Period t = 1 is the last period in this economy, so there is no chance for
the agent(s) to manipulate the other parties’ beliefs. Therefore, the incentives
of the agents are the same as those in the static game, which implies that the
analysis should be the same. Notice that, on the equilibrium path, each party
would have the common belief pP1 at t = 1, therefore, !
⇤
i,1(p
P
1 ) = !
S
i,1(p
P
1 ).
For pˆ1 < p⇤, the principal would not invest at t = 1 after no success occurs
at t = 0, since the net profit would be negative if she invests. Therefore, the
incentives of the agent(s) are the same as those in the static game, which make
the optimal grand and sub-contracts are the same, !⇤i,0(p0) = !
S
i,0(p0)
Now the focus shifts to the scenarios with pˆ1   p⇤. Consider the situa-
tion in which agent one’s individual work is motivates at t = 0. This requires
that (1.4.10) binds, and !⇤1,0 =
c+ B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)
 Rp0
. Meanwhile, (1.4.11) needs to be
satisfied, otherwise agent one would deviate.
Consider the other situation in which the partnership is motivated at
t = 0. From (1.4.5), agent two’s free-riding incentive constraint must bind.
Thus the optimal sub-contract !⇤2,0(p0) must satisfy:
!⇤2,0(p0) =
c+  B21(pˆ1; p1, p1)
!⇤1,0(p0)(1 + ✓) Rp0
(A.0.23)
Also, when (1.4.5) binds, agent one’s continuation value from the collaboration
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would be:
U1,CO0 (p0) =p0!1,0(2 + ✓) R 
3 + 2✓
1 + ✓
c  2 + ✓
1 + ✓
 B21(pˆ1; p1, p1)
+  [1  p0 (2 + ✓)]uˆ1(p1; p1, p1)
(A.0.24)
If agent one deviates to free-ride on the agent 2’s work, his continuation value
from such deviation is:
U1,FR0 (p0) = p0!1,0 R 
1
1 + ✓
c  1
1 + ✓
 B21(pˆ1; p1, p1) +  (1  p0 )uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1)
(A.0.25)
If agent one deviates to exclude the agent 2 and indeed exerts e↵ort, his
continuation value is shown in (A.0.19). If he deviates to exclude agent two
and shirks, his continuation value would be:
U1,ES0 (p0) =  uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1) (A.0.26)
Therefore, to support the partnership, the principal needs to o↵er a grand
contract such that:
U1,CO0 (p0)   max
n
U1,FR0 (p0), U
1,E
0 (p0), U
1,ES
0 (p0)
o
(A.0.27)
This is equivalent to that (1.4.8) and (1.4.9) are satisfied.
When the synergy is negative, ✓ 2   1,min 0, 1 2     , the di↵erence
between agent one’s continuation value from the free-riding and exclusion-work
is:
4U1,FE0 (p0) =
✓
1 + ✓
c  1
1 + ✓
 B21(pˆ1; p1, p1)+ (1 p0 ) [uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1)  uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)]| {z }
“<000
(A.0.28)
It’s clear that (A.0.28) is negative when ✓ < 0, in which case agent two’s
free-riding incentive is dominated by the exclusion-work incentive. Notice that
(1.4.9) represents agent one’s incentives constraints of working alone and shirk-
ing after he has excluded agent two, thus (1.4.8) and (1.4.9) can be simplified
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as:
ICFR1,0 : !1,0p0 R  
2
1 + ✓
c+
  (B21(pˆ1, p1, p1)(1 + ✓) + B
1
1(pˆ1; p1, p1))
1 + ✓
ICEW1,0 : !1,0p0 R  
2 + ✓
(1 + ✓)2
c+
  [(2 + ✓)B21(pˆ1, p1, p1) + (1 + ✓)B
1
1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)]
(1 + ✓)2
ICES1,0 : !1,0p0 R  
3 + 2✓
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
c+
  [(2 + ✓)B21(pˆ1, p1, p1) + (1 + ✓)B
1
1(p0; p1, pˆ1)]
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
(A.0.29)
Notice that the principal would make the !⇤1,0 as low as possible, then the
dominant incentive should have the largest right hand side in (A.0.29). The
dominant incentive constraint would be binding and the constraints of others
would be slack. From (A.0.29), the di↵erence between the right hand side of
ICEW1,0 and IC
ES
1,0 :
4RHSWS = 1  ✓   ✓
2
(1 + ✓)2(2 + ✓)
c+ 

B21(pˆ; p1, p1)
(1 + ✓)2
+
B11(pˆ; p1, pˆ1)
1 + ✓
  B
1
1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
2 + ✓
 
(A.0.30)
It’s clear that the first term on the right hand side of (A.0.30) and B21(pˆ1; p1, p1)
are positive when ✓ 2   1,min 0, 1 2     . For p1   pT , this right hand side
can be simplified as:
4RHSWS >  

B21(pˆ; p1, p1)
(1 + ✓)2
+
B11(pˆ; p1, pˆ1)
1 + ✓
  B
1
1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
2 + ✓
 
   

B11(pˆ; p1, pˆ1)
1 + ✓
  B
1
1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
2 + ✓
 
=  c

[1  p0 (2 + ✓)](2✓ + 3)
(1 + ✓)2(2 + ✓)
  (1  p0 )(3 + 2✓)
(1 + ✓)2
+
1
2 + ✓
+
1
1 + ✓
p0
pˆ1
 
/ 1
1 + ✓
p0
pˆ1
  2 + 2✓
2 + ✓
>
1
✓
  2 + 2✓
2 + ✓
=
 ✓
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
> 0
(A.0.31)
Thus agent one’s incentive constraint of working dominates the incentive of
shirking after excluding agent two, and it needs to be binding. For pT > p1  
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p⇤, uˆ1(p1; p1, p1) = 0, and (A.0.30) can be simplified as:
4RHSWS >  

B21(pˆ; p1, p1)
(1 + ✓)2
+
B11(pˆ; p1, pˆ1)
1 + ✓
  B
1
1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
2 + ✓
 
   

B11(pˆ; p1, pˆ1)
1 + ✓
  B
1
1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
2 + ✓
 
=  

1  p0 
1 + ✓
uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)  1
2 + ✓
uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
  (A.0.32)
Notice that, uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) =
pˆ1(2+✓)
p1
c  3+2✓1+✓ c and uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1) = p0(2+✓)p1 c  c 
2+✓
1+✓
p0
pˆ1
c if pˆ1p1   2+✓(1+✓)2 , then in (A.0.32):
4RHSWS
> 

1  p0 
1 + ✓
uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)  1
2 + ✓
uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
 
/1  p0 
1 + ✓

pˆ1
p1
(2 + ✓)c  3 + 2✓
1 + ✓
c
 
  1
2 + ✓

p0
p1
(2 + ✓)c  c  2 + ✓
1 + ✓
p0
pˆ1
c
 
/1  p0 (2 + ✓)
2 + ✓
  (1  p0 )(2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
+
p0
pˆ1(1 + ✓)
 p0
pˆ1
(2 + ✓)(1   )
(1 + ✓)2
  (1  p0 )(2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
=
(1  p0 )(2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
  (1  p0 )(2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
=0
(A.0.33)
Agent one’s incentive constraint of working still dominates others in this case.
If pˆ1p1 2
⇣
1, 2+✓(1+✓)2
⌘
, uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) =
pˆ1
p1
c  c and uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1) = p0p1 c  c, then in
(A.0.32):
4RHSWS >  

1  p0 
1 + ✓
uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)  1
2 + ✓
uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
 
/ 1  p0 
1 + ✓
✓
pˆ1
p1
c  c
◆
  1
2 + ✓
✓
p0
p1
c  c
◆
/ 1  p0 (2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
  1  p0 (2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
= 0
(A.0.34)
Again, agent one’s incentive constraint of working dominates others in this
case. To sum up, when the synergy is negative, agent one’s incentive of ex-
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cluding agent two and working alone dominates, in which case
!⇤1,0(p0) =
(2 + ✓)c+  
h
(2 + ✓)Bˆ21(pˆ1; p1, p1) + (1 + ✓)Bˆ
1
1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)
i
(1 + ✓)2 Rp0
.
Consider the small positive synergy scenario, ✓ 2
h
0,min
np
5 1
2 ,
1 2 
 
o⌘
.
In this scenario, the first term on the right hand side of (A.0.30) is still positive.
For p1   pT , in (A.0.30):
4RHSWS
>
1  p0 
1 + ✓
uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)   
2 + ✓
uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1)   1  p0 (2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
uˆ1(p1; p1, p1)
= c

1  p0 (2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
  (1  p0 )(2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
+
1
1 + ✓
p0
pˆ1
 
/ 1
1 + ✓
p0
pˆ1
  1
1 + ✓
>0
(A.0.35)
Then agent one’s incentive of the shirking after excluding agent two is dom-
inated in this case. For pT > p1   p⇤, uˆ1(p1; p1, p1) = 0. Notice that, If
pˆ1
p1
  21+✓ > 2+✓(1+✓)2 , uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) = pˆ1(2+✓)p1 c  3+2✓1+✓ c and uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1) =
p0(2+✓)
p1
c 
c   2+✓1+✓ p0pˆ1 c, so the analysis would be the same as that in (A.0.33), in which
case agent one’s incentive of the shirking after excluding the agent 2 is domi-
nated. If pˆ1p1 2
⇣
1, 2+✓(1+✓)2
⌘
, uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) =
pˆ1
p1
c  c and uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1) = p0p1 c  c,
so the analysis must be the same as that in (A.0.34). Therefore, agent one’s
incentive of the shirking after excluding agent two is dominated in all di↵erent
cases with small positive synergy. As a result, it can be only focused on the
free-riding incentive and exclusion-work incentive.
Notice that agent one’s free-riding incentive dominates if 4U1,FE0 (p0) is
positive,
4U1,FE0 (p0) =
✓c
1 + ✓
c  1
1 + ✓
 B21(pˆ1; p1, p1)
+  (1  p0 ) [uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1)  uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)]   0
=)    ✓c
B21(pˆ1; p1, p1) + (1 + ✓)(1  p0 ) [uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1)  uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1)]
(A.0.36)
98
If p1   pT , (A.0.36) can be simplified as
   ✓
 (1 p0)(2+✓)2
1  (2+✓) + p0 
=)    ✓[1   (2 + ✓)]
 (2 + ✓)2   p0 [(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)]
(A.0.37)
The denominator is always positive as 1    (2 + ✓) > 0. When the positive
synergy is less than 1, to prove that the right hand side of (A.0.37) is less than
1, I take the di↵erence between the numerator and the denominator as follows:
✓[1   (2 + ✓)]  (2 + ✓)2 + p0 [(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)]
<✓[1   (2 + ✓)]   (2 + ✓)2 +  [(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)]
=(✓   1)[1   (2 + ✓)] < 0
(A.0.38)
Therefore, the right hand side of (A.0.37) is less than 1, and it holds for
8✓ 2 ⇥0,min 1 2   , 1  . Agent one’s free-riding incentive dominates when
  2 [0,  ˜], where  ˜ = ✓[1  (2+✓)] (2+✓)2 p0 [(3+✓)(1+✓)+ (2+✓)] . This result holds for 8✓ 2⇥
0,min
 
1 2 
  , 1
  
.
If pT > p1   p⇤, B21(pˆ1; p1, p1) = 0. For pˆ1p1   21+✓ , uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) =
(2+✓)pˆ1
p1
c  3+2✓1+✓ c and uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1) = pˆ1p1 c  c, then, from (A.0.36),
   ✓
(1+✓)2(1  )p0
p1
  (2 + ✓)(1  p0 )
(A.0.39)
To prove that its right hand side is less than 1, the di↵erence between the
numerator and the denominator would be rewritten as:
✓   (1 + ✓)
2(1   )p0
p1
  (2 + ✓)(1  p0 )
< ✓   (1 + ✓)
2p0
p1
+ (2 + ✓)(1  p0 ) < ✓   2(1 + ✓) + (2 + ✓)(1  p0 )| {z }
since
p0
p1
>
pˆ1
p1
  21+✓
=  (2 + ✓)p0  < 0
(A.0.40)
Therefore, agent one’s free-riding incentive dominates when   2 [0,  ˜], where
99
 ˜ = ✓
(1+✓)2(1  )p0
p1
 (2+✓)(1 p0 )
. For pˆ1p1 2
 
1, 21+✓
 
, uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, pˆ1) = uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1) =
pˆ1
p1
c   c, and then 4U1,FE0 (p0) in (A.0.36) is always positive, which implies
that the free-riding incentive is always dominates in this case, and it as-
sociated incentive constraint needs to be binding. As a result, !⇤1,0(p0) =
2c+ (B21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+B11(pˆ1;p1,p1))
(1+✓) Rp0
. When   2 [ ˜, 1], the exclusion-work incentive dom-
inates, and the optimal grand contract should be the same as that in the
negative synergy case.
Now consider the large positive synergy, where ✓ 2 ⇥1, 1 2    . Now
pT   p⇤. For p1   pT , To show the situation in which case the free-riding
incentive also dominates the exclusion-shirk incentive, the di↵erence of the
right hands between ICFR1,0 and IC
ES
1,0 in (A.0.29) also needs to be positive,
where
4RHSFS
=
1
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
c+  

✓B21(pˆ1; p1, p1)
1 + ✓
+
B11(pˆ1; p1, p1)
1 + ✓
  B
2
1(p0; p1, pˆ1)
2 + ✓
 
/ 1
2 + ✓
+  

✓(2 + ✓)(1  p0) 
1   (2 + ✓) + ✓p0  
 (1 + ✓)(1  p0)
(1   )[1   (2 + ✓)]
 
> 

✓(2 + ✓)(1  p0) 
1   (2 + ✓)  
 (1 + ✓)(1  p0)
(1   )[1   (2 + ✓)]
 
/✓2   1 + ✓[1   (2 + ✓)] > 0
(A.0.41)
Then the free-riding incentive dominates the exclusion-shirk incentive in this
case. To determine the relationship between the free-riding and exclusion-work
incentives, the analysis is similar to that in which case ✓ 2 ⇥0,min 1, 1 2     
and p1   pT . The di↵erence between the numerator and the denominator in
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(A.0.37) would be:
✓[1   (2 + ✓)]   (2 + ✓)2 + p0 [(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)]
=✓[(2 + ✓)2   (3 + ✓)(1 + ✓)   (2 + ✓)]
    (2 + ✓)2   p0[(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)] 
>✓
 
(2 + ✓)2   p0[(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)]
 
    (2 + ✓)2   p0[(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)] 
=(✓    ) (2 + ✓)2   p0[(3 + ✓)(1 + ✓) +  (2 + ✓)] > 0
(A.0.42)
Therefore, the free-riding incentive also dominates the exclusion-work incen-
tives in this case.
Finally, consider the positive synergy is medium, in which case ✓ 2hp
5 1
2 ,min
 
1, 1 2  
 ⌘
. For p1   pT , notice that the right hand side of (A.0.41)
is a linear function of the discount factor  , and 4RHSFS is positive when
  = 0. Now let   = 1, then (A.0.41) becomes
4RHSFS| =1 / 1
2 + ✓
  (1  ✓
2) (1  p0)
[1   (2 + ✓)](1   ) +
 ✓(1  p0 )
1   
>
1      (2 + ✓)[✓2    + (1  ✓2)p0]
(2 + ✓)[1   (2 + ✓)](1   )
/ 1      (2 + ✓)[✓2    + (1  ✓2)p0]
> 1      (2 + ✓)(✓2    + 1  ✓2)
= (1   )[1   (2 + ✓)] > 0
(A.0.43)
As a result, the 4RHSFS is always positive for 8 [0, 1] in this case.
For p1   pT , agent one’s incentive of free-riding dominates the incentive
of exclusion-work if (A.0.37) is satisfied, which is the same as that with small
positive synergy. For pT > p1   p⇤, B21(pˆ1; p1, p1) = 0 and uˆ1(p1; p1, p1) = 0.
If pˆ1p1 2
 
1, 21+✓
 
, uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1) =
p0
p1
c   c and uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1) = p0p1 c   c. Then, in
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(A.0.41),
4RHSFS = 1
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
c+  c

1   (2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
p0
p1
  1  p0 (2 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
 
=
1
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
c+ 0 > 0
(A.0.44)
This implies that the exclusion-shirk incentive is dominated by the free-riding
incentive in this case. If pˆ1p1   21+✓ , uˆ1(pˆ1; p1, p1) = p0p1 c  c and uˆ1(p0; p1, pˆ1) =
(2+✓)p0
p1
c  c  (1+✓)p0(2+✓)pˆ1 . Then, in (A.0.41),
4RHSFS
=
1
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
c+  
1  p0 
1 + ✓
✓
pˆ1
p1
c  c
◆
   
2 + ✓
✓
(2 + ✓)p0
p1
c  c  (2 + ✓)p0
(1 + ✓)pˆ1
c
◆
>
 
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
c+  
1  p0 
1 + ✓
✓
pˆ1
p1
c  c
◆
   
2 + ✓
✓
(2 + ✓)p0
p1
c  c  (2 + ✓)p0
(1 + ✓)pˆ1
c
◆
/ 1
(1 + ✓)(2 + ✓)
+
1  p0 
1 + ✓
✓
pˆ1
p1
  1
◆
  1
2 + ✓
✓
(2 + ✓)p0
p1
  1  (2 + ✓)p0
(1 + ✓)pˆ1
◆
/(2  ✓) +  2(3 + ✓) +  2p0(1  ✓   ✓2) +  p0(✓2 + 2✓) +  (2✓2 + 3✓   4)
(A.0.45)
Notice that, in this case,   2 (13 , 12) and ✓ 2
⇣p
5 1
2 , 1
⌘
, then, from the results1
in Software “Mathematica”, (A.0.45) is always positive in this case. Therefore,
the exclusion-shirk incentive is dominated in this case. Moreover, to check
whether the free-riding incentive or the exclusion-work incentive dominates,
the analysis is the same as before and results in (A.0.40) still hold.
Proof of Corollary 1.4.1
Notice that the left hand side of the two inequalities in (1.4.11) are
the same, then it only needs to be checked wether the grand contract for
motivating the individual work satisfies the inequality with the larger right
hand side, where !IW1,0 (p0) =
c+ B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)
 Rp0
. The di↵erence of the right hand
1The code is: Manipulate[Plot[(2 ✓)+ 2(3+✓)+ 2p0(1 ✓ ✓2)+ p0(✓2+2✓)+ (2✓2+3✓ 
4),{✓,
p
5 1
2 ,1}],{ , 13 , 12}{p0,0,1}]
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sides are:
4RHSIW = ✓
1 + ✓
c+  (1  p0 )
 
uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, p1)  uˆ11(pˆ1; pˆ1, pˆ1)
 
=
✓
1 + ✓
c+  (1  p0 )max
⇢
  ✓
1 + ✓
c, 0
  (A.0.46)
It’s clear that the right hand side of the first inequality is larger in (1.4.11)
when the synergy is positive, thus it can only be focused on whether the first
inequality is satisfied. On the other hand, when the synergy is negative, the
focus shifts to the second inequality in (1.4.11).
When ✓   ⇥1, 1 2    , (1.4.11) requires:
(1 + ✓)c+ (1 + ✓) B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) +  
1  p0 (2 + ✓)
1 + ✓
c < 2c (A.0.47)
Its left hand side is an increasing function of   and reaches the minimum at
  = 0. However, (1 + ✓)c   2c. This implies for 8  2 [0, 1], (1.4.11) is always
violated.
Now consider the small positive synergy, ✓ 2 ⇥0,min 1 2   , 1  . Firstly,
for pˆ1   pT and pˆ1p1   21+✓ , (1.4.11) becomes:
 

B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) 
(1  p0 )(1  ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
c
 
<
1  ✓
1 + ✓
c (A.0.48)
The left hand side of the inequality above is a continuous linear function of
 , and it’s always satisfied at   = 0. Now check whether it’s still satisfied at
  = 1. If it is, then it’s satisfied for 8  2 [0, 1]; if it’s violated, according to the
intermediate value theorem, there must exist  v 2 (0, 1), such that (1.4.11) is
violated for   2 [ v, 1], and satisfied for   2 [0,  v). Similar argument would be
applied for the all rest of proof of Corollary 1.4.1. At   = 1, (A.0.48) requires:
B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) 
(1  p0 )(1  ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
c  1  ✓
1 + ✓
c < 0
=) / ✓2 + ✓   2 + 2 (2 + ✓)  p0 (✓2 + 3✓ + 2 ) < 0
=) p0  > ✓
2 + ✓   2 + 2 (2 + ✓)
✓2 + 3✓ + 2 
(A.0.49)
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It’s clear that (A.0.49) always holds if   2  0, 1 ✓2 ⇤ since the numerator ✓2 +
✓   2 + 2 (2 + ✓) is negative in this case. Thus I focus on the scenario with
  2  1 ✓2 , 12 , in which case ✓ 2 ⇣p5 12 , 1⌘. Notice that pˆ1p1   21+✓ , and it
requires:
p0   ✓   1 +  (3 + ✓)
3✓ + ✓2 + (2 + ✓)(1  ✓)  and   2
✓
1  ✓
1 + ✓
,
1
2
◆
(A.0.50)
Since 2  > (2 + ✓)(1   ✓)  and ✓2   1 +   < 0 when   2  1 ✓2 , 12  and ✓ 2⇣p
5 1
2 , 1
⌘
, it must be true that ✓
2+✓ 2+2 (2+✓)
✓2+3✓+2  <
✓ 1+ (3+✓)
3✓+✓2+(2+✓)(1 ✓)  and   2 
1 ✓
1+✓ ,
1
2
 
. Therefore, (A.0.48) doesn’t hold for p0
⇣
0, ✓
2+✓ 2+2 (2+✓)
 (✓2+3✓+2 )
i
in this
case. As a result, according to intermediate value theorem, 9 v 2 (1 ✓2 , 12)
and 9✓v 2
⇣p
5 1
2 , 1
⌘
, such that (1.4.11) holds for 8p0 2 (0, 1), in which case
  2 ⇥ v, 12  and ✓ 2 ⇥✓v,min 1, 1 2     . Thus, (A.0.48) doesn’t hold at   =
1. Therefore, (1.4.11) is violated when   2 [ v, 1] in this case, where  v =
(1 ✓2)c
(1+✓)2B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1) (1 p0 )(1 ✓) . Aslo, it’s easily to see that (A.0.49) is violated if
p0 2 (0, pv], in which case pv = min
n
1, ✓
2+✓ 2+2 (2+✓)
 (✓2+3✓+2 )
o
.
Secondly, for pˆ1   pT and 1 < pˆ1p1 < 21+✓ , in (1.4.11):
 
⇢
B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) 
(1  p0 )(1  ✓)
(1 + ✓)2
c+
[1  p0 (2 + ✓)][2p1   (1 + ✓)pˆ1]
pˆ1(1 + ✓)2
c
 
<
1  ✓
1 + ✓
c
(A.0.51)
By applying the same argument as the previous case, the inequality holds at
  = 0. At   = 1, it requires:
 + ✓   1  p0 ✓
(1 + ✓)(1   ) < 0 =) p0  >
 + ✓   1
✓
(A.0.52)
Since 1 < pˆ1p1 <
2
1+✓ , in which p0  >
✓ 1+ (3+✓)
3✓+✓2+(2+✓)(1 ✓)  , it implies that
 + ✓   1
✓
  ✓   1 +  (3 + ✓)
3✓ + ✓2 + (2 + ✓)(1  ✓)  /  
2      ✓ < 0 (A.0.53)
Therefore, (A.0.52) holds at   = 1. As a result, (1.4.11) is always satisfied for
8  2 [0, 1] in this case.
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Thirdly, for pT > pˆ1   p⇤, (1.4.11) requires
 B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) <
1  ✓
1 + ✓
c (A.0.54)
Again, it’s satisfied at   = 0. At   = 1, it becomes:
1  p0 
1    c 
2
1 + ✓
c < 0 =) p0  > ✓   1 + 2 
1 + ✓
(A.0.55)
If 0 < ✓  1   2 , (A.0.55) is always satisfied as the numerator is nega-
tive. However, if ✓ 2  1  2 ,min{1 2   , 1} , it implies that 0 < ✓ 1+2 (1+✓)  < 1.
Thus, together with p0 2
⇣
0, ✓ 1+2 (1+✓) 
i
, (A.0.55) is violated, and it follows
that (A.0.54) is violated at   = 1. As a result, for   2
h
1 ✓
(1+✓)B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)
, 1
i
,
✓ 2  1  2 ,min{1 2   , 1}  and p0 2 ⇣0, ✓ 1+2 (1+✓)  i, (1.4.11) is violated. In this
case, pv = ✓ 1+2 (1+✓)  ,  v =
(1 ✓)c
(1+✓)B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)
, and ✓v = 1   2 , which are di↵erent
from previous levels of threshold.
Now consider the negative synergy, ✓ 2   1,min 1 2   , 0  , in which it
only needs to be checked whether the second inequality in (1.4.11) is satisfied.
Firstly, pˆ1   pT and pˆ1p1   2+✓(1+✓)2 , (1.4.11) becomes:
 

B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) 
(1  p0 )(1  ✓   ✓2)
(1 + ✓)3
c
 
<
1  ✓   ✓2
(1 + ✓)2
c (A.0.56)
The inequality is satisfied at   = 0. At   = 1, it can be simplified as:
✓2 + ✓   1 + (2  ✓2)  < p0 
⇥
 (1  ✓   ✓2) + ✓2 + 2✓⇤ (A.0.57)
Since pˆ1p1   2+✓(1+✓)2 , it requires that p0  [ (1  ✓   ✓2) + ✓2 + 2✓] 
✓2+✓ 1+ (3+2✓)
2+✓ ,
which also implies that:
✓2 + ✓   1 + (2  ✓2)  < ✓
2 + ✓   1 +  (3 + 2✓)
2 + ✓
=) (1  2✓2   ✓3)  < (1  ✓   ✓2)(1 + ✓)
(A.0.58)
This inequality is always satisfied for 8  2 (0, 1) and 8✓ 2   1,min{0, 1    } 
in this case. Now it can focus on the value of p0. If it’s coe cient is pos-
itive, [✓2 + ✓   1 +  (3 + ✓)]  > 0, it must be true that ✓2 + ✓   1 +
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 (3 + ✓) > 0. This scenario exists at   2
⇣
 ✓(2+✓)
1 ✓ ✓2 , 1
⌘
and ✓ 2 ( 1, ✓v0 ],
where  ✓v0 (2+✓v0 )
1 ✓v0 ✓2v0
=
1 ✓v0 ✓2v0
3+✓v0
. In contrast, it’s implies that (A.0.56) is vio-
lated in this case if p0 2
⇣
0, ✓
2+✓ 1+(2 ✓2) 
 [ (1 ✓ ✓2)+✓2+2✓]
⌘
with   2
⇣
1 ✓ ✓2
2 ✓2 , 1
⌘
and
✓ 2 ( 1, ✓v0 ]. Thus (1.4.11) is violated at   = 1. As a result, (1.4.11) would
be violated at   2
"
1 ✓ ✓2
(1+✓)2
c
B11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)  (1 p0 )(1 ✓ ✓
2)
(1+✓)3
c
, 1
#
, p0 2
⇣
0, ✓
2+✓ 1+(2 ✓2) 
 [ (1 ✓ ✓2)+✓2+2✓]
⌘
with  2
⇣
1 ✓ ✓2
2 ✓2 , 1
⌘
and ✓ 2 ( 1, ✓v0 ]. On the other hand, if [✓2 + ✓   1 +
 (3 + ✓)]  < 0, it requires that ✓2 + ✓   1 + (2   ✓2)  < 0. Thus, (A.0.56) is
violated at p0 2
⇣
✓2+✓ 1+(2 ✓2) 
 [ (1 ✓ ✓2)+✓2+2✓] , 1
⌘
with   2
⇣
0, 1 ✓ ✓
2
3+✓
⌘
. However, since
✓2+✓ 1+(2 ✓2) 
 [ (1 ✓ ✓2)+✓2+2✓] > 1 in this scenario, it can be discarded.
Secondly, for pˆ1   pT and 1 < pˆ1p1 < 2+✓(1+✓)2 , from (1.4.11),
 
⇢
B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) +
[1  p0 (2 + ✓)][(2 + ✓)p1   (1 + ✓)2pˆ1]
pˆ1(1 + ✓)3
c
 (1  p0 )(1  ✓   ✓
2)
(1 + ✓)3
c
 
<
1  ✓   ✓2
(1 + ✓)2
c
(A.0.59)
The inequality is satisfied at   = 0. At   = 1, it can be simplified as:
✓2 + ✓   1
(1 + ✓)2
< 0 (A.0.60)
This implies that (A.0.59) is also satisfied at   = 1. Therefore, (1.4.11) is
always satisfied in this case.
Thirdly, for pT > pˆ1   p⇤, from (1.4.11),
 B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) <
1  ✓   ✓2
(1 + ✓)2
c (A.0.61)
The inequality is satisfied at   = 0. At   = 1, this condition can be simplified
as:
p0
pˆ1
c  2 + ✓
(1 + ✓)2
c < 0 =) p0 > ✓
2 + ✓   1 + (2 + ✓) 
 (1 + ✓)2
(A.0.62)
Notice that the numerator is always negative as ✓ 2 ( 1, 0) and 1  (2+✓) > 0,
thus (A.0.62) is always satisfied for 8  2 [0, 1].
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Proof of Proposition 1.4.2
If p0   p⇤ > pˆ1, ⇡⇤1(p1) = ⇡⇤1(pˆ1) = 0. Notice that   2 [0, 1], then the
principal would never delay the investment. When comparing the profits from
the partnership and the individual work, the analysis should be the same as
that in the static game with belief p0, so Lemma 1.4.1 can be applied. When
✓ 2  1, 1 2    , it is equivalent to the case in which Rc 2 h 2(1+✓) p0 , 2(1+✓) pˆ1⌘;
when ✓ 2   1, 1 2    , it equivalent to the case in which Rc 2 h 1 p0 , 1 pˆ1⌘. The
rest of proof of Proposition 1.4.2 would focus on the scenarios in which pˆ1  
p⇤. Moreover, notice that Bi1(·) is a linear function of the cost c, it can be
represented as Bi1(p
i
1; p
P
1 , p
j
1) =  
i
1(p
i
1; p
P
1 , p
j
1)c, where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Firstly, consider the large positive synergy in which case ✓ 2 ⇥1, 1 2    .
According to Corollary 1.4.1, the principal would only choose between the
partnership and delaying the investment, and she would prefer the partnership
at t = 0 if the di↵erence between the benefit from these two choices,4V CN0 (p0),
is positive. When pˆ1   p⇤   p1, the principal would not invest at t = 1 after the
failure from the collaboration, and ⇡⇤1(p1) = 0. As a result, (1.4.15) is always
positive as   2 [0, 1], and e⇤i,0(p0) = 1 = ePi,0(p0). This scenario is equivalent to
R
c 2
h
2
(1+✓) pˆ1
, 2(1+✓) p1
⌘
. When p1   p⇤, ⇡⇤1(p1) > 0, and V CN0 (p0) is positive
at   = 0. This scenario is equivalent to Rc   2(1+✓) p1 . Then I check if it’s still
positive at   = 1. If it is, the partnership at t = 0 is preferred; if it’s not, then
9 ⇤ 2 (0, 1), such that the partnership is preferred for   2 [0,  ⇤). The rest of
the proof would also follow the similar argument. At   = 1, V CN0 (p0) can be
simplified as:
4V CN0 (p0)| =1 =[1  p0 (2 + ✓)]p1 (2 + ✓)R
  2(2 + ✓)
1 + ✓

1  p0 (1 + ✓) + (2 + ✓) (1  p0)
1   (2 + ✓)
 
c
/p1 R  2  2p1 (1 + ✓)
(1 + ✓)[1   (2 + ✓)]c
(A.0.63)
This implies that 4V CN0 (p0)| =1   0 if Rc   2[1 p1 (1+✓)]p1 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)] > 2(1+✓)p1  . There-
fore, e⇤i,0(p0) = 1 when
R
c   2[1 p1 (1+✓)]p1 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)] . When Rc 2
h
2
(1+✓)p1 
, 2[1 p1 (1+✓)]p1 (1+✓)[1  (2+✓)]
⌘
,
4V CN0 (p0)| =1 < 0, thus e⇤i,0(p0) = 1 for   2 [0,  ⇤], and e⇤i,0(p0) = 0 for
  2 ( ⇤, 1], where 4V CN0 (p0)| ⇤ = 0.
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Now consider the scenarios with the negative synergy, in which case
✓ 2   1,min 0, 1 2     . When all the parameters make (1.4.11) to be satis-
fied, it must be true that both 4V CN0 (p0) and 4V CW0 (p0) are positive if the
partnership is motivated, which can be simplified as:8<:
R
c  
[1  p0 (2+✓)](2+✓)+ [(2+✓) 21(pˆ1;p1,p1)+(1+✓) 11(pˆ1;p1,pˆ1)]
p0 (1+✓)2[1   (2+✓)] =
⇣
R
c
⌘cn
R
c   2+✓1+✓
⇣
R
c
⌘cn   (1+✓)2  [p0 (2+✓)2(1+✓) (1+✓)2 11(p0;pˆ1,pˆ1)]p0 (1+✓)3[1   (2+✓)] = ⇣Rc ⌘cw
(A.0.64)
For p0   pT = (3+2✓)c(1+✓)3 R , the partnership is always preferred at   = 0 since
R
c   3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3 > 2+✓p0 (1+✓)2 . Thus, for 8  2 [0, 1], the partnership is preferred
as long as Rc   max
n⇣
R
c
⌘cn | =1,⇣Rc ⌘cw | =1, 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3o = Rc . Such value-cost
ratio always exists as Rc 2 [0,+1). On the other hand, if (1.4.11) is not
satisfied, 4V CW0 (p0) can be discarded for   2 [ v, 1] as the individual work
cannot be motivated in this case. For   2 [0,  v], the partnership is preferred
only if Rc   max
n⇣
R
c
⌘cn | = v ,⇣Rc ⌘cw | = v , 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3o. Therefore, for   2 [0, 1],
it has to be true that Rc   max
n⇣
R
c
⌘cn | =1,⇣Rc ⌘cw | = v , 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3o. It’s clear
that such value-cost ratio still exists, which is denoted by Rc .
For Rc 2
h
3+2✓
p0 (1+✓)3
, Rc
⌘
, the di↵erence of the static profits are still pos-
itive, p0 (2 + ✓)R   3+2✓(1+✓)2 c   0 and p0 (2 + ✓)R  
 
2+✓
1+✓
 2
c   0. From
(A.0.64), it must be true that 9 cw 2 [0, 1] and 9 cn 2 [0, 1] such that the
partnership is preferred at   2 ⇥0,min  cw,  cn ⇤ when (1.4.11) is satisfied,
then  
⇤
c = min
 
 cw,  cn
 
in this case. On the other hand, when (1.4.11) is vio-
lated and the individual work cannot be motivated at   2 [ v, 1], the principal
would preferred to the partnership at   2 ⇥0,max min  cw,  cn ,  v ⇤, and
 
⇤
c = max
 
min
 
 cw,  cn
 
,  v
 
in this case. The individual work is preferred
to no investment only if 4V WN0 (p0) is positive, which can be simplified as:
4V WN0 (p0) = p0 R  c    
⇥
B21(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1)  (1  p0 )⇡⇤1(pˆ1) + ⇡⇤1(p0)
⇤
(A.0.65)
Notice the left hand side is always positive, thus this inequality must hold at
  = 0. But it might be violated at   = 1. For instance, for Rc 2
h
3+2✓
p0 (1+✓)3
, 1p1 
⌘
,
(A.0.65) is violated as B21(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1) = ⇡
⇤
1(pˆ1) = 0. Therefore, 9 wn 2 [0, 1]
such that the individual work is preferred to no investment at   2 [0,  wn].
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Together with 4V CN0 (p0) < 0, no investment at t = 0 is preferred at   2 
max
 
 cn,  wn
 
, 1
⇤
when (1.4.11) is satisfied, and then  
⇤
w = max
 
 cn,  wn
 
 
⇤
c in this case. When (1.4.11) is violated, e
⇤
i,1 = 0 at   2
⇣
 
⇤
c, 1
i
, in which case
 
⇤
w =  
⇤
c.
Consider Rc 2
h
1
p0 
, 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3
⌘
. For Rc 2
h
1
p0 
,min
n
1
pˆ1 
, 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3
o⌘
, 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) as it’s equivalent to a static game. For Rc 2
h
1
pˆ1 
, 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3
⌘
,
V CW0 (p0) can be simplified as:
V CW0 (p0) =p0 (1 + ✓) 
3 + 2✓
(1 + ✓)2
c   [p0 2(1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c  (p0
pˆ1
  1)c
+
(2 + ✓)(1  p0 )c
1 + ✓
max
⇢
pˆ1(2 + ✓)
p1(1 + ✓)
  3 + ✓
1 + 2✓
,
p0
pˆ1
  1
 
]
   

p0 
2(1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c  (p0
pˆ1
  1)c  p0(2 + ✓)(1  p0 )
pˆ1(1 + ✓)
 
/ 

 (2 + ✓)
1   (2 + ✓) +
1  p0
(1   )[1   (2 + ✓)]
 
< 0
(A.0.66)
This implies that the collaboration is dominated by the individual work in this
case. The analysis between the individual work and no investment at t = 0
follows the same argument as that in (A.0.65). As a result, now
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
=
(0, 0) at   2 ( wn, 1] and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  wn], in which case
 
⇤
w =  wn.
Finally, consider the small positive synergy, where ✓ 2 ⇥0,min{1 2   , 1} .
For p0   pT = (3+✓)c(1+✓)2 R , the argument would be the same as that in the negative
synergy scenario with p0   pT = (3+2✓)c(1+✓)3 R , thus the similar threshold R˜c must
exist in which case R˜c   3+✓p0 (1+✓)2  . For Rc 2
h
3+✓
p0 (1+✓)2
, R˜c
⌘
, the argument would
be the same as that in the negative synergy scenario with Rc 2
h
3+2✓
p0 (1+✓)3
, Rc
⌘
,
and then similar  ˜⇤c and  ˜
⇤
w can be achieved.
For Rc 2
h
1
p0 
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
⌘
, 4V CW0 (p0) is always negative. Since the game
is equivalent to a static one for Rc 2
h
1
p0 
,min
n
1
pˆ1 
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
o⌘
,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
=
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(1, 0). For Rc 2
h
1
pˆ1 
,min
n
3+✓
p0 (1+✓)2
, 1p1 
o⌘
, 4V CN0 (p0) can be simplified as:
4V CN0 (p0) = p0 (2 + ✓)R 
2(2 + ✓)
1 + ✓
c   (p0 R  c) (A.0.67)
If Rc 2
h
max
n
2
p0 (1+✓)
, 1pˆ1 
o
,min
n
3+✓
p0 (1+✓)2
, 1p1 
o⌘
✓ S˜, 4V CN0 (p0)   0 at   =
0 and 4V CN0 (p0) < 0 at   = 1.Thus exists  ˜cn 2 (0, 1) such that V CN0 (p0)   0
at   2 [0,  ˜cn]. Therefore, when (1.4.11) is violated,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) at
  2 [ v,  ˜cn],
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( ˜cn, 1] and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at
  2 [0,  v). In this case,  ˜⇤c =  ˜cn, and it’s clear that the interval [ v,  ˜cn] is non-
empty when (1.4.11) is violated. When (1.4.11) is satisfied, the partnership
is dominated by the individual work as 4V CW0 (p0) is negative. The principal
now only compares the individual work and no investment at t = 0, and the
analysis follows the same argument as that in (A.0.65). As a result, in this
case,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( ˜wn, 1], and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  ˜wn]
and  ˜⇤w =  ˜wn.
For Rc 2
h
1
p1 
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
⌘
, 4V CN0 (p0) would be:
4V CN0 (p0) = p0 (2 + ✓)R 
(2 + ✓)2
(1 + ✓)2
c    ⇥p0 R(2 + ✓) + B11(p0; pˆ1, pˆ1)⇤
(A.0.68)
For Rc 2
h
max
n
2+✓
p0 (1+✓)2
, 1p1 
o
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
⌘
✓ S˜, 4V CN0 (p0)   0 at   = 0, thus
exists  ˜cn 2 (0, 1] such that V CN0 (p0)   0 at   2 [0,  ˜cn]. Therefore, when
(1.4.11) is violated,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 1) at   2 [ v,  ˜cn],
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at
  2 ( ˜cn, 1], and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  v). In this case,  ˜⇤c =  ˜cn, and it’s
clear that the interval [ v,  ˜cn] is non-empty when (1.4.11) is violated. When
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(1.4.11) is satisfied, at   2 [0,  ˜), V CW0 (p0) can be simplified as:
V CW0 (p0) =p0 (1 + ✓)R 
3 + ✓
1 + ✓
c
   

p0 
2(1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c  (p0
pˆ1
  1)c  p0(2 + ✓)(1  p0 )
pˆ1(1 + ✓)
 
   

p0 
2(1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c  (p0
pˆ1
  1)c  p0(2 + ✓)(1  p0 )
pˆ1(1 + ✓)
 
/ 

 (2 + ✓)
1   (2 + ✓) +
1  p0
(1   )[1   (2 + ✓)]
 
< 0
(A.0.69)
Similarly, at   2 [0,  ˜), V CW0 (p0) can be simplified as:
V CW0 (p0) =p0 (1 + ✓) 
3 + 2✓
(1 + ✓)2
c   [p0 2(1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c  (p0
pˆ1
  1)c
+
(2 + ✓)(1  p0 )
1 + ✓
cmax
⇢
pˆ1(2 + ✓)
p1(1 + ✓)
  3 + ✓
1 + 2✓
,
p0
pˆ1
  1
 
]
   

p0 
2(1 + ✓)R  p0 (1 + ✓)c  (p0
pˆ1
  1)c  p0(2 + ✓)(1  p0 )
pˆ1(1 + ✓)
 
/ 

 (2 + ✓)
1   (2 + ✓) +
1  p0
(1   )[1   (2 + ✓)]
 
< 0
(A.0.70)
These imply that the collaboration is dominated by the individual work in
this case. The analysis between the individual work and no investment at
t = 0 follows the same argument as that in (A.0.65). As a result, in this case, 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( ˜wn, 1], and
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  ˜wn] and
 ˜⇤w =  ˜wn.
For Rc 2
h
1
p0 
, 3+✓p0 (1+✓)2
⌘
\ S˜, the argument would be the same as that
for For Rc 2
h
1
p0 
, 3+2✓p0 (1+✓)3
⌘
with the negative synergy, in which (1.4.11) is
always satisfied. As a result, in this case,
 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (0, 0) at   2 ( ˜⇤w, 1], and 
e⇤1,0, e
⇤
2,0
 
= (1, 0) at   2 [0,  ˜⇤w].Now  ˜⇤w =  ˜wn if (1.4.11) is satisfied; otherwise,
 ˜⇤w = max
n
 ˜wn,  v
o
.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.3
The notation follows that in the proof of Lemma 1.3.2.3). When mo-
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tivating the collaboration, since two agents are identical, si,t =
1
2!1,t, and the
optimal sub-contract at t = 1 in positive synergy case is !⇤2,t =
1
2 . Therefore,
the free-riding incentive at t would be exactly the same as that in positive
synergy case. As a result, when the synergy is positive, both the principal’s
profit maximisation problem and the agents’ surplus are the same as those in
three-tier structure since the free-riding incentive constraint binds in both en-
vironment; when the synergy is negative, the principal is strictly better o↵ in
the two-tier one since exclusion incentive is discarded which is binding in the
three-tier one. Also, s⇤1,t + s
⇤
2,t would be exactly the same as those in Lemma
1.4.1 and Proposition 1.4.1 with ✓   1. This implies that agent one’s surplus
is strictly less in the negative synergy case, and agent two’s stays the same.
When motivating the individual work, both the incentive of shirking
and the over-investment incentive need to be satisfied, which are the same as
those in the three-tier structure if the link between two agents still exists. In
this case, the same contract as the three-tier one would be o↵ered and (1.4.11)
needs to be satisfied, thus the principal achieves the same profit level as the
three-tier structure. If the link doesn’t exist anymore, the principal only needs
to consider the agent’s incentive of shirking. In this case, the contract would
still be the same as that in three-tier structure. As a result, the principal’s
profit is weakly higher with less distortion. This also implies that agent one’s
surplus is less. Agent two still gets zero.
When considering the optimal choice at t = 0, the analysis should be
exactly the same as that in Proposition 1.4.2 with positive synergy if the link
between two agents still exits. The principal reaches the same profit level as
that in the three-tier structure. If the link doesn’t exist, constraint (1.4.11)
can be discarded, and the principal would never over-invest, in which case her
expected profit is strictly higher.
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 2
B.0.1 Proofs for Preliminaries and Public Experimen-
tation
Proof of Claim 2.3.1
When a0(·) is a single reward, the agent would not conduct any experiments
since the reported successes would not increase the reward. Thus, the principal
would not observe any results of experiments being reported, and she solves
the following maximisation problem:
max
a0(0,0)
  p0
 
a0(0, 0) M 2   (1  p0)  a0(0, 0) 2
The optimal solution then is a0(·) = a0(0, 0) = p0M .
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
Lemma 2.3.1.1): When the agent reports more than one failure, the principal
learns that the agent’s type is bad and he must have over-experimented after
his first failure. Notice that the principal wants to deter such behaviour on
the equilibrium path, thus ak(kg, 1)   ak(kg, kb > 1) is a plausible candidate
to achieve such goal. If there exists a contract with ak(kg, 1) < ak(kg, kb > 1)
which can achieve the same goal, the bad type’s equilibrium path behaviour
in such contract would be the same as that with ak(kg, 1)   ak(kg, kb > 1).
Lemma 2.3.1.2): Suppose the principal motivates a potential good type agent
to report k successes without failures. When the agent reports kg   k successes
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with one failure, the principal learns that the agent is a bad type and he has
over-experimented. To deter such deviation from the bad type agent, the
principal would assign ak(kg   k, 0)   ak(kg   k, 1)   0. Thus ak(kg  
k, 1) = 0 is a candidate which can achieve such goal, and it’s equal to bad
type’s true value. For any other contracts with ak(kg   k, 1) > 0 which can
achieve the same goal, the bad type’s equilibrium path behaviour would be the
same as the contract with ak(kg   k, 1) = 0. Moreover, together with Lemma
2.3.1.1), ak(kg   k, kb   1) = 0.
Lemma 2.3.1.3): After achieving k successes without failures, the agent would
stop experimenting if:
[1  ✓(1  pj)]4ak(j + 1, 0) < c, j > k (B.0.1)
where 4ak(j + 1, 0) = ak(j + 1, 0)   ak(j, 0). Thus 4ak(j + 1, 0) must be
bounded, 4ak(j + 1, 0) 2
h
0, c1 ✓(1 pj)
⌘
. For 8k, j 2 N, 4ak(j + 1, 0) 2 [0, c)
since 1   ✓(1   pj) is increasing as j increases, the same incentive can be
achieved by setting 4ak(j + 1, 0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Given motivating the potential good type agent to report k successes,
the principal’s ex ante expected payo↵ can be represented as following:
VP (k, p0) =  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k  ak(k, 0) 2
 
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓
 
ak(i, 1)
 2 (B.0.2)
Given ak(·) in proposition 2.3.1.1) is committed, the expected payo↵ above
can be simplified as:
VP (a
k(·)) =  p0(1  pk)M2  
⇣
max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o⌘2
(B.0.3)
Proof by contradiction then can be applied in order to achieve the con-
clusion that ak(·) in Proposition 2.3.1.1) is optimal and unique on the equilib-
rium path. Suppose not, then, given Properties in Lemma 2.3.1 are satisfied,
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there must exist another reward scheme a˜k(·):8<:a˜
k(j < k, 1) = max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
+ ✏j
a˜k(k, 0) = pkM +max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
+ ✏k
(B.0.4)
where (✏k, ..., ✏0) 2 Rk and (✏k, ✏k 1, ..., ✏0) 6= 0, such that VP (a˜k(·))   VP (ak(·))
and IR constraint is still satisfied. Now the principal’s expected payo↵ can be
represented as:
VP (a˜
k(·)) =  p0
⇣
pkM +max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
+ ✏k  M
⌘2
  (1  p0)(1  ✓)k
⇣
pkM +max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
+ ✏k
⌘2
 
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓
⇣
max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
+ ✏i
⌘2
=  p0(1  pk)M2  
⇣
max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o⌘2   2maxn0, k˜c  p0Mo ✏
 
(⇥
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k
⇤
✏2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓✏2i
)
(B.0.5)
Where ✏ =
⇥
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k
⇤
✏k +
Pk 1
i=0 (1   p0)(1   ✓)i✓✏i. Since a˜k(·)
must satisfy IR constraint:
E(a˜k(kg, kb)|k, p0)  k˜c   0
=) ✏    max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
+ k˜c  p0M = min
n
k˜c  p0M, 0
o
=) max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
✏   max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
min
n
k˜c  p0M, 0
o
  0
(B.0.6)
Notice (✏k, ✏k 1, ..., ✏0) 6= 0:
⇥
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k
⇤
✏2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓✏2i > 0 (B.0.7)
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Combining from (B.0.5) to (B.0.7), the following result can be achieved:
VP (a˜
k(·))  VP (ak(·)) = 
(⇥
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k
⇤
✏2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓✏2i
)
  2max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
✏ < 0
(B.0.8)
which contradicts to VP (a˜k(·))   VP (ak(·)). Therefore, it can concluded that
ak(·) is uniquely optimal on the equilibrium path.
The following part focuses on the optimal motivated number of exper-
iments, kP in public experimentation. When k  k, max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
= 0,
from (B.0.3):
VP (a
k(·)) =  p0(1  pk)M2 (B.0.9)
and the principal’s expected payo↵ is increasing as k increases, and this implies
kP = k in this scenario.
When k > k, max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
= k˜c  p0M , (B.0.3) becomes:
VP (a
k(·)) =  p0(1  pk)M2  
⇣
k˜c  p0M
⌘2
(B.0.10)
the second term
⇣
k˜c  p0M
⌘2
is increasing as k increases, and it would under-
mine the benefit of exploration through experiment. Notice that when k !1,
VP (ak(·))!  1, the optimal number kP must be finite, kP <1.
B.0.2 Proofs for Private Experimentation
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1
Suppose, when a potential good agent is motivated to report k 2 N+
successes, in the optimal reward scheme ak(·), there exit(s) some j 2 N and
0  j < k, such that
max
 
ak(j + 1, 1), ak(j + 1, 0)
  max ak(j, 1), ak(j, 0) > c
1  ✓
To simplify the notation, I let ⇢i = max
 
ak(i, 1), ak(i, 0)
 
for i = 0, ..., k.
Given the scheme ak(·), I use ↵k to denote the reward that a potential good
type agent receives and use ↵0i<k to denote the reward that is actually re-
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ceived by the bad type agent whose first failure occurs in i + 1th experiment.
In each of the following steps, I construct a profitable and feasible deviation
for the principal to show the contradiction without violating ICS in (2.4.3).
Step 1. Suppose ak(k, 0)  ⇢k 1 > c1 ✓ . A bad type agent with k  1 successes
would over-experiment since the expected extra gain is higher than the extra
cost of doing so. Thus ↵k = ↵k 1 = ak(k, 0) and ↵j<k 1 = ⇢nˆ, where nˆ 2
max
n2N,jnk
⇢n   (n  j) c1 ✓ . The principal’s expected payo↵ now is
V (ak(·)) =  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2 (1 p0)(1 ✓)k 1 ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2 k 2X
j=1
(1 p0)(1 ✓)j✓↵2j
(B.0.11)
and the continuation payo↵ of a potential good agent with posterior belief pj
can be simplified as
U(k   j, pj) =pj
pk
ak(k, 0) + (1  pj)(1  ✓)k j 1✓

ak(k, 0)  c
1  ✓
 
+
k 2X
i=j
(1  pj)(1  ✓)i✓U(i  j, 0) 
kX
i=j
pj
pi
c
(B.0.12)
which satisfies ICS in (2.4.3).
Now consider a di↵erent reward scheme a˜k(·), in which a˜k(k   1, 0) =
a˜k(k   1, 1) = ak(k, 0)   c1 ✓ , and a˜k(i, n) = ak(i, n) for i = 1, ..., k   2, k and
n 2 N. The bad type agent with k   1 successes would not over-experiment
since the extra gain of doing so equals to the expected cost. Thus ↵˜k = ↵k,
↵˜k 1 = ↵k   c1 ✓ and ⇢˜j = ⇢j for j = 0, ..., k   2. Notice that, under a˜k(·), the
continuation payo↵ of the bad type agent with j < k   1 successes is
U˜(k   j, 0) =
max
8>>><>>>: ↵˜k|{z}=↵k  (k   j)
c
1  ✓ , ↵˜k 1   (k   j   1)
c
1  ✓| {z }
>⇢k 1 (k j 1) c1 ✓
, max
n2N+,i<k 1
⇢n   (n  j) c
1  ✓
9>>>=>>>;
  U(k   j, 0)
(B.0.13)
Thus, the continuation payo↵ of the potential good agent with posterior belief
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pj would be
U˜(k   j, pj) =pj
pk
ak(k, 0) + (1  pj)(1  ✓)k j 1✓

ak(k, 0)  c
1  ✓
 
+
k 2X
i=j
(1  pj)(1  ✓)i✓U˜(i  j, 0) 
kX
i=j
pj
pi
c
 U(k   j, pj)
(B.0.14)
This inequality implies that ICS0j<k 1 in (2.4.3) are still satisfied under the
new reward scheme a˜k(·). Notice that now the potential good agent with
posterior belief pk 1 can get ak(k, 0)  c1 ✓ if he stops immediately, then
U˜(1, pk 1) 

ak(k, 0)  c
1  ✓
 
=
pk 1
pk
ak(k, 0) + (1  pk 1)✓

ak(k, 0)  c
1  ✓
 
  c 

ak(k, 0)  c
1  ✓
 
=
pk 1
pk
c
1  ✓   c / 1  (1  ✓) = ✓ > 0
(B.0.15)
Therefore, ICSk 1 is also satisfied and (B.0.13) and (B.0.15) imply that the
new scheme a˜k(·) can also motivates a potential good type agent to report k
successes on equilibrium path.
If there exits 0  j0 < k   1 such that ⇢k 1   ⇢j0  (k   1   j0) c1 ✓
and ak(k, 0)   ⇢j0  (k   j0) c1 ✓ under ak(·), they also hold under a˜k(·) since
a˜k(k, 0) = ak(k, 0), ⇢˜j0 = ⇢j0 and
⇢˜k 1  ⇢˜j0 = ak(k, 0)  c
1  ✓   ⇢j0  (k  j
0)
c
1  ✓  
c
1  ✓ = (k  1  j
0)
c
1  ✓
(B.0.16)
which implies that ↵˜j0 = ↵j0 . If there exits 0  j00 < k 1 such that ⇢k 1 ⇢j00 >
(k   1   j00) c1 ✓ , this bad type agent would stop over-experimenting once he
achieves k   1 successes under a˜k(·), which makes ↵˜j00 < ↵j00 . As a result,
↵˜j  ↵j for 0  j < k   1.
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Under a˜k(·), the principal’s expected payo↵ can be written as
V (a˜k(·))
=  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2
  (1  p0)(1  ✓)k 1✓

ak(k, 0)  c
1  ✓
 2
 
k 2X
j=1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓↵˜2j
>  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k 1 ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2   k 2X
j=1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓↵2j
=V (ak(·))
(B.0.17)
This shows that the principal is strictly better o↵ by o↵ering a˜k(·) instead of
ak(·). This contradicts to that ak(·) is optimal. As a result, ak(k, 0)  ⇢k 1 
c
1 ✓ must hold.
Step 2. Suppose ⇢k 1   ⇢k 2 > c1 ✓ . Together with the result in step 1, a
bad type agent with k   2 successes would over-experiment and stop when
he achieves k   1 successes. Thus ↵k = ak(k, 0), ↵k 1 = ↵k 2 = ⇢k 1 and
↵j<k 2 = ⇢nˆ. Then principal’s expected payo↵ now is
V (ak(·)) =  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2
  (1  p0)(1  ✓)k 1 (⇢k 1)2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k 1 (⇢k 1)2
 
k 3X
j=1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓↵2j
(B.0.18)
and the continuation payo↵ of a potential good agent with posterior belief pj
is
U(k   j, pj)
= 
kX
i=j
pj
pi
c+
pj
pk
ak(k, 0) + (1  pj)(1  ✓)k j 1✓⇢k 1
+ (1  pj)(1  ✓)k j 2✓
✓
⇢k 1   c
1  ✓
◆
+
k 2X
i=j
(1  pj)(1  ✓)i✓U(i  j, 0)
(B.0.19)
which satisfies ICS in (2.4.3).
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Consider another reward scheme aˇk(·), in which aˇk(k   2, 0) = aˇk(k  
2, 1) = ⇢k 1   c1 ✓ , and aˇk(i, n) = ak(i, n) for i = 1, ..., k and i 6= k   2.
Now the bad type agent with k   2 success would not over-experiment since
the extra gain is the same as the expected cost of doing so. Thus ↵ˇk = ↵k,
↵ˇk 1 = ↵k 1 = ⇢k 1, ↵ˇk 2 = ⇢k 1   c1 ✓ and ⇢ˇj = ⇢j for j = 0, ..., k   3. Thus,
under aˇk(·), the continuation payo↵ of the bad type agent with j < k   2
successes is
Uˇ(k   j, 0)
= max
8>>><>>>:↵ˇk 1|{z}=⇢k 1 (k   1  j)
c
1  ✓ , ↵ˇk 2   (k   j   2)
c
1  ✓| {z }
>⇢k 2 (k j 2) c1 ✓
, max
n2N+,i<k 2
⇢n   (n  j) c
1  ✓
 
  U(k   j, 0)
(B.0.20)
which implies that ICS0j<k 2 in (2.4.3) are still satisfied under aˇ
k(·). Since
aˇk(k, 0) = ak(k, 0) and ↵ˇk 1 = ↵k 1, ICSk 1 is also satisfied. Notice that now
the potential good type agent with posterior belief pk 2 can get ↵k 1   c1 ✓ if
he stops immediately, then
Uˇ(2, pk 2) 
✓
⇢k 1   c
1  ✓
◆
=
pk 2
pk 1
2664
 ⇢k 1 from ICSk 1z }| {
 c+ pk 1
ppk
ak(k, 0) + (1  pk 1)✓↵k 1
3775
+ (1  pk 2)✓
✓
⇢k 1   c
1  ✓
◆
  c 
✓
⇢k 1   c
1  ✓
◆
 pk 2
pk 1
⇢k 1 + (1  pk 2)✓
✓
⇢k 1   c
1  ✓
◆
  c 
✓
⇢k 1   c
1  ✓
◆
=
pk 2
pk 1
c
1  ✓   c / 1  (1  ✓) = ✓ > 0
(B.0.21)
This means that ICSk 2 is also satisfied. Also, (B.0.20) and (B.0.21) show that
the aˇk(·) can also motivates a potential good type agent to report k successes
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on equilibrium path.
If there exists 0  i0 < k   2 such that ⇢k 2   ⇢i0  (k   2   i0) c1 ✓
and ⇢k 1   ⇢i0  (k   1   i0) c1 ✓ under ak(·), they also hold under aˇk(·) since
↵ˇk 1 = ↵k 1 = ⇢k 1, ⇢ˇi0 = ⇢i0 and
↵ˇk 2  ⇢ˇi0 = ⇢k 1  c
1  ✓   ⇢i0  (k  1  i
0)
c
1  ✓  
c
1  ✓ = (k  2  i
0)
c
1  ✓
(B.0.22)
This implies that ⇢ˇi0 = ⇢i0 . If there exits 0  i00 < k  2 such that ⇢k 2  ⇢i00 >
(k   2   i00) c1 ✓ , this bad type agent would stop over-experimenting once he
achieves k 2 successes under aˇk(·), which makes ↵ˇi00 < ↵i00 . Therefore, ↵ˇi  ↵i
for 0  i < k   2.
Under aˇk(·), the principal’s expected payo↵ is
V (aˇk(·))
=  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2
  (1  p0)(k   1)k 1✓(⇢k 1)2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k 2✓
✓
⇢k 1   c
1  ✓
◆2
 
k 3X
j=1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓↵ˇ2j
>  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k 1 ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2
  (1  p0)(k   1)k 1✓(⇢k 1)2
  (1  p0)(k   1)k 2✓(⇢k 1)2
 
k 2X
j=1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓↵2j = V (ak(·))
(B.0.23)
This shows that, compared to ak(·), the principal can find a profitable deviation
by o↵ering aˇk(·). This contradicts to that ak(·) is optimal. As a result, ⇢k 1 
⇢k 2  c1 ✓ must hold.
Step 3. Repeat the similar argument sequentially with descending order from
j = k   3 to j = 0 and suppose ⇢j+1   ⇢j > c1 ✓ . I can always construct
another feasible deviation a˙k(·), in which a˙k(j, 1) = a˙k(j, 0) = ⇢j+1   c1 ✓ , and
a˙k(i, n) = ak(i, n) for i = 1, .., k and i 6= j. With the similar argument in step
2, ICSi in (2.4.3) are still satisfied for i = 0, ..., k and i 6= j. Similarly, for the
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good agent with posterior belief pj,
U˙(k   j, pj) 
✓
⇢j+1   c
1  ✓
◆
=
pj
pj+1
U(k   j   1, pj+1) + (1  pj)✓
✓
⇢j+1   c
1  ✓
◆
  c 
✓
⇢j+1   c
1  ✓
◆
  pj
pj+1
⇢j+1 + (1  pj)✓
✓
⇢j+1   c
1  ✓
◆
  c 
✓
⇢j+1   c
1  ✓
◆
=
pj
pj+1
c
1  ✓   c / ✓ > 0
(B.0.24)
Then ICSj is also satisfied. Furthermore, by applying the same argument as
those in step 2, it must be true that ↵˙n  ↵n for n = 0, ..., j. Therefore, the
principal now can receive
V (a˙k(·))
=  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2   kX
i=j+1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓↵2i
  (1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓
✓
⇢j+1   c
1  ✓
◆2
 
j 1X
i=1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓↵˙2i
>  p0
 
ak(k, 0) M 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k ⇥ak(k, 0)⇤2   kX
i=j+1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓↵2i
  (1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓⇢2j+1  
j 1X
i=1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓↵2i = V (ak(·))
(B.0.25)
This result contradicts to ⇢j+1   ⇢j > c1 ✓ . As a result, ⇢j+1   ⇢j  c1 ✓ must
hold. To sum up, ⇢j+1   ⇢j must hold for 0  j < k.
Given motivating the potential good agent to report k successes, the principal
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solves the following utility maximisation problem in private experimentation:
Max
ak(·) 0
V (k, p0) = E
⇣
   ak(·) Mi 2   k, p0⌘
s.t : IR : U(k, p0)   0
ICS : U(k   j, pj)   ak(j, 0), 0  j < k
ICF : max
 
ak(j + 1, 1), ak(j + 1, 0)
 
 max ak(j, 1), ak(j, 0)  c
1  ✓
(B.0.26)
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condtion (KKT) can be applied to solve the
constrained maximisation problem above, since the feasible set under the con-
straints is convex and utility function is continuous and quasi-concave. How-
ever, it’s too tedious and not convenient to follow the logic if the details of
KKT are shown. Thus an alternative way could be adopted—proof by contra-
diction, which is similar as the proof of Proposition 2.3.1.1).
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2
Suppose 0  ak(j < k, 1) < ak(j, 0), the agent would never disclose
failures if any. Thus, on the equilibrium path, the principal can only observe
successes are reported, and constraints become:
IR0 :
kX
i=1
p0
pi
⇥
ak(i, 0)  ak(i  1, 0)⇤+ ak(0, 0)   kX
i=1
p0
pi 1
c
ICS
0
:
kX
i=j+1
p0
pi
⇥
ak(i, 0)  ak(i  1, 0)⇤   kX
i=j+1
p0
pi 1
c
ICF
0
: ak(j + 1, 0)  ak(j, 0)  c
1  ✓ , 0  j < k
(B.0.27)
The structure of constraints is the same as that in private experimentation
with unverifiable failures. Instead, if assigning ak(j < k, 1)   ak(j, 0), the
principal gives the incentive to the agent to disclose all acquired realisations.
She can do so because failures are verifiable and the agent can prove himself
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that he indeed ran experiments but failed. Constrains now are:
IR :
kX
i=1
p0
pi
⇥
ak(i, 1)  ak(i  1, 1)⇤+ ak(0, 1)   kX
i=1
p0
pi 1
c
ICS :
kX
i=j+1
p0
pi
⇥
ak(i, 1)  ak(i  1, 1)⇤+ p0
pj
⇥
ak(j, 1)  ak(j, 0)⇤   kX
i=j+1
p0
pi 1
c
ICF : ak(j + 1, 1)  ak(j, 1)  c
1  ✓ & a
k(k, 0)  ak(k   1, 1)  c
1  ✓
(B.0.28)
Notice that the feasible set in (B.0.27) is weakly smaller than that in (B.0.28),
and the latter reaches the largest when ak(j < k, 0) = 0. Without solving
original maximisation problem, it can be concluded that the solution in sce-
nario “ak(j < k, 1)   ak(j, 0) = 0” is weakly better than that in scenario
“0  ak(j < k, 1) < ak(j, 0)”. This conclusion can also be confirmed later
when the optimal reward schemes with verifiable and unverifiable failures are
compared, and this is because that the structure of solution to maximisation
problem when “0  ak(j < k, 1) < ak(j, 0)” is the same as that with unverifi-
able failures.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Consider the optimal reward scheme CF in public experimentation.
When k  kˆ, pkM  c1 ✓ and this implies that ICF and ICS are always
satisfied in CF. Moreover, since CF is the optimal reward scheme in public
experimentation which contains least constraints, CF must be the optimal re-
ward scheme in this current scenario as well. However, when k > kˆ, pkM >
c
1 ✓
and this leads the last ICF , ak(k, 0)  ak(k   1, 1)  c1 ✓ , to be violated.
Now proof by contradiction can be applied to check if the Type-I step
function (MF-I) proposed in Proposition 2.4.1.1.b) is optimal when k > kˆ.
Suppose not, then, there must exist another reward scheme bk(·):8<:bk(j < k, 1) = ak(j, 1) + ⌘jbk(k, 0) = ak(k, 0) + ⌘k (B.0.29)
where (⌘k, ..., ⌘0) 2 Rk and (⌘k, ..., ⌘0) 6= 0, such that VV
 
bk(·)    VV  ak(·) 
and all constraints are satisfied, where VV (·) is the principal’s expected payo↵
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in private experimentation with verifiable failures. The principal’s expected
payo↵ with bk(·) then can be represented as:
VV (b
k(·))
=  p0
 
ak(k, 0) + ⌘k  M
 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k  ak(k, 0) + ⌘k 2
 
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓
 
ak(i, 1) + ⌘i
 2
=VV (a
k(·)) 
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
  2max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
⌘
+ 2p0M⌘k   2(k   l)p0
pk
c
1  ✓⌘k   2
c
1  ✓
k 1X
i=l+1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓(i  l)⌘i
  2
 
plM  
kX
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1  ✓
!"
p0
pk
⌘k +
k 1X
i=l
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘i
#
(B.0.30)
Where ⌘ = p0pk ⌘k +
Pk 1
i=0 (1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘i. Notice bk(·) must satisfy IR, and
it’s similar to (B.0.6):
E(bk(·)|k, p0)  k˜c   0
=) ⌘    max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
+ k˜c  p0M = min
n
k˜c  p0M, 0
o
=) max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
⌘   max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
min
n
k˜c  p0M, 0
o
  0
(B.0.31)
Meanwhile, ICF,V must be satisfied:8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
bk(k, 0)  bk(k   1, 1)  c1 ✓
...
bk(l + 1, 1)  bk(l, 1)  c1 ✓
...
bk(1, 1)  bk(0, 1)  c1 ✓
=)
8>>><>>>:
⌘k   ⌘k 1  0
...
⌘l+1   ⌘l  0
=) ⌘lj<k   ⌘k
(B.0.32)
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Now apply this result to Equation (B.0.30):
VV (b
k(·))
VV (ak(·)) 
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
  2max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
⌘
+ 2p0M⌘k   2 c
1  ✓⌘k
"
(k   l)p0
pk
+
k 1X
i=l+1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓(i  l)
#
  2
 
plM  
kX
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1  ✓
!"
p0
pk
+
k 1X
i=l
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓
#
⌘k
=VV (a
k(·)) 
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
  2max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
⌘
+ 2
 
p0M  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!
⌘k   2
 
p0M  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!
⌘k
=VV (a
k(·)) 
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
  2max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
⌘
(B.0.33)
Since (⌘k, ..., ⌘0) 6= 0:
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i > 0 (B.0.34)
Combing (B.0.31), (B.0.33) and (B.0.34), it can be concluded that:
VV (b
k(·))  VV (ak(·))  
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
  2max
n
0, k˜c  p0M
o
⌘ < 0
(B.0.35)
This result contradicts to VV (bk(·))   VV (ak(·)). Therefore, the proposed
reward scheme in Proposition 2.4.1.1) is optimal.
When kˆ   kP , CF is still feasible at level kP , thus kP must be the
number of successes which gives the principal least expected loss for k  kˆ.
On the other hand, for k > kˆ, compared to CF, MF-I is the optimal reward
scheme with more constraints and it implies that the principal’s expected loss
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is higher under MF-I scheme than that under CF scheme give the same number
of experiments k. Therefore, k is dominated by kP for 8k > kˆ in this case.
When kˆ < kP , CF is no longer feasible at level kP , and MF-I is optimal
and the proof is the same as above. To show that the optimal number of exper-
iments in private environment is still higher than the first threshold number,
k⇤V   k, it needs to be proved that principal is better o↵ as k increases when
k  k. In the case where k  k  kˆ or k < kˆ < k, the optimal reward scheme
is CF and rest of proof would be the same as that in in proof of proposition
2.4.1.2).
Notice that VV (k) is the principal’s expected payo↵ in the optimal re-
ward scheme given the incentive to run k experiments if no failure occurs, In
the case where k = kˆ < k, it needs to be shown that VV (kˆ + 1)   VV (kˆ). The
di↵erence between VV (kˆ + 1) and VV (kˆ) is:
VV (kˆ + 1)  VV (kˆ)
=  p0

pkˆM +
✓
1  pkˆ
pkˆ+1
◆
c
1  ✓
 2
  (1  p0)(1  ✓)kˆ+1

pkˆM +
✓
1  pkˆ
pkˆ+1
◆
c
1  ✓
 2
  (1  p0)(1  ✓)kˆ✓
✓
pkˆM  
pkˆ
pkˆ+1
c
1  ✓
◆2
+ p0 (1  pkˆ)M2
=
 
2p0M   p0
pkˆ+1
c
1  ✓ +
p0pkˆ
p2
kˆ+1
c
1  ✓
!
| {z }
“>0” as p0M>
p0
p
kˆ+1
c
1 ✓
✓
1  pkˆ
pkˆ+1
◆
c
1  ✓
+ (1  p0)(1  ✓)kˆ✓
✓
pkˆ
pkˆ+1
c
1  ✓
◆2
> 0
(B.0.36)
This result suggests that the principal would strictly prefer kˆ+1 experiments
are conduct rather than kˆ.
Consider the other case where kˆ < k  k. It needs to be proved that
the principal’s expected payo↵ is an increasing function of k in this region.
Thus the problem is equivalent to show that VV (k + 1)   VV (k) > 0 in this
region. At k+1, the “l” in Definition 1 would be l(k+1) = l or l(k+1) = l+1,
depending on the parameters. If l(k + 1) = l, then the extra expected payo↵
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that the principal can gain from increasing one more experiment is:
VV (k + 1)  VV (k) =
2p0M
c
1  ✓  
p0
pk+1
(2k   2l + 1)
✓
c
1  ✓
◆2
+
p0
pl
24 plM   k+1X
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1  ✓
!2
 
 
(plM  
kX
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1  ✓
!235
=
p0
pk+1
c
1  ✓

2pk+1M   (2k   2l + 1) c
1  ✓
 
  pl
pk+1
c
1  ✓
 
2p0M  
k+1X
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!
(B.0.37)
Thus,
Sign (VV (k + 1)  VV (k)) =pk+1
p0

2p0M   p0
pk+1
(2k   2l + 1) c
1  ✓
 
  pl
p0
 
2p0M  
k+1X
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!
(B.0.38)
Notice that
(k   l) p0
pk+1
<
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
and pk+1 > pl
Together with(B.0.38), it can be achieved that (B.0.37) is strictly positive.
If l(k + 1) = l, the principal’s gain from one more experiment is:
VV (k + 1)  VV (k)
=
pl+1
p0
 
p0M  
k+1X
i=l+2
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!2
  pl
p0
 
p0M  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!2
+
k+1X
i=l+2
p0
pi
(
c
1  ✓ )
2  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
(
c
1  ✓ )
2   2 p0
pk+1
(k   l)( c
1  ✓ )
2
(B.0.39)
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Notice that
(k   l) p0
pk+1
<
k+1X
i=l+2
p0
pi
<
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
and pl+1 > pl
thus (B.0.39) is strictly positive. Therefore, it’s always true that VV (k + 1) >
VV (k) when kˆ < k  k. As a result, if k  k, the principal is always better
o↵ by increasing the motivated number of successes in the commitment, and
it implies that k⇤V   k. To prove k⇤V < 1, the argument is the same as that
in the proof of proposition 2.3.1.2).
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
The arguments and steps to prove the optimality of reward scheme
proposed in Propostion 2.4.2.1) are similar to those in proof of Proposition
2.3.1.1) and 2.4.1.1), and proof by contradiction is applied.
Proposition 2.4.2.1.a): When k  min
n
kˆ, k
o
, it can be seen that k˜c  p0M 
p0
pk
c
1 ✓ , which implies that IC
S,NV and ICF,NV are satisfied under CF scheme.
Thus CF must be the optimal reward scheme in this scenario.
Proposition 2.4.2.1.b): When kˆ < k  k, it becomes that pkM > c1 ✓ and
p0M   k˜c. Now CF scheme leads the last ICF,NV , pkM < c1 ✓ , to be violated.
MF-I scheme satisfies all ICF,NV and ICS,NV in this scenario, so it must be
optimal.
Proposition 2.4.2.1.c): When k < k  kˆ, p0M < k˜c and pkM  c1 ✓ , it’s easy
to check that both CF scheme and MF-I scheme violate at least one ICS,NV .
Then proof by contradiction can be applied to check the optimality of MF-II in
this scenario. Suppose MF-II is not optimal, then there exists another feasible
reward scheme dk(·): 8<:dk(j < k, 1) = ak(j, 1) + ⌧jdk(k, 0) = ak(k, 0) + ⌧k (B.0.40)
where (⌧k, ..., ⌧0) 2 Rk and (⌧k, ..., ⌧0) 6= 0, such that VNV
 
dk(·)    VNV  ak(·) 
and all constraints are satisfied. When 0  m < k 1, the principal’s expected
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payo↵ with dk(·) is:
VNV (d
k(·)) =  p0
 
ak(k, 0) + ⌧k  M
 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k  ak(k, 0) + ⌧k 2
 
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓
 
ak(i, 1) + !i
 2
=VNV (a
k(·)) 
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
  2
mX
n=1
pn
pn 1
c
"
p0
pk
⌧k +
k 1X
i=n
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌧i
#
  2
 
kX
i=m+1
pm+1
pi 1
c  pm+1M
!"
p0
pk
⌧k +
k 1X
i=m+1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌧i
#
(B.0.41)
Since IR and all ICS,NV are satisfied, the following inequalities must be true:8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
p0
pk
⌧k +
Pk 1
i=0 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓⌧i   0
p0
pk
⌧k +
Pk 1
i=1 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓⌧i   (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓⌧0
p0
pk
⌧k +
Pk 1
i=2 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓⌧i   (1  p0)(1  ✓)2✓⌧1
...
p0
pk
⌧k +
Pk 1
i=m+1(1  p0)(1  ✓)✓⌧i   (1  p0)(1  ✓)m+1✓⌧m
(B.0.42)
If ⌧0   0, it’s true that p0pk ⌧k +
Pk 1
i=1 (1   p0)(1   ✓)✓⌧i   0 from the
second inequality in (B.0.42); if ⌧0 < 0, it also states that
p0
pk
⌧k +
Pk 1
i=1 (1  
p0)(1   ✓)✓⌧i   0 from the first inequality in (B.0.42). Thus it always holds
that p0pk ⌧k +
Pk 1
i=1 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓⌧i   0. Similarly, if ⌧1   0, p0pk ⌧k +
Pk 1
i=2 (1 
p0)(1   ✓)✓⌧i   0 and this is achieved from the third equality in (B.0.42);
if ⌧1   0, it’s still obtained that p0pk ⌧k +
Pk 1
i=2 (1   p0)(1   ✓)✓⌧i   0 from
p0
pk
⌧k +
Pk 1
i=1 (1   p0)(1   ✓)✓⌧i   0. Thus it can always hold that p0pk ⌧k +Pk 1
i=2 (1   p0)(1   ✓)✓⌧i   0. Together with the same logic and (B.0.42), it’s
concluded that:
p0
pk
⌧k +
k 1X
i=j
(1  p0)(1  ✓)✓⌧i   0, where 1  j  m+ 1 (B.0.43)
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Meanwhile, notice that (⌧k, ..., ⌧0) 6= 0 and
Pk
i=m+1
pm+1
pi 1 c   pm+1M   0, in
(B.0.41):
VNV (d
k(·)) VNV (ak(·)) 
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
<VNV (a
k(·))
(B.0.44)
This result contradicts to VNV (dk(·))   VNV (ak(·)), therefore, MF-II scheme
is optimal in this scenario when 0  m < k   1. When m = k   1, similarly,
the principal’s expected payo↵ now is:
VNV (d
k(·)) =VNV (ak(·)) 
(
p0
pk
⌘2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌘2i
)
  2
k 1X
n=1
pn
pn 1
c
"
p0
pk
⌧k +
k 1X
i=n
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓⌧i
#
  2 p0
pk 1
c⌧k
(B.0.45)
Together with (B.0.42), it shows that the last two terms in (B.0.44) are both
negative. Notice that the second term in (B.0.44) is strictly negative, therefore
MF-II scheme is optimal when m = k   1. To sum up, it can be concluded
that MF-II is optimal when k < k  kˆ.
Proposition 2.4.2.1.d): When k > max
n
kˆ, k
o
, it states that p0pk
c
1 ✓ < p0M <
k˜c. Now CF and MF-I violate at least one ICS,NV , and MF-II violates at least
one ICF,NV . Thus consider the optimality of MF-III. Suppose MF-III is not
optimal in this scenario, then there exists another feasible reward scheme ek(·):8<:ek(j < k, 1) = ak(j, 1) + !jek(k, 0) = ak(k, 0) + !k (B.0.46)
where (!k, ...,!0) 2 Rk and (!k, ...,!0) 6= 0, such that VNV
 
ek(·)    VNV  ak(·) 
and all constraints are satisfied. The principal’s expected payo↵ with ek(·) then
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can be represented as:
VNV (e
k(·)) =  p0
 
ak(k, 0) + !k  M
 2   (1  p0)(1  ✓)k  ak(k, 0) + !k 2
 
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓
 
ak(i, 1) + !i
 2
=VNV (a
k(·)) 
(
p0
pk
!2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓!2i
)
+ 2p0M!k
  2(k   l)p0
pk
c
1  ✓!k   2
c
1  ✓
k 1X
i=l+1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓(i  l)!i
  2
 
plM  
kX
i=l+1
pl
pi
c
1  ✓
!"
p0
pk
!k +
k 1X
i=l
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓!i
#
  2
mX
n=1
pn
pn 1
c
"
p0
pk
!k +
k 1X
i=n
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓!i
#
  2
 
kX
i=m+1
pm+1
pi 1
c  pm+1M
!"
p0
pk
!k +
k 1X
i=m+1
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓!i
#
(B.0.47)
The rest of proof is similar to the proofs of MF-I and MF-II. Since IR and
ICS,NV are satisfied, the following inequalities can be achieved, which are sim-
ilar to (B.0.42):8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
p0
pk
!k +
Pk 1
i=0 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓!i   0
p0
pk
!k +
Pk 1
i=1 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓!i   (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓!0
p0
pk
!k +
Pk 1
i=2 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓!i   (1  p0)(1  ✓)2✓!1
...
p0
pk
!k +
Pk 1
i=m+1(1  p0)(1  ✓)✓!i   (1  p0)(1  ✓)m+1✓!m
(B.0.48)
Similar to (B.0.43), the same the logic in proof of MF-II can be applied and
the following inequality can be achieved:
p0
pk
⌧k +
k 1X
i=j
(1  p0)(1  ✓)✓!i   0, where 1  j  m+ 1 (B.0.49)
This implies that the last two terms in (B.0.47) are negative, noticing that
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p0
pk
!k +
Pk 1
i=2 (1  p0)(1  ✓)✓!i   0.
Also, since ICF,NV are satisfied, similar to (B.0.32), the following in-
equalities are true:8>>><>>>:
!k   !k 1  0
...
!l+1   !l  0
=)
8>>><>>>:
 !k 1   !k
...
 !l   !l+1  ...   !k
(B.0.50)
Then (B.0.47) becomes:
VNV (e
k(·)) VNV (ak(·)) 
(
p0
pk
!2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓!2i
)
+ 2
 
p0M  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!
!k   2
 
p0M  
kX
i=l+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓
!
!k
=VNV (a
k(·)) 
(
p0
pk
!2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓!2i
)
(B.0.51)
Again, notice (!k, ...,!0) 6= 0:
VNV (e
k(·)) VNV (ak(·)) 
(
p0
pk
!2k +
k 1X
i=0
(1  p0)(1  ✓)i✓!2i
)
<VNV (a
k(·))
(B.0.52)
This result contradicts to VNV (ek(·))   VNV (ak(·)), therefore, MF-III scheme
must be optimal in this scenario.
Proposition 2.4.2.2): if k  kˆ, for 8k  k, CF is optimal and then principal
is strictly better o↵ as k increasing, which can be obtained from the proof of
proposition 2.3.1.2); if kˆ < k, for 8k  k, optimal reward scheme is either CF
or MF-I, and the optimal amount in this region is k, which is the same proof
as that in proposition 2.4.1.2). Therefore, k⇤NV   k. To prove k⇤NV < 1, it’s
the same argument as that in proposition 2.3.1.2).
Proof of Corollary 2.4.1
If the principal motivates the agent not to run any experiments, a sin-
gle reward scheme should be determined by the prior belief p0, regardless of
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public and private experimentation. Thus the principal’s expected payo↵ is
VNO(p0) =  p0(1   p0)M2. In stead, given the incentive to run any positive
number of experiments k, the principal can achieve VP (ak(·)), VV (ak(·)) and
VNV (ak(·)) in public and private cases respectively, which are shown in pre-
vious proofs. It’s clear that the set of parameter ranges is not empty, which
satisfies:
VNO(p0)  
 
VP (a
k(·)), VV (ak(·)), VNV (ak(·))
 
Proof of Corollary 2.4.2
When Mc  11 ✓ , kˆ !1. From Proposition 2.4.1, CF is always optimal
for 8k 2 N+ in private experimentation with verifiable failures. Thus the
optimal reward scheme is always the same as that in public experimentation.
As a result, k⇤V = k
P and V CFp
 
kP , p0
 
= V CFV (k
⇤
V , p0).
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3
For p0M   c, the participation threshold can be rewritten into k =
max{k 2 N : p0Mc   k˜}. When Mc increases, the left hand side of the inequality
constraint is increasing, and it implies that this condition can hold for a larger
number of experiments. As a result, the first threshold k becomes larger. For
p0M < c, when
M
c increases, this inequality is easier to be violated, thus k
tends to become larger. To sum up, k is increasing as Mc increases.
For p1M  c1 ✓ , the over-experimentation threshold can be rewritten
into kˆ = max{k 2 N : Mc  1(1 ✓)pk }. When Mc increases, the left hand side of
the inequality constraint is increasing, and it implies that this condition would
be violated at a lower level of experiment. As a result, the second threshold
kˆ shrinks. For p1M >
c
1 ✓ , kˆ stays at zero when
M
c increases. To sum up, the
participation threshold kˆ is decreasing as Mc increases.
In the public case, kP   k, which implies that the lower bound of the
potential optimal number of experiments is increasing. Now it can focus on
the number which satisfied k > k. Firstly, take the first di↵erent between k+1
and k:
VP (k+1) VP (k) =
"
p0(pk+1   pk)(M
c
)2  
 
p0
pk
+ 2
kX
i=1
p0
pi 1
  2p0M
c
!
p0
pk
#
c2
(B.0.53)
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Then the first derivate with respect to Mc can be achieved:
@(VP (k + 1)  VP (k))
@Mc
= 2
 
k+1X
i=1
p0
pi 1
c+
kX
i=1
p0
pi 1
c  p0M
!
p0
pk
c2
M
> 0
(B.0.54)
This strictly positive first di↵erence for 8k > k suggests that the (local and
global) maximum point is getting larger as Mc increases. Together with that k
is increasing as Mc increases, it can be concluded that k
P is increasing as Mc is
increases.
Similar arguments can be applied in the private experimentation sce-
nario. In private with verifiable failures, if k < k⇤V  kˆ, the conclusion is the
same as (B.0.53). If k⇤V > max
n
k, kˆ
o
, it can be focus on the di↵erence of the
principal’s expected payo↵ at k + 1 and k, for 8k > max
n
k, kˆ
o
. Similar to
(B.0.37) and (B.0.39), if l(k + 1) = l, it’s first derivative with respect to M
would be
@(VV (k + 1)  VV (k))
@M
= p0
c
1  ✓
✓
2  pl
pk+1
◆
+ 2
p20
pk
c > 0 (B.0.55)
Instead, if l(k + 1) = l + 1, the first derivative becomes
@(VV (k + 1)  VV (k))
@M
=2pl+1
 
p0M  
k+1X
i=l+2
pi
p0
c
1  ✓
!
  2pl
 
p0M  
kX
i=l+1
pi
p0
c
1  ✓
!
+ 2
p20
pk
c > 0
(B.0.56)
The positive signs in (B.0.55) and (B.0.56) imply the first di↵erence is in-
creasing as agent’s value M increases, and it leads the maximum point k⇤V to
increase together with k increasing.
In private with unverifiable failures, if kˆ  k, for 8k > k, then associ-
ated optimal reward scheme is MF-III, then the first di↵erence of principal’s
expected could be obtained. From Definition 3, if m(k + 1) = m+ 1, the first
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derivative would be
@(VNV (k + 1)  VNV (k))
@M
=
@(VV (k + 1)  VV (k))
@M
+ 2(pm+2   pm+1)
 
p0M +
kX
i=m+2
p0
pi 1
c
!
+ 2
p0
pk
(pm+2   p0)c > 0
(B.0.57)
Instead, if m(k + 1) = m = m(k), the first derivative becomes:
@(VNV (k + 1)  VNV (k))
@M
=
@(VV (k + 1)  VV (k))
@M
+ 2
p0
pk
(pm+2   p0)c > 0
(B.0.58)
The positive signs in (B.0.57) and (B.0.58) suggest that the first di↵erence is
increasing as M increases for 8k > k   kˆ. As a result, k⇤NV increases due to
the same reason in private with verifiable failures.
If kˆ > k, for 8k > kˆ, MF-III is still optimal and the conclusions are the
same as (B.0.57) and (B.0.58). For k < k < kˆ, MF-II is optimal, and it can
focus on the first derivative of the first di↵erence of the principal’s expected
payo↵ with respect to M . From Definition 2, if m(k) = m < k   1 and
m(k + 1) = m+ 1
@(VNV (k + 1)  VNV (k))
@M
= 2p0(pk+1   pk)M + 2(pm+2   pm+1)
 
p0M +
kX
i=m+2
p0
pi 1
c
!
+ 2
pm+2
pk
p0c > 0
(B.0.59)
if m(k) = m < k   1 and m(k + 1) = m, the first derivative is
@(VNV (k + 1)  VNV (k))
@M
= 2p0(pk+1   pk)M + 2pm+2
pk
p0c > 0 (B.0.60)
if m(k) = k   1, the first derivative becomes
@(VNV (k + 1)  VNV (k))
@M
= 2
pk+1
pk
p0c > 0 (B.0.61)
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From the positive signs in (B.0.59), (B.0.60) and (B.0.61), it shows that the
first di↵erence is increasing as M increases in this case. For 8k > kˆ > k,
the conclusions would be the same as (B.0.57) and (B.0.58). To sum up, it
concludes that k⇤NV is increasing as M increases.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.4
The bad type agent’s value is zerio if early failure occurs and he would
learn it. For the potential good type, his posterior value is pkM given he
successfully collected k successes in k experiments without failure, and he has
the posterior belief pk that his type is good. The proofs below are comparing
these values to the rewards that di↵erent types of agents can received in the
optimal contracts of public and private experimentation respectively.
In the public case, the optimal contract would deliver the bad type
agent a reward level ak
P
(k < kP ) = max
n
0, (
PkP
i=1
p0
pi 1 c  p0M)2
o
  0, and it
implies that the bad type is overpaid. For the potential good type, he would
receive the reward level ak
P
(k = kP ) = pkPM + a
kP (k < kP )   pkPM , and it’s
clear to see that he is also overpaid.
In the private case with verifiable failures, the bad types who face a later
failure would receive a weakly higher reward. Comparing the lowest reward
among them, the bad type would receive max
n
0, (
Pk⇤V
i=1
p0
pi 1 c  p0M)2
o
  0,
so it shows that all bad types are overpaid at di↵erently level of early failure.
However, for the potential good type, he would receive
(kV  l(kV )) c
1  ✓+pl(k⇤V )M 
k⇤VX
i=l(k⇤V )+1
p0
pi
c
1  ✓+max
8<:0, (
k⇤VX
i=1
p0
pi 1
c  p0M)2
9=;
and it’s not clear whether it’s higher than pk⇤VM , and it concludes that the
potential good type is not necessarily overpaid.
In the private case with unverifiable failures, the lowest possible reward
that a bad type agent receives under the optimal contract is 0, which is the
same as his true valuation. Therefore the bad type is weakly overpaid. For the
potential good type, with similar argument in private with verifiable bad ones,
the conclusion is still not clear whether he is overpaid or not, when comparing
the reward that the potential good type receives to pk⇤NVM .
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Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
Given the agent has acquired j successes without failures, the benefit
from fulfilling the remaining experiments is:8<:UB(k   j, pj) =  c+ (1   )UAB (k   j   1, pj+1) +  UAB (k   j   1, pj)UB(1, pk 1) =  c+ (1   )akB(k, 0) +  UAB (1, pk 1)
(B.0.62)
Where 0  j < k   1. It can be simplified as:
UB(k   j, pj) = p0
pk
ak(k, 0) +
kX
i=j
(1  p0)(1  ✓)j✓ak(j, 1) 
kX
i=j
p0
pi 1
c
1   
(B.0.63)
Then condtions (2.5.2) now become
ICS,B0jk 1 :
p0
pk
ak(k, 0)+
kX
i=j
(1 p0)(1 ✓)j✓ak(j, 1)   ak(j, 1)+
kX
i=j
p0
pi 1
c
1   
(B.0.64)
Conditions (B.0.64) then are the same as those in private experimentation
with unverifiable failures as well as IR constraint, and the cost level of a single
experiment is c1   . Also, IC
F,B in (2.5.3) are the same as those in conditions
(2.4.8). Additionally, when failures are verifiable, Lemma 2.4.2 can be applied.
Therefore, the principal is maximising the expected payo↵ under the same
constraints in the scenario with unverifiable failures, and the optimal solution
should be the same.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.2
1) When k < T , the agent still has further opportunity for over-
experimenting even if the first failure occurs in the kth experiment. Thus
the condition (2.5.4) must be satisfied. Similarly, when the first failure occurs
in the j + 1th experiment, where j < k, to prevent agent from pretending to
be those whose have more successes, the following incentive constraints need
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to be satisfied:
(1  ✓T j 1)
1  ✓
⇥ c+ (1  ✓)akF (j + 1, 1)⇤+ ✓T j 1akF (j, 1)  akF (j, 1)
=)   c
1  ✓ + a
k
F (j + 1, 0)  akF (j, 1)
(B.0.65)
These constraints together with (2.5.4) are the same as ICF in (2.4.6) and
(2.4.8). Meanwhile, to prevent agent from stopping experimenting earlier with-
out a failure, the following ICS,F constraints need to be satisfied:
ICS,F0jk 1 : UF (k   j, pj)   akF (j, 0) (B.0.66)
These conditions are exactly the same as those ICS when failures are verifiable
and not verifiable respectively. Therefore, the principal is solving the same
maximisation problem as that in T !1, and the optimal solution should be
the same.
2) When k = T , the constraint (2.5.4) can be removed since the first failure
occurs in the last experiment and the agent has no chance to over-experiment.
But other constraints in (B.0.65) and (B.0.66) are still the same as those in
section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 when failures are verifiable and unverifiable respectively.
When failures are verifiable, it can be easily show that CF scheme satisfies all
these constraints, so it has be optimal. In the other scenario where failures are
not verifiable, it can be shown that all constraints are satisfied under CF and
MF-II when T  k and T > k respectively. This is still true even if T > kˆ.
3) Denote by VF (k) the principal’s expected payo↵ given the incentive
to run k experiments in finite opportunity case. In public experimentation,
CF is optimal from Proposition 2.5.2.1), thus VF,P (k) = VP (k) for 8k > 0.
Therefore, if T   kP , the principal can just provide the incentive to run kP
experiments if no failure occurs, and achieve the same expected payo↵ as that
in the public case with infinite opportunities.
If experiments are private and failures are verifiable, since more con-
straints are binding and the feasible set shrinks, the principal is worse o↵
relative to the private case, VV (k)  VP (k) for 8k > 0. Notice that VV (k)
and VP (k) are decreasing functions when k > kP and k > k⇤V respectively, it’s
must be true that 9kV = max {k 2 N : VP (k)  VV (k⇤V )} and VP (k)  VP (kV )
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for 8k   kV . From Proposition 2.5.2.2), CF is still optimal at k = T
in the case with finite opportunities, which implies that it’s still true that
VF,P (T ) = VP (T ). Notice that k⇤V  kV , the principal would optimally moti-
vate to agent to run k⇤V < T experiments When T > kV .
If experiments are private and failures are not verifiable, the expected
payo↵ under MF-II scheme is weakly higher than that under MF-III given
the same number of experiments is motivated, VNV (k)  VV (k) for 8k >
k, according to Definition 3 and Proposition 2.4.2.1). Notice that VNV (k)
and VV (k) are decreasing function when k > k⇤V and k > k
⇤
NV respectively,
thus it’s must be true that 9kNV = max {k 2 N : VV (k)  VNV (k⇤NV )} and
VV (k)  VV (kNV ) for 8k   kNV . From Proposition 2.5.2.2), MF-II is optimal
at k = T > k in the case with finite opportunities, and VF,NV (T ) = VV (T ).
Notice thatk⇤NV  kNV , as a result, the principal would optimally motivate the
agent to run k⇤NV < T experiments in the optimal contract when T > kNV .
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1
I prove this Lemma by using the following claim.
Claim C.0.1. The expected cost of acquiring a success for a potential good
type agent is lower than that for a bad type, and it’s decreasing as his posterior
belief increases.
Proof. Suppose a potential good type agent has n successes without failures.
Now his posterior belief is pA(n,0) = pn. If he conducts one more experiment,
he can acquire a success with probability pn + (1   pn)(1   ✓); if he fails
with probability (1   pn)✓, he knows that he is actually a bad type and the
expected cost of acquiring a success becomes to c1 ✓ . Thus, the expected cost
of acquiring a success for the potential good type would be (1 pn✓)c1 ✓ <
c
1 ✓ .
Moreover, when pn increases, the numerator in the expected cost is lower as
the coe cient of pn is negative.
This claim suggests that only a bad type might have the incentive to
stop before k successes are acquired, and the potential good type agent has a
stronger incentive to conduct more experiments.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3
I prove this lemma by using the following clam.
Claim C.0.2. Given k   0 successes have been acquired, a potential good type
agent has a stronger incentive to continue experimenting relative to a bad type
agent.
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Proof. Suppose now the agent has k   0 successes already, which is required
on the equilibrium path. If the agent is a potential good type who hasn’t failed
yet, his posterior belief is pA(k,0) = pk. To acquire another N > 0 successes, his
expected payo↵ Un(pk) would be:
UnG(pk) =
pk
pk+n
pP(k+n,0)M  
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c
+
n 1X
j=0
(1  pk)(1  ✓)j✓max
⇢
max
i2{0,...,n j}
pP(k+i,0)M  
ic
1  ✓ , p
P
(k,0)M, ..., p
P
(k+j,0)M
 
(C.0.1)
With belief monotonicity, where pP(k+n+1,0)   pP(k+n,0), Un(pk) can be
simplified as:
UnG(pk) =
pk
pk+n
pP(k+n,0)M  
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c
+
n 1X
j=0
(1  pk)(1  ✓)j✓

max
i2{0,...,n j}
pP(k+i,0)M  
ic
1  ✓
  (C.0.2)
Similarly, if a bad type agent deviates to acquire n more successes, his
expected payo↵ would be:
UnB(p
A = 0) = pP(k+n,0)M  
nc
1  ✓ (C.0.3)
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Thus, the di↵erence of their expected payo↵ would be:
UnG(pk) UnB(pA = 0)
  pk
pk+n
pP(k+n,0)M   pP(k+n,0)M +
nc
1  ✓
 
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c+
n 1X
j=0
(1  pk)(1  ✓)j✓

pP(k+n,0)M  
(n  j)c
1  ✓
 
=
nc
1  ✓  
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c 
n 1X
j=0
(1  pk)(1  ✓)j✓ (n  j)c
1  ✓
=
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c
1  ✓  
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c =
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
✓c
1  ✓ > 0
(C.0.4)
Therefore, if UnB(p
A = 0)   pP(k,0)M , it must be true that UnG(pk) > pP(k,0)M .
Claim C.0.2 suggests that if the principal’s posterior belief makes the
potential good type has no incentive to continue experimenting, the bad type
would also not to do so. Thus, the potential good agent would not to con-
tinue experimenting if the current payo↵ is larger than the expected payo↵ of
continuing experimenting. This implies that UnG(pk)  pP(k,0)M is satisfied for
8n 2 N+:
n 1X
j=0
(1  pP(k,0))(1  ✓)j✓

max
i2{0,...,n j}
pP(k+i,0)M  
ic
1  ✓
 

pk
⇣
pk+n   pP(k+n,0)
⌘
pk+n
M +
nX
i=1
pk
pk+i 1
c
(C.0.5)
If this condition is not satisfied, the potential good type would always continue
experimenting, which contradicts to an equilibrium where the potential good
type stops after k successes are acquired.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Proof of 3.4.1.1). Given the agent doesn’t run any experiments, the
principal would optimally assign pP(0,0) = p0, a(p0) = p0M . Consider the
deviation of the agent. Since (3.4.3) is satisfied, the agent has no incentive to
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run more experiments.
The following claim is useful when proving 3.4.1.2).
Claim C.0.3. There doesn’t exist an equilibrium with learning at k > k.
Proof. Suppose a separating equilibrium with learning exists, in which the
agent’s strategy is to run k > 0 experiments without failures, and stop once k
successes have been acquired or he faces an early failure. Thus, aE(pP(k,0)) =
pkM . From (3.4.3), UkS(p0) = p0M   k˜c. Notice that the agent’s expected
payo↵ is decreasing as k increases, k > k implies that UkS(p0) < U
k
S(p0) < 0.
This implies that the agent would be better o↵ by deviating to stop at the
beginning. Thus the separating equilibrium with learning doesn’t exists in
this case. Suppose a pooling equilibrium with learning exists, in which the
bad type agent whose first failure occurs after j + 1th experiments would over-
experiment till k successes are acquired. In this case, aE(pP(k,0)) = pjM , and
UkO(p0) = p0M   k˜c 
Pk 1
i=j (1  p0)(1  ✓)i 1✓(k   i)c = p0M  
Pj
i=1
p0
pi 1 c 
p0(k j)
pj 1 c < p0M   k˜c. Thus, when k > k, UkO(p0) < 0 and the agent would
always deviate. Thus the pooling equilibrium with learning also doesn’t exists
in this case.
Proof of 3.4.1.2.a). Claim C.0.3 suggests that k plays the role of participation
threshold, and all the equilibrium must satisfy that k  k. Therefore, when
p0M < c, k = 0, which implies the only equilibrium left is no-experiment
equilibrium. The following proofs would focus on the scenario when p0M   c.
Proof of 3.4.1.2.b). Consider a separating equilibrium with learning, in which
the agent’s strategy is to conduct k > 0 experiments without failures, and stop
once k successes have been acquired or he faces an early failure. In this case,
on the equilibrium path, only the potential good type agent would report k
successes, and the bad type agent would report less. This implies that the
principal’s posterior belief is the same as that of the potential good type agent
when observing k successes, pP(k,0) = p
A
(k,0) = pk. Thus, a
E
⇣
pP(k,0)
⌘
= pkM > 0
and aE(pP(kg<k,0)) = 0.
The agent has no incentive to conduct more experiments since (3.4.3)
is satisfied. Consider the agent’s incentive of conducting less experiments. If
he deviates to conduct fewer experiments, the agent would be worse o↵ since
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aE(pP(kg<k,0)) = 0. Now check the bad type’s over-experimentation incentive.
The bad type agent whose first failure occurs occurs in kth experiment has the
strongest incentive to over-experiment, since he only needs one more success to
pretend to be a good type. Thus, such bad type agent will not over-experiment
if the extra benefit pkM is less than it’s cost
c
1 ✓ by dosing so,
pkM  c
1  ✓ =) k  kˆ =
8<:max
 
k 2 N : pkM  c1 ✓
 
p1M  c1 ✓
0 p1M >
c
1 ✓
(C.0.6)
kˆ is the over-experimentation threshold, and k  kˆ suggests that all the bad
types would not over-experiment. Therefore, the set of separating equilib-
ria with learning would must satisfy
n
k 2 N : 0 < k  min{kˆ, k}
o
. Moreover,
when Mc >
1
p1(1 ✓) , kˆ = 0 and
n
k 2 N : 0 < k  min{kˆ, k}
o
= ?. As a result,
the separating equilibria exist only when Mc 2
h
1
p0
, 1p1(1 ✓)
i
.
Now check the over-experimentation incentive. Suppose now the agent
fails in kth experiment, where the agent has the strongest incentive to over-
experiment. He receives zero If he sticks to the strategy on the equilibrium
path. Alternatively, if he continues experimenting and collects one more suc-
cess by chance, he would be treated as a potential good type agent and receive
pkM . Thus, to prevent such behaviour on the equilibrium path, the number
of experiments k must satisfy:
pkM  c
1  ✓ (C.0.7)
Where c1 ✓ is the expected cost of acquiring a success for a bad type agent.
Notice that the left hand side of (C.0.7) is increasing as k increases, the over-
experimentation threshold kˆ can be found, which is the largest number of
experiments such that the bad type agent has no incentive to over-experiment
no matter when he fails,
kˆ =
8<:max
 
k 2 N : pkM  c1 ✓
 
p1M  c1 ✓
0 p1M >
c
1 ✓
(C.0.8)
if Mc 2
h
1
p0
, 1p1(1 ✓)
i
, the over-experimentation threshold is strictly positive,
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therefore, in a candidate of separating equilibrium with learning, it must be
true that k  kˆ. As a result, the number of successes reported by the poten-
tial good type on the equilibrium path must satisfied 0 < k  max
n
k, kˆ
o
.
Moreover, once k successes have been acquired by the potential good type, he
has no incentive to continue experimenting as (3.4.4) is satisfied.
Proof of 3.4.1.2.c). In a pooling equilibrium with learning, exists bad type
agent(s) who must over-experiment on the equilibrium path, thus it must
be true that kˆ < k  k. When Mc 2
h
1
p0
, 1✓
i
, pkM < M  c1 ✓ , and it
implies that kˆ ! 1, in which case the set of pooling equilibria is empty set.
Therefore, to guarantee that kˆ < 1, the only possible value-cost ratio would
be Mc
⇣
max
n
1
p0
, 11 ✓
o
,+1
⌘
. The following Claim C.0.4 suggests that the
possible pooling equilibria must satisfy kˆ + 1 < k  k.
Claim C.0.4. There doesn’t exist an equilibrium with learning at k = kˆ + 1.
Proof. Previous arguments have shown that the claim holds for k  kˆ. Con-
sider kˆ < k. Suppose a separating equilibrium with learning exists, the con-
tradiction is obvious since pkˆ+1M >
c
1 ✓ and the bad type agent whose first
failure occurs in kˆ + 1th experiment would deviate to over-experiment. Con-
sider a pooling equilibrium with learning. Suppose only the potential good
type and the bad type whose first failure occurs in kˆ + 1th experiment would
report kˆ + 1 successes on the equilibrium path, then pP
(kˆ+1,0)
= pkˆ. However,
since pkˆM  c1 ✓ , the bad type agent would not over-experiment, which is a
contradiction.
With Claim C.0.4, there doesn’t exists pooling equilibrium if k = kˆ +
1. Therefore, the existence of the pooling equilibrium with learning can be
restricted in kˆ + 1 < k  k with k > kˆ + 1.
Suppose the only a bad type agent whose first failure occurs after
kˆ + l + 1th experiment would over-experiment on the equilibrium path, the
principal’s posterior belief would be pP(k,0) = pkˆ+l and p
P
(kg<k,0) = 0, where
0 < l  k   kˆ. Thus, aE (k, 0) = pkˆ+lM and aE (kgk, 0) = 0. To support this
as an equilibrium, in the first place, k  k guarantees that the agent would
not deviate to no-experiment choice. In the second place, For the agent whose
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first failure occurs in kˆ + l + 1th, he would indeed over-experiment if the extra
benefit is larger than the expected total cost by doing so:
pk+lM >
k   kˆ   l
1  ✓ c =)
M
c
>
k   kˆ   l
pkˆ+l(1  ✓)
(C.0.9)
Meanwhile, for the bad type agent whose first failure occurs in kˆ + lth exper-
iment, he needs to have no incentive to over-experiment, which requires that
the total expected cost to do so is larger than the extra benefit:
pk+lM  k   kˆ   l+
1  ✓ c =)
M
c
 k   kˆ   l + 1
pkˆ+l(1  ✓)
(C.0.10)
Therefore, to support such pooling equilibrium, it requires the value-cost ratio
belongs to the following non-empty set:
M
c
2
 
k   kˆ   l
pkˆ+l(1  ✓)
,
k   kˆ   l + 1
pkˆ+l(1  ✓)
#
⇢
✓
max
⇢
1
p0
,
1
1  ✓
 
,+1
◆
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
In public experimentation, since only the no-experiment equilibrium
exists, the agent’s expected payo↵ would be UP (p0) = p0M and the principal’s
expected payo↵ is VP (p0) =  p0(1  p0)M2.
In private experimentation, given (3.4.3) is satisfied, if the no-experiment
equilibrium survives, both the agent’s and the principal’s expected payo↵,
UN (p0) and VN (p0), would be the same as that in public experimentation,
where UN (p0) = UP (p0) = p0M and VN (p0) = VP (p0) =  p0(1  p0)M2.
When the separating equilibria with learning survive, consider the one
in which the potential good type agent reports 0 < k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
suc-
cesses. The agent’s expected payo↵ would be strictly worse o↵ relative to
public experimentation: UkS (p0) = p0M  
Pk
i=1
p0
pi 1 c < p0M = UP (p0).
From the perspective of the principal, she would be strictly better o↵ since
V kS (p0) =  p0(1  pk)M2 >  p0(1  p0)M2 = VP (p0).
When the pooling equilibria with learning survive, consider the one
in which the potential good type reports kˆ + 1 < k  k successes and the
bad type agent whose first failure occurs after kˆ + l + 1th experiment would
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over-experiment, where 0 < l  k   kˆ. In this case, the agent’s expected
payo↵ would be UkO (p0) = p0M  
Pkˆ+l
i=1
p0
pi 1 c  
p0(k kˆ l)
pkˆ+l 1
c < p0M = UP (p0),
thus the agent is worse o↵. For the principal, her expected payo↵ would be
V kO (p0) =  p0(1   pkˆ+l)M2 >  p0(1   p0)M2 = VP (p0), so she is strictly
better o↵ relative to public experimentation.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
Consider k first. When p0M < c, k = 0. This condition can be rewritten
as p0
M
c < 1 In this case, the change of ✓ doesn’t a↵ect the participation
threshold. As p0 or
M
c increases, p0
M
c is getting larger, which makes the
inequality is harder to be satisfied. If it’s violated, k becomes to 1. When
p0M   c, k = max
n
k 2 N : p0Mc   k˜
o
. It’s easy to see that p0
M
c is increasing
as Mc increases, which implies a larger number of experiments whose expected
total cost can be cover. Thus k rises in this case. Now consider the marginal
e↵ect of ✓ and p0 on this condition:
@Uk(p0, ✓)
@✓
= (1  p0)
kX
i=1
(i  1)(1  ✓)i 2c > 0
@Uk(p0, ✓)
@p0
= M  
kX
i=1
[1  (1  ✓)i 1]c
> p0
"
M  
kX
i=1
[1  (1  ✓)i 1]c
#
>
kX
i=1
(1  ✓)i 1c| {z }
since p0M Pki=1[p0+(1 p0)(1 ✓)i 1]c 0
  0
(C.0.11)
These two first derivatives suggest that Uk(p0, ✓) is increasing as p0 or ✓ in-
creases, holding k constant, which implies more experiments’ expected total
cost can be covered by the prior expected value. Therefore, k is weakly in-
creasing in this case.
Now consider kˆ. When Mc >
1
p1(1 ✓) , kˆ = 0. When
M
c increases, the
participation threshold stays the same as the left hand side of the condition
increases. Now the first derivatives of 1pk(1 ✓) with respect to p0 and ✓ can be
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calculated, where k 2 N+:
@ 1pk(1 ✓)
@✓
=
p0 + (1  p0)(1  ✓)k(1  k)
p0(1  ✓)2
@ 1pk(1 ✓)
@p0
=  (1  ✓)
k 1
p20
< 0
(C.0.12)
Therefore, 1pk(1 ✓) decreases when p0 increases at 8k   1. When Mc > 1p1(1 ✓) ,
1
p1(1 ✓) decreases as p0 increases. Therefore, it’s easier to have the over-
experimentation threshold staying at 0. When ✓ increases, the marginal changes
at k = 1 is positive, which implies 1p1(1 ✓) gets larger, and it’s harder to have
the over-experimentation threshold staying at 0. When Mc   1✓ , kˆ !1. This
condition is easier to be satisfied when Mc or ✓ increases, but is independent
of p0. When
1
1 ✓  Mc  cp1(1 ✓) , kˆ is finite. Since 1pk(1 ✓) is decreasing as p0
increases, the condition Mc  1pk(1 ✓) is harder to have the kˆ staying at current
level. As a result, kˆ tends to fall. When Mc increases, it’s also hard to have
the over-experimentation threshold staying a the current level since the left
hand side of the condition increases, which leads that kˆ also tends to fall in
this case. Notice that the sign of
@ 1pk(1 ✓)
@✓ varies at di↵erent k, thus it cannot
be achieved a monotonic e↵ect of ✓ on kˆ.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
Firstly, I prove that it’s not credible when the agent commits to report
k > k successes or k = kˆ + 1 successes with kˆ < k. Suppose he commits to
report k > k successes, then the principal learns that he must be a bad type
when less than k successes are reported. If the agent doesn’t over-experiment,
his expected payo↵ would be p0M  
Pk
i=1
p0
pi 1 c < 0 as k > k. Thus, the
agent will always deviate and not to run any experiments, which implies such
commitment is not credible. Therefore, the agent would only commit to k  k.
Suppose the agent commits to report k = kˆ+1 successes with kˆ < k, he receives
pkˆM as a reward when reporting kˆ+1 successes since the principal learns that
the bad type agent who fails in kˆ + 1th experiment would over-experiment.
However, since pkˆM  c1 ✓ , such bad type agent would deviate and not to
over-experiment. Therefore, this commitment is also not credible.
Secondly, I prove that the agent is better o↵ by committing to report a
149
number of successes at 0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
rather than that at kˆ+1 < k  k.
In the region 0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
, when committing to report k0 successes,
the agent receives pk0M when reporting k0 successes since no bad type agents
would over-experiment, thus his expected payo↵ would be Uk
0
S (p0) = p0M  Pk0
i=1
p0
pi 1 c, which is the same as that when the agent cannot commit. In the
region kˆ+1 < k  k, the agent’s reward level would be pkˆ+lM when reporting k
successes, since the principal knows that the bad type agent whose first failure
occurs after kˆ + l + 1th experiment has incentive to over-experiment, where 0 <
l  k kˆ l, thus his expected payo↵ would be the same as that when the agent
cannot commit, UkO (p0) = p0M  
Pkˆ+l
i=1
p0
pi 1 c 
p0(k kˆ l)
pkˆ+l 1
c < p0M  
Pk
i=1
p0
pi 1 c.
Since k0 < k, UkO (p0) < p0M  
Pk
i=1
p0
pi 1 c < p0M  
Pk0
i=1
p0
pi 1 c = U
k0
S (p0).
Therefore, the agent strictly prefers committing to report a number of successes
at 0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
.
Thirdly, I show that the agent prefers committing to report a smaller
number at 0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
. In this region, the agent’s expected total
cost
Pk
i=1
p0
pi 1 c is weakly increasing as k decreases. Thus, the agent’s optimal
choice k⇤ would be the smallest k in this region. Ideally, k⇤ = 0.
Fourthly, I show that the agent comprises to commit to report a larger
number to makes (3.4.4) being satisfied. Suppose the agent choose k = 0.
To support it’s credibility, the restrictions on the principal’s o↵-equilibrium
path belief (3.4.4) needs to be satisfied. If not, the agent would always deviate
to run at least one experiment and report the successes if any, which leads
the initial commitment to be non-credible. In this case, the agent has to
choose the second lowest number, k = 1. Now it needs to check if (3.4.4) is
violated in this case. If it’s not, k⇤ = 1. If it is, the agent seeks to the next
lowest number except the previous ones. This process would hold in the region
0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
. Therefore, Proposition 3.5.1.1) summarises the process
above in this region.
Fifthly, I show that the expected total cost in the region kˆ + 1 < k 
k is not monotonic with respect to k. Suppose when committing to report
k successes, the bad type agent whose first failure occurs after kˆ + l + 1th
experiment has incentive to over-experiment. This requires k kˆ l1 ✓ c < pkˆ+lM 
k kˆ l+1
1 ✓ c. If the agent commits to report k + 1 successes, it implies that, at
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most, the bad type agent whose first failure occurs after kˆ + l + 2th experiment
would over-experiment, as pkˆ+l+1M >
k kˆ l
1 ✓ c. In this case, his expected payo↵
would be Uk+1O (p0) = p0M  
Pkˆ+l+1
i=1
p0
pi 1 c 
p0(k kˆ l)
pkˆ+l
c. Thus,
Uk+1O (p0) UkO (p0) /  [p0+(1 p0)(1 ✓)kˆ+l✓]+(k  kˆ l)(1 p0)(1 ✓)kˆ+l 1✓
(C.0.13)
It can easily see that this di↵erence is not always negative or positive under
di↵erent parameter range. Alternatively, the agent’s optimal choice in the
region at kˆ + 1 < k  k can be rewritten as kp 2 argmax
k2N,kˆ+1<kk
UkO (p0). As a
result, if (3.4.4) is violated in the region 0  k  min
n
k, kˆ
o
, the agent would
consider k⇤ = kp. If (3.4.4) is still violated at k⇤ = kp, the agent would choice
the sub-optimal choice in this region, which maximises UkO (p0) except kp. The
process is then summarised Proposition 3.5.1.2).
Finally, if (3.4.4) is violated at 0  k  k, the agent’s commitment
would not be credible at any level in this region.
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